THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDE FORMATION

by

Nicholas Fred Martini

An Abstract

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

July 2012

Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Brian H. Lai
Professor David P. Redlawsk

ABSTRACT

I examine the formation of a "foreign policy" ideology and how it shapes the preferences and decisions of individuals during foreign policy events. Following from earlier research on the structure of a foreign policy ideology, two dimensions are identified as important determinants of individual preferences: a militant dimension and a cooperative dimension. To understand the determinants of an individual's ideology, a bottom-up, value driven approach is employed that explores influences that are both psychological (values, beliefs, traits) and sociological (groups, environment). As to the impact of ideology on preferences, I explore how ideology influences preferences in the context of support for military intervention, leader evaluation during times of war, and casualty tolerance. Beyond simply shaping preferences, one novel aspect of my research is exploring if ideology can modify the impact of external stimuli, such as elite cues and environmental context, on individual preferences. Following from research on "motivated reasoning" my theory argues that ideology colors the way new information is interpreted and accepted. In essence, ideology can filter the influence exerted by partisan/elite cues and environmental context (i.e. casualties, mission purpose).

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PH.D. THESIS

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To Gianna and Avery

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ABSTRACT

I examine the formation of a "foreign policy" ideology and how it shapes the preferences and decisions of individuals during foreign policy events. Following from earlier research on the structure of a foreign policy ideology, two dimensions are identified as important determinants of individual preferences: a militant dimension and a cooperative dimension. To understand the determinants of an individual's ideology, a bottom-up, value driven approach is employed that explores influences that are both psychological (values, beliefs, traits) and sociological (groups, environment). As to the impact of ideology on preferences, I explore how ideology influences preferences in the context of support for military intervention, leader evaluation during times of war, and casualty tolerance. Beyond simply shaping preferences, one novel aspect of my research is exploring if ideology can modify the impact of external stimuli, such as elite cues and environmental context, on individual preferences. Following from research on "motivated reasoning" my theory argues that ideology colors the way new information is interpreted and accepted. In essence, ideology can filter the influence exerted by partisan/elite cues and environmental context (i.e. casualties, mission purpose).

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CHAPTER 1

A FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY?

Introduction

Scholarship has long attempted to piece together how individuals form their attitudes regarding foreign policy issues. Research has advanced significantly from the notion of a fickle public with "non-attitudes" (Lippmann 1955, Almond 1950, 1956, Converse 1964) to the belief that issues positions tend to be stable and coherent (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979, Holsti 1979, Bardes and Oldendick 1978). Decades of research has convincingly demonstrated that individuals actually have a fairly constrained ideological worldview when it comes to foreign policy (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Chittick et al. 1995, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chanley 1999, Bjereld and Ekengren 1999). This ideology is not the generic liberal/conservative divide most commonly considered in the social sciences but consists of a specific, multidimensional worldview regarding foreign policy and the international environment. Unfortunately, while a significant amount of research has gone into demonstrating the existence of a foreign policy ideology, much less has explored its role in shaping individual preferences (exceptions include Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999), and even less research has attempted to consider what leads individuals into their ideology in the first place (exceptions include Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Schoen 2007).

This lack of interest in applying ideology to individual attitude formation regarding foreign events is somewhat puzzling. There has certainly not been a lack of exploration into what shapes public opinion on foreign events in general, but just little

attention has been devoted to ideology. Instead, two theories have tended to dominate this discussion. One takes a more rational choice, or context oriented, approach (e.g. Mueller 1973, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner 2008a, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Larson 2000, Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998, Chapman and Reiter 2004, Knopf 1998, Fordham 2008, Gelpi 2010). The second theory argues that the public relies on cues and heuristics from party elites and the media to aid in attitude formation (e.g. Berinsky 2007, Zaller 1992, Baum 2002, 2004, Baum and Potter 2008, Powlick and Katz 1998). Strangely, what is largely missing from much of these explanations is the idea that people possess a foreign policy ideology that not only drives preferences, but also shapes perceptions and interpretations of events.

Likewise, renewed interest into the formation of ideology in general has led to astounding explorations into a wide range of influences; such as personality, values, socialization, and even biological factors (Jost et al. 2007, 2008, 2009, Thorisdottir et al. 2009, Smith et al. 2012, Velhurst et al. 2012). Again, this exploration has rarely expanded into the formation of a foreign policy ideology.[1]

Research Objectives

Essentially, we know that a foreign policy ideology exists, but know quite little beyond that point. The purpose of this project is to fill some of these gaps in our understanding of a foreign policy ideology. The main focus of this project will be an in depth exploration of the impact of ideology on preferences and perceptions. If

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[1] One exception comes from Schoen (2007), who explored the role of personality traits on foreign policy ideology among a sample of Germans. In addition, an APSA panel in 2011 was devoted to this topic so it does appear, at least, that attention may be finally moving in this direction.

individuals possess a structured ideology specific to the international environment, then it would seem natural that this ideology should shape how they perceive foreign events and form preferences regarding these events. This is the direct effect hypothesis that I expand on in chapter 4. Furthermore, I contend that ideology has the potential to bias the interpretation of new information regarding intervention and conflict situations. This new information will have a varied influence on individual preferences depending on how much ideology biases the interpretation in the first place. This is the indirect effect hypothesis that I will also expand on in chapter 4.

A secondary objective is an initial exploration on the factors that contribute to the formation of ideology in the first place. My theoretical framework argues that ideology is influenced by both psychological and sociological factors. While a wide range of causes can be considered, this analysis takes a first cut at some of the major factors studied by researchers exploring ideology in general; most notably personality traits, core values and beliefs, and external events.

Why is this important?

Attempting to form a more complete understanding of how individuals form their foreign policy preferences is important for a number of reasons. First of all, research has shown that public opinion actually has a significant impact on foreign policy (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006, Russett 1990, Sobel 2001). This signifies that the attitudes individuals have regarding foreign events actually matters and shapes the policies of government leaders. Because of this, it is essential to have a better understanding of how individuals form their policy preferences in the first place. If people do make a difference, then what

shapes their attitudes is an important piece of information for researchers and policy makers.

Secondly, research has consistently shown that individuals are quite stable and rational in their foreign policy attitude formation (Page and Shapiro 1992, Wittkopf 1990). Individuals do not just guess about their policy preferences for foreign policy issues, but instead, tend to have fairly constrained and structured attitudes. What we still lack, however, is a fuller understanding of how individuals form their attitudes in the first place. As mentioned, the more dominant theories for foreign policy attitude formation consists for the elite/media/party cue explanation (e.g. Berinsky 2007, Baum 2002, 2004, Jacobson 2008, Larson 1996, Eichenberg 2006, Groeling and Baum 2008) or the more rational/context oriented approach (e.g. Mueller 1973, Gartner et al. 2004, Gartner and Segura 2008, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Larson 1996, 2000, Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998). While these explanations have taught us much, they focus on the role of the stimulus but rarely attempt to consider how the stimulus interacts with the individual. Considerable work in political psychology (Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Lodge et al. 1995, Zaller 1992) has demonstrated that the interaction between the individual and the stimulus matters greatly. For example, Zaller's (1992) RAS model or Taber and Lodge's (2006) "motivated skepticism" are based on this idea that individuals are different and that the interaction between different types of individuals and political stimuli is a vital consideration. Surprisingly, this stimulus to individual interaction has rarely been applied to foreign policy decision-making. What this research does is to directly explore this connection and see if these theories apply to the domain of foreign politics as well. The end result is that we may have a very different theory of how

individuals form their foreign policy attitudes, one that is closely linked to theories that have largely been confined to domestic politics and vote choice.

Another contribution of this research is a more refined understanding of a foreign policy ideology and a demonstration of why we should consider such an ideology in models of foreign policy attitude formation. The usefulness of a liberal/conservative ideology to explain foreign policy attitudes is quite lacking. In general it is lacking in a lot of areas (Kinder 1998, Feldman 1988, see also Jost et al. 2009) and so scholarship has sometimes advanced from the generic view of ideology to more refined approach that breaks ideology into economic and/or social dimensions (Feldman 1983, 1988, Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski 1984, Sears, Huddy and Schaffer 1986, Layman and Carsey 2002, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). What has not been incorporated is a foreign policy aspect. Much research has demonstrated that ideological dimensions for foreign policy do exist (Wittkopf 1990, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chittick et al. 1995), but rarely is that leap taken from showing an ideology exists to explaining how it shapes attitudes and policy preferences. By demonstrating that a foreign policy ideology shapes attitude formation directly and indirectly, this research demonstrates the importance of ideology and how it can shape attitudes. If scholarship is moving to embracing a more domain specific ideology, this research should demonstrate the need to incorporate a foreign policy domain.

Finally, a big picture contribution of this research is to help scholarship get a better understanding of why people support executives during times of war. This dissertation presents an exploration that looks directly at the individual. Instead of considering all these external factors, I argue that maybe there are just some people that

are more inclined to support conflict in general, where others may be supportive only on certain conditions. This eliminates the assumption that individuals are the same and allows researchers to consider another factor that should help make a more complete model of attitude formation and executive support. This is important because it helps clarify some of the assumptions held in dominant IR theories, such as audience costs, rally effects and casualty tolerance.

For example, theory on audience costs assumes that all individuals will penalize leaders equally for backing down in a conflict. However, this is a problematic assumption because it is highly unlikely that all individuals will act the same. It is more likely that the presence and severity of audience costs are based on many micro-level aspects, such as the type of person, the context, the political environment and how these all interact. By analyzing this at a more micro level, we are able to identify those situations when audience costs are more likely to occur and by what segments of the population. This does a number of things. First, it can explain why we have divergent findings for the presence of audience costs in the first place (see Schultz 2001 and Tomz 2007). Secondly, from a policy perspective, it helps show when we should or should not expect audience costs and how they could be minimized. Essentially, it helps us make the step from assuming audience costs are always present to identifying when and how we should see them. This is a big refinement for a major pillar to democratic peace.

Chapter Breakdown

The following chapter (chapter 2) discusses the literature on ideology and specifically foreign policy ideology. Essentially, this chapter provides the basic definitions and conceptualizations that will carry through the rest of this research. Within

this chapter, I will lay out my definition of a foreign policy ideology and discuss how it fits in with current definitions of ideology. Also, I will discuss the outstanding literature on conceptualizing and operationalizing foreign policy ideology. Drawing from this literature, I will then provide my own conceptualization of the multidimensional nature of foreign policy ideology.

Chapter 3 will develop and test a theoretical model of the formation of a foreign policy ideology. Given the limited scholarship in this area, the theoretical background comes from research exploring the origins of the more generic liberal/conservative ideology (mainly from social psychology). The primary variables of interest consist of personality traits, individual core values and beliefs, and external influences. I test this relationship through data obtained in a survey conducted at the University of Iowa in April of 2011.

Chapter 4 departs from exploring what leads to ideology to focusing on what impact ideology has on policy preferences. This chapter will lay out a theoretical model that argues ideology has both a direct and indirect influence on preference formation. The direct effect draws on schema theory and contends that individuals draw on their ideological worldviews to help them understand foreign events and then form preferences for these events. The indirect effect draws from work on motivational reasoning and claims that ideology can bias the interpretation of new information presented during a foreign event in a manner more favorable towards the initial ideological stance.

Chapter 5 empirically tests the direct effect hypothesis from chapter 4. In this exploration, I use data from the 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and from the Fall 2010 and Spring 2011 University of Iowa Hawkeye Polls. The dependent

variable in these analyses consists of support for military intervention in hypothetical situations (2006 CCGA) and Libya (Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll), along with continued support in Afghanistan (Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll). The primary independent variable consists of the two foreign policy ideological dimensions (militant and cooperative). This chapter demonstrates that ideology should be part of scholarly explorations for intervention support. In many cases, the effect from ideology exceeds the influence from the other dominant theories.

Chapter 6 expands on the connection between ideology and preferences by exploring the impact ideology has on leader evaluations. Specifically this chapter investigates how ideology shapes leader evaluations at numerous stages of a conflict situation and also assesses how ideology modifies the formation of audience costs. In addition, this chapter tests the indirect effect hypothesis by assessing whether ideology modifies the impact of partisanship on leader evaluations. For this empirical analysis I use data from a survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in April of 2011.

Chapter 7 further explores the indirect hypothesis by considering how ideology plays a role in the assessment of casualties in conflict situations. Casualties have consistently been considered a strong influence in shaping public support for conflict. This analyses explores whether ideology biases individual interpretation of casualties, which then indirectly influences conflict support. Data from a survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in November of 2011 will be used in this analysis.

Finally, chapter 8 will conclude by summarizing the findings of the previous chapters and discuss the implications of these findings for research on public opinion and foreign policy. In addition, this chapter will discuss the implications of these findings on

the study of both a foreign policy ideology, and ideology in general. Finally, the chapter

will conclude with a discussion of future avenues for research in the study of foreign

policy ideology.

CHAPTER 2

DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALIZING A

FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY

Introduction

The following chapter provides some of the basic definitions and

conceptualizations that will be used throughout this dissertation. I start with a definition

for a foreign policy ideology and explain why a separate ideology is needed in the first

place. Then I conceptualize ideology as multidimensional with a militant dimension and

a cooperative dimension, and describe each of the dimensions. Finally, I discuss how I

operationalize each of the dimensions.

The focus of this research is on a foreign policy ideology, its construction, and its

impact. Given this focus, it is first necessary to concretely explain what is meant by a

foreign policy ideology[2]. Certainly, the term ideology is a well understood concept for

researchers of American politics, political behavior, or a host of other political science

sub-fields. For example, Converse (1964, pg. 207) defined belief systems (his term for

ideology) as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound

together by some form of constraint of functional independence." Holsti (1962, pg. 245)

defines ideology as "a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical

and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining

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[2] The term "foreign policy ideology" is interchangeable with numerous other terms used by
researchers. For example, Converse (1964) uses the term "belief systems."   This term is adopted by
Wittkopf (1990) in his analysis. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) reference ideology as "postures", where
Herrmann et al. (1999) and Herrmann and Keller (2004) reference them as dispositions. While all these
terms mean the same I will attempt to stick to the term foreign policy ideology.

it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics…. In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behavior, the belief system has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences." More recent interpretations from Jost et al. (2009, pg. 309) state that "ideologies also endeavor to describe or interpret the world as it is –by making assertions or assumptions about human nature, historical events, present realities, and future possibilities –and to envision the world as it should be, specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic, and political ideals."

All of these, and this is certainly not all the possible definitions, define ideology somewhat differently but they also lead into the same general idea. In essence, these all boil down to the idea that individuals have some abstract view of how the world works and how individuals and governments should act within this frame. These views are abstract in the sense that they are broader and more general in scope instead of on specific issues or attitudes. These views also form an impression of what is appropriate in that environment. Let us consider a domestic example. Feldman (1988) focuses on three core beliefs that make up an economic ideology. These core beliefs consist of 1) equality of opportunity, 2) economic individualism, and 3) support for free enterprise. These three core beliefs are the basis of how an individual believes economic and business matters should be handled by the government. They should help develop more specific attitudes and policy preferences (for example, fewer taxes and less services) but be more general than the attitudes they inform. Based on an individual's theory of the world, he or she forms an understanding of how government should operate in this environment.

With a general definition of ideology laid out, I now move specifically to a foreign policy ideology. ***I define a foreign policy ideology as an individual's general theory of how the international environment works, and how governments should act within this international framework.*** A foreign policy ideology should provide an individual with a lens on how he or she should perceive international events. This ideology should also aid the individual in the formation of more specific policy prescriptions to address these events.

If we go back to the earlier example of economic ideology, an individual will perceive events from this ideological lens and supports policies in line with his or her ideological beliefs. So an individual with a free market economic ideology would believe in an economic system largely free from government intrusion. This individual may view an issue based on this lens of government intrusion (for example, the healthcare debate). This individual's ideology may also aid in helping him or her form policy prescriptions for the specific issue. In the same regard, we can expect a foreign policy ideology to do the same thing. For example, an individual with a more militant foreign policy ideology may perceive conflict issues quite differently from an individual with a non-militant ideology. Beyond perceiving the event through different lenses, they may also prefer different policies. The militant may support the conflict where the non-militant may not or may have very specific conditions on when he or she would support the conflict.

Why A Separate Foreign Policy Ideology?

When we think of the term ideology, we assume it refers to the standard left/right or liberal/conservative scale. This standard scale has been applied consistently to

domestic issues, with varying success (e.g. Converse 1964, Kinder 1998, Feldman 2003). This varying success has led researchers to question the usefulness of the single left/right ideology. Kinder (1998) argues that a unidimensional model of ideology tends to be a poor predictor of political attitudes for most people. This may not be the case for some "easy issues" (Carmines and Stimson 1980) where the issues have been easily placed along a conservative or liberal spectrum. Many issues, however, do not fit as neatly along this spectrum. Researchers have noted this for social and economic issues and have argued for the need of separate ideological dimensions for these two areas (e.g. Feldman 1983, 1988, Sniderman, Brody and Kuklinski 1984, Sears, Huddy and Schaffer 1986, Layman and Carsey 2002, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). For example, an economic conservative, who focuses on less government intervention and less taxes, is certainly not the same as a social conservative, who focuses on moral and social issues like abortion and gay marriage.

This lack of usefulness may be even more pronounced in areas such as foreign policy, where the applicability of the single left/right ideological dimension to foreign policy issues has been suspect (Herrmann et al. 1999, Bardes and Oldendick 1978, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Hurwitz, Peffley and Selingson 1993, but see Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004). Rarely have studies found a meaningful connection between a left/right (or domestic ideology) and foreign policy opinions. Being conservative or liberal may be slightly useful in understanding how people form attitudes on foreign policy (possibly conservatives may be less supportive of global government because they generally support smaller government) but conservative and liberal tend to focus more on a domestic mindset. With that, I argue that we need a separate ideology for how

individuals view foreign affairs. I now will discuss this foreign policy ideology

conceptualization in more detail and justify the dimensions that make up this ideology.

Conceptualizing a Foreign Policy Ideology

As stated earlier, I define a foreign policy ideology as an individual's general

theory of how the international environment works, and how governments should act

within this international framework. While this is a basic and general definition,

conceptualizing what a foreign policy ideology looks like becomes more complicated.

The international environment is quite complex and state interactions vary considerably.

With this complexity in mind, a single, general dimension just does not work well, and

instead research concerning foreign policy ideology has tended to conceptualize it in a

multidimensional space (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chittick et al.

1995). A multidimensional aspect must be considered that covers these most basic

beliefs within foreign policy. The question then becomes, what are the relevant

dimensions that a foreign policy ideology should be based on?   While there is no

universal agreement on what this multidimensional foreign policy ideological structure

looks like, scholarship has tended to focus on two dominant dimensions: one concerning

a more militant or security based dimension, and a second concerning a cooperative or

community based dimension (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987,

Herrmann et al. 1999, Chanley 1999, Chittick et al. 1995, Bjereld and Ekengren 1999).

Theoretically, these two dimensions to a foreign policy ideology make sense in

that they effectively cover the most dominant and basic views of global politics.

Essentially, these two dimensions cover an individual's viewpoints on 1) what the

international environment looks like and 2) how the state should act in that environment. The militant/security dimension informs an individual's worldview on how threatening and dangerous the world is. Is the world seen as inherently dangerous or inherently peaceful with sporadic instances of violence? Given this threatening or nonthreatening global outlook, should a state put security issues at the forefront of foreign policy? Is military action a viable option in the interactions between states? The cooperative dimension, on the other hand, informs a worldview as to what the makeup of the international environment looks like. To take the extremes of this dimension, does the environment consist of 200 individual states or does it consist of one global community. Given this outlook, do states have the duty to aid other states in times of need? How important are global concerns compared to that of the individual state?

As I will discuss later in this chapter, researchers have been unable to settle on an exact conceptualization for a foreign policy ideology. Some researchers present two dimensions, others three, and still others more. Also, the exact dimensions differ in their focus. One reason for this lack of agreement is due to much of this work relying on more inductive strategies for conceptualizing ideology rather than a more theoretical approach (Wittkopf 1990, Chittick et al. 1995, Bardes and Oldendick 1978). This dissertation draws from these varying works and research strategies but also provides a theoretical basis to the conceptualization of ideology. I argue this provides a good approach for studying foreign policy ideology for a number of reasons. First, as I will discuss later in this chapter, dimensions along some sort of a militant and cooperative line tend to be quite consistent in the literature. Secondly, as Holsti (1992, 2004) has noted, these two dimensions mirror closely to two of the more dominant theories of IR (realism and

liberalism) in the ideas of the security dilemma and the global community. Given the prominence of these two IR theories, it lends support to the idea that individuals would see the world in a similar fashion or along a similar set of dimensions. Thirdly, these two dimensions are quite basic and general in their conceptualization. While foreign policy issues tend to be "hard issues", devising a worldview based on general concepts of if the world is dangerous and how global is the international community is a much simpler task for individuals. These basic and simpler concepts can then inform preferences on much more complex issues (as I will show throughout this dissertation).

Militant/Non-Militant

The first of these dimensions stems from this notion that individuals will have some inherent worldview on how aggressive and militant the international community is. The ideological dimension here mirrors closely to the same concepts devised by Wittkopf (1990), Holsti (2004), Hurwitz and Peffley (1987), Herrmann et al. (1999), Chittick et al. (1995) and others. Wittkopf (1990) describes this dimension as "Militant Internationalism" and Holsti (1992, pg. 449) describes this militant internationalism dimension as a realist worldview. He claims, "Realism views conflict between nations as a natural state of affairs rather than an aberration that is subject to permanent amelioration. Such realist concepts as security dilemma, relative capabilities, and 'zero sum' view of conflict are also basic to the MI dimension." In essence, this militant dimension reflects a hawk/dove individual dimension. This dimension informs an individual as to how dangerous the world is, how international matters should be handled, or at least what is proper, and how important security matters should be to a state. To go

back to my earlier criteria of how ideology explains an individual's viewpoint, let us first consider criteria one (what does the international environment look like). An individual can see the world as inherently peaceful, where security is not a large concern, or as inherently dangerous, where security is a major concern. Because of this perceived nature of the world, an individual would then form beliefs on how important issues of national security are. Finally, given the individual's viewpoint on nature of the international environment, we consider the second criteria (how should the state act in this environment). An individual forms an abstract belief into how proper and useful military force is. In a threatening international environment, the use of force would be largely justified where in a non-threatening environment it would not. Basically, this dimension gets at the notion of what is the proper role of military force and security in interacting with other states.

Cooperativism/Non-cooperativism

The second worldview concerns the dimension of cooperativism. Essentially, this dimension looks at the world from a more liberal perspective (liberalism from the international relations definition and not domestic ideology). For example, Holsti (1992, pg. 449) notes, "There are similarly intimate links between liberalism and the cooperative internationalism dimension. … Institution building, improved international education and communication, and trade are but a few of the ways in which nations may jointly gain and thus mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshest features of international relations in an anarchic system". Chittick et al. (1995, pg. 318) describe this same dimension as "concern for the wider community" and label it a multilateralism-unilateralism

dimension. In essence, this worldview concerns a more globalist mentality. Beyond just believing in taking an active part in the world, this dimension covers an individual's theory on how global and harmonious the international environment is. In regards to explaining what the international environment looks like (criteria one), this dimension considers if the international environment is perceived as 200 independent nation-states concerned with their own best interest or as one global community concerned with the greater good? This worldview, of one global community or separate nation-states, drives individual beliefs on the best way to address international problems (the second criteria: how a state should act in this environment). Should international problems be best addressed by individual states or are they a "commons" problem where the international community should work together to address? Also, should states even concern themselves with the problems of others? Again, these are general impression of how cooperative states are and should be in the international community and will inform more specific policy preferences when events occur.

Existing Empirical Explorations for Foreign Policy Ideological Dimensions

Research has consistently shown these two dimensions as being the dominant way in which a foreign policy ideology is organized. A wide range of inductive studies by Wittkopf and colleagues (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, 1981, 1986, Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983, Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981) demonstrated mass public and leader worldviews along both a militant and a cooperative dimension. Holsti and Rosenau (1990) used survey data of elites from the Foreign Policy Leadership Project and found strikingly similar worldviews. Chittick et al. (1995) challenge the two dimensions and include a third for

internationalism versus isolationism but the other two dimensions mirror closely to the MI/CI scheme. Bjereld and Ekengren (1999) looked for foreign policy beliefs in Sweden and found similar dimensions along both a militant and a cooperative scale. Beyond these more inductively driven studies, other research looking at a foreign policy ideology and its effects have used similar dimensions. For example, studies by Hurwtiz and Peffley (1987) used both militarism and isolationism as ideology dimensions (or postures in their study). Herrmann et al. (1999) considered both an isolationism dimension and an assertiveness versus accomodationalist dimension. Certainly, this assertiveness scale is not the same as militantism or cooperativism but it does tap similar beliefs in the proper role of states in the international community, which would somewhat match up to those dimensions.

It is important to mention, however, that there is not a complete agreement on what the exact structure of a foreign policy ideology is and differences certainly exist. Earlier studies (e.g. Mandelbaum and Schneider 1978, Bardes and Oldendick 1978, Holsti 1979) argued for somewhat different ideological structures. For example, Bardes and Oldendick (1978) ran a factor analysis on questions in the 1974 Chicago Council of Global Affairs Survey and found five dimensions (militarism, involvement, world problems, détente and support for the United Nations). Some of these match up to the dimensions used in this study but others do not. Also, more recent studies have used some of these dimensions but not all. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) did not consider a cooperative worldview and instead their third was the containment of communism. Herrmann et al. (1999) only considered militarism and isolationism but failed to consider some aspect of cooperativism.

The point from this above discussion is to impress the notion that there certainly is no complete consensus on what a foreign policy ideology should look like. At the same time, study after study has consistently considered ideological dimensions running along some sort of militant and cooperative lines. Many studies may not incorporate these identical dimensions, but the concept of a more militant and cooperative dimension is tends to dominate the scholarly thinking.

Operationalizing Ideology

Assessing an individual's foreign policy ideology is not a simple task that can be accomplished by one question. First of all, respondents would probably not know how to respond is asked what their foreign policy ideology was in the first place. Even the basic liberal/conservative ideology question that has been asked for years is suspect in its own meaning. When someone answers liberal or conservative on the standard ideology question, are they talking about a social ideology, an economic ideology, or something else? Instead, we must conceive of a foreign policy ideology as a latent construct made up of a wide range of items tapping into general beliefs about foreign policy. While there is no standard conceptualization of a foreign policy ideology, there is also no standard operationalization. In all the different conceptualization examples discussed in the earlier paragraphs, nearly all used a different set of items and strategies for operationalizing ideological dimensions.

In a similar fashion, I also operationalize foreign policy ideology as a latent construct of a wide variety of foreign policy belief questions. However, since this dissertation relies on multiple data sources, the items used in the latent constructs is not always the same. For example, the analysis in chapters 3, 6 and 7 relies on data from a

unique survey experiment that I conducted so I was able to incorporate a large 25 item battery of questions. On the other hand, space was very limited on the two University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll surveys used in chapter 5 and so only 4 items were available. Despite this lack of consistency, the items used for my latent constructs attempt to mirror each other as closely as possible. Three chapters do rely on the two surveys I conducted personally and do have access to all 25 items but the analysis in chapter 5 relies on data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) and from two surveys from the University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll. The empirical tests from the CCGA rely on a 15 item battery of foreign policy importance questions which is also incorporated in the 25 item battery. The Hawkeye Poll items (4 total) were also drawn from questions used in the 25 item battery. So while all the analyses do not rely on the same exact items to form the ideological dimensions, they at least have similar questions. In addition, factor analysis was used to create the dimensions in every data set used and the top two factors were always along the lines of a militant and cooperative dimension.

I addition to maintaining as much consistency as possible in the latent construct across data sets, I also attempted to maintain consistency with my operationalization to that of previous scholarship. Specifically, the 15 item "foreign policy importance" questions found in my analysis using the CCGA data along with being incorporated in the larger 25 item battery mirrors the strategy used by William Chittick and colleagues (1995) in the construction of their foreign policy ideology questions (see also Page and Bouton 2006). Secondly, the 4 items used in the Hawkeye Poll surveys along with the additional 10 items in the larger 25 item battery mirror closely to the general foreign policy belief questions used by Herrmann et al. (1999), Herrmann and Keller (2004), and

Holsti and Rosenau (1990).[3]   In addition, while each of these works have different conceptualizations of a foreign policy ideology, the dimensions they create and the items used to make them, do resemble the dimensions and items in my analyses.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the definitional basics for the remainder of the dissertation. I have defined foreign policy ideology as ***an individual's general theory of how the international environment works, and how governments should act within this international framework.*** I have also discussed my conceptualization and operationalization of ideology and how that relates to previous scholarship. My two dimensions, militant and cooperative, are repeatedly found to be the dominant dimensions when discussing a foreign policy ideology. So, to scholars studying public opinion and foreign policy, this chapter should not provide anything shocking. However, now that the definitional work is complete, we can move on to understanding the factors in the formation of a foreign policy ideology (the next chapter) and the impact of ideology on foreign policy preferences (chapters 4 through 7).

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[3] Some of the items came from Herrmann and colleague's work and some from the Holsti and Rosenau's work.

CHAPTER 3

THE FORMATION OF A FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY

Introduction

Now that a basic definition and conceptualization of ideology has been established, the first step is to explore the factors that make up a foreign policy ideology. While scholarship has been quite successful in identifying the existence and structure of a foreign policy ideology among the mass public, explaining the formation of such an ideology has been significantly less explored. Hierarchical models point to ideology as being a product of a wide range of factors, including core values, individual traits, fundamental beliefs, and environmental factors (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Page and Boutton 2006, Schoen 2007, Kam and Kinder 2007). While these models provided a starting base for research, theoretical and empirical explorations are limited (Barker et al. 2008, Schoen 2007, Kam and Kinder 2007). Given this starting point, my endeavor is not entirely novel. However, this endeavor advances our understanding by combining both a theoretical and empirical exploration into the formation of ideology that incorporates a wide variety of factors leading into a foreign policy ideology (i.e. values, traits, experiences).

While the main focus of this research is the role that ideology plays on attitude formation, including an initial exploration into what leads to ideology is important for a number of reasons. First, because we know very little of what forms an individual's foreign policy ideology, advancing this line of research is important, especially if it is shown that foreign policy ideology is an important piece of the attitude formation puzzle. Public opinion can shape policy and this also makes it vital to understanding what factors

shape the public into having different worldviews. Finally, this research is important because it attempts to unify much of the scattered research exploring this topic. By putting much of the same research under one umbrella and exploring the factors and effects together, we get a better picture of the causal pathways.

What Leads to a Foreign Policy Ideology – Previous Explorations

Before delving into the theory and empirical explorations, let us first consider previous attempts to explore the formation of ideology. During the 1950s and 1960s, when major psychological and behavioral work was taking off (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950, Eysenck 1960, Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 1964), some scholarship began investigating the causal relationship to foreign policy ideology (Levinson 1957, Galtung 1964). For example, Levinson (1957) argued that foreign policy postures have both a psychological and a sociological component. His analysis attempted to explore the psychological component. Drawing heavily from research on authoritarian personality (Adorno et al. 1950), Levinson attempted to link psychological aspects of individuals to foreign policy ideology. This ideological structure consisted of an internationalism to nationalism scale, with a further breaking down of isolationism and imperialism. Levinson's findings indicate a psychological link to foreign policy beliefs. Specifically, he found a connection between nationalist beliefs and psychological values, such as ethnocentrism, religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism. While his foreign policy ideology dimensions and statistical tests are quite limited compared to recent scholarship, this work was significant in identifying the initial components of ideology formation.

Despite Levinson's (1957) groundbreaking work, little followed until the 1980s with research by Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987). Their research argued that foreign policy attitude formation was hierarchically structured with attitudes at the bottom, ideological structures (or postures according to them) in the middle and core values at the top. The idea is that because people are cognitive misers (Popkin 1991) and rely on shortcuts (Popkin 1991, Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 2006, McDermott 1997, Lupia 1994, Koch 2001, Rahn 1993), more abstract beliefs higher up the hierarchy will influence attitudes at the bottom of the hierarchy. Essentially, more specific foreign policy attitudes are influenced by an individual's ideology on foreign policy, which is influenced by one's more abstract core values. They discussed two core values that may lead to ideology formation (ethnocentrism and the morality of warfare) but they acknowledge that these two core values are not exhaustive (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, pg. 1109). Despite their analysis using a limited number of core values, it continued the exploration of how individuals form their foreign policy ideology. Interestingly, their analysis ignores the sociological component that Levinson (1957) argued for (but also failed to analyze).

Beyond work by Hurwitz and Peffley, little research into what leads individuals into their foreign policy ideology has occurred until the last few years. This recent interest has also coincided with renewed interest in the causes and formation of domestic ideology (Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Gerber et al. 2010, Mondak et al. 2010). Probably one of the most significant updates to Hurwitz and Peffley's model comes from Page and Bouton (2006). Page and Bouton's model mirrors the hierarchical nature of attitude formation, and then attempts to decipher the complex web of relationships

between core values, ideology, world events, personal characteristics, perceptions and attitudes. Unfortunately, while their visual model is quite elaborate, they do not really expand upon this model empirically or theoretically.

In addition to Page and Boutton (2006), other recent studies have completed more focused analyses on specific factors leading into individual beliefs and attitudes (Kam and Kinder 2007, Barker et al. 2008, Schoen 2007, Guth 2010). For example, Kam and Kinder (2007) explored how individual levels of ethnocentrism influence foreign policy attitudes on a wide range of issue attitudes (spending on homeland security and the war on terror, border control, defense spending, attitudes towards Iraq and Afghanistan, foreign aid, and approval of President Bush)[4]. They find strong links between levels of ethnocentrism and many of the attitudes they studied. They also found that for many ethnocentrism's influence was triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attack. Barker and colleagues (2008) researched the role of religious traditionalism and how it influenced nationalist and militant beliefs. In general, they find a strong connection between militarism and numerous religious aspects, such as biblical inerrancy, covenant theology, cognitive dogmatism and hierarchical visions of authority. They also found that much of this connection works through feelings of nationalism. Schoen (2007), in a sample of Germans, explored how individual personality traits led to specific foreign policy attitudes. Using the Big 5 personality measures (e.g. Costa and McCrae 1992, Gosling et al. 2003, John and Srivastava 1999) Schoen attempts to link the different personality

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[4] Kam and Kinder's (2007) work bypasses the core values to ideology connection and looks for a direct connection between core values and attitudes. While this does not exactly match earlier work exploring the causal connection to ideology, it does show that ethnocentrism is a powerful influence on individuals.

aspects to foreign policy attitudes and beliefs. Findings provide evidence for this connection between some aspects of personality and some foreign policy opinions. Specifically, Schoen finds a link between agreeableness and openness to being supportive of international cooperation and skeptical of military usage. Also, conscientiousness tends to be tied to more support for the military and less support for cooperation.[5] Finally, Guth (2010) uses a wide range of religious measures; such as measures for religious beliefs, behavior and affiliation, and finds a strong relationship between many religious measures and Wittkopf's MI/CI dimensions. Even when controlling for partisan identification and ideology, Guth still finds that some religious measures, most notably the religious orientation measures, have a strong tie to both the cooperative and militant internationalist dimensions.

One thing that the above discussion should convey is that scholarship has barely scratched the surface in attempting to explore what leads into an individual's foreign policy ideology. We have evidence for a number of different personality traits and core values and beliefs but this evidence is from a handful of studies over a wide time frame, using different belief measures, and modeling each factor in isolation to a wealth of other personality traits, core beliefs and values, and any socialization factors. While these studies may have their limitations, they also provide good direction for a more structured theory on foreign policy beliefs.

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[5] An update to Schoen's exploration of personality traits and ideology is currently being performed by a group of researchers led by William Chittick. A panel in the 2011 American Political Science Association annual conference was devoted to exploring the connection between personality traits, core values, and foreign policy ideology.

Theory – What Leads into a Foreign Policy Ideology

Drawing from the above research, along with the on the bottom-up, value driven conception of ideology from political psychology (e.g. Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2003, Adorno et al. 1950, Eyseneck 1960), the basic premise is that individuals have a wide range of influences on their ideological viewpoints. These influences consist of both psychological/internal factors (values, beliefs, traits) or sociological/external (groups, environment) (see Figure 3.1 for a graphical representation of the overarching theory). Individuals should have internal core features that form their worldviews but these worldviews may also be shaped by the outside environment. Individuals vary greatly in his or her internal features such as personality traits, core values, and even demographics and this variation is sure to lead to differing worldviews. At the same time, individuals vary greatly in what external events and life experiences he or she is exposed to. These more external influences should also help form an individual's worldview. For example, an inherent belief in ethnocentrism may influence an individual to have a less cooperative foreign policy ideology because of his or her suspicion of other races and cultures. At the same time, experiences to external stimuli, such as being close to 9/11, may push individual worldviews that the international environment is inherently dangerous, and thus become more militant in ideology.

The idea that ideology is a product of both psychological and sociological factors is simple enough, but the key is identifying what psychological and sociological factors influence the formation of a foreign policy ideology and in what ways. Below I discuss the specific factors that should influence ideology. Starting with the psychological

factors, I will discuss the role of personality traits and core values. Following will be a discussion of the sociological factors, specifically external events/life experiences.

Psychological/Internal Factors

The first set of factors consist of psychological and internal factors. As Figure 3.1 notes, this research focuses on two major categories (personality traits, and core beliefs/values). Each is discussed below.

Personality Traits

Personality traits have been used widely by psychology and sociology researchers in attempting to get a better understanding of domestic ideology formation (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950, Eyseneck 1960, Jost et al. 2009, Jost et al. 2008, Jost 2006, Block and Block 2006, Carney et al. 2008), but has only recently been embraced by political science scholars (Gerber et al. 2010, Mondak et al. 2010). As for the connection between personality traits and foreign policy beliefs, Schoen (2007) explored this connection on a sample of Germans and also a recent panel at the American Political Science Association (2011 in Seattle) began exploring this connection in a US sample.

One reason to consider personality traits is because they tend to be highly stable (Block and Block 2006, Caspi, Roberts and Shiner 2005, Jost et al. 2003). There is also evidence that points to the connection between traits and genetics (Bouchard 1997). Given a genetic component, personality traits should be largely stable for many (but see Winter 2003 for a counter argument). This stability has also been confirmed by long term longitudinal studies. For example, Block and Block (2006) compared personality

assessments of children in pre-school and to assessments of these same individuals twenty years later and found incredible stability over time.

A second reason to consider personality traits is the significant amount of research linking personality traits to domestic ideology. In a review article by Carney et al. (2008), the authors combine the works of over two dozen studies linking some aspects of personality traits to domestic ideology. For example, when considering the Big 5 personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992, Gosling et al. 2003, John and Srivastava 1999) they note that studies tend to find a connection between individuals ranking high on openness to experience and liberalism. On the other hand, conservatives have been much more closely linked to high conscientiousness. Beyond the Big 5 personality traits, other important traits such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Altemeyer 1996, 1998, 2004, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth and Malle 1994, Pratto 1999) have been linked to aspects such as prejudice, inequality, lack of moral restraint and political attitudes. In summary, there is substantial evidence to point to the notion that 1) personality traits are highly stable, and 2) personality traits are connected to beliefs and ideology. This leads to the following proposition:

Hypothesis 1: An individual's personality traits should influence the formation of his or her foreign policy ideology.

Beyond just hypothesizing that personality traits should have a connection to ideology, we need to consider how this connection is made. If we consider the Big 5 personality traits (Costa and McCrae 1992, Gosling et al. 2003, John and Srivastava 1999), we can theorize a possible connection between a number of these traits. In a study of Germans, Schoen (2007) found significant connections between three of the Big 5

traits (openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness) and foreign policy ideology. Scholarship studying personality has also found political connections to these traits (Gerber et al. 2010, Carney et al. 2008). Let us address each of these traits individually.

First, individuals scoring high on openness indicates acceptance of new ideas and knowledge, which could translate to more tolerance for diversity. Openness has been typically linked to more of a liberal mindset and ideology (Carney et al. 2008, Gerber et al. 2010, McCrae 1996, Gosling et al. 2003). For foreign policy ideology, we should expect that individuals scoring higher on the openness trait should believe in a more cooperative international environment (in effect, have a more cooperative ideology). Aspects of the openness trait, such as acceptance of new ideas and tolerance for diversity, would link closely to a more cooperative mentality that sees the world as one global and harmonious environment. Someone not possessing this "openness" may be more suspicious of outsiders and possibly have an "us versus them" mentality which would be more likely seen in a low cooperative who sees the world as separated nation states concerned with their own self-interest.

Second, let us turn to agreeableness. Individuals scoring high on agreeableness would be characterized by terms such as "altruism, tender-minded, trust, and modesty" (John and Srivastava 1999, pg 121). The link from agreeableness to domestic ideology is somewhat mixed with some support for a conservative link (Gerber et al. 2010, Carney et al. 2008, Gosling et al. 2003, Mondak and Halperin 2008). For foreign policy, Schoen (2007) showed a link between agreeableness and a more cooperative foreign policy mindset. I expect a similar relationship. Essentially, individuals scoring higher on agreeableness should be more willing to cooperate with the international community and

hence, have a more cooperative ideology. If an individual has a more trusting outlook towards other nations, there is more of a likelihood of expecting a working relationship between states for some global good. In contrast, if there is suspicion of other nation states or the international system, then expecting a successful relationship to address global concerns is a less likely scenario.

Finally, we should consider the link between emotional stability and ideology. Within the emotional stability trait lays facets such as anxiety, hostility, and vulnerability. While these facets focus on the individual, they may also cross over into a societal, cultural, or international framework. All of these may contribute to an ideology that sees the world as inherently dangerous; i.e. a more militant ideology. An individual who sees the international environment as hostile or that states look to exploit vulnerabilities in others would see the world as inherently more dangerous and in a more security oriented fashion. So, an individual with a lower score in emotional stability will see their personal situation as threatening, but may also see the same in the international environment. Possible connections between these three traits (emotional stability, agreeableness, and openness) lead to the following refined hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1A: Individuals who are stronger in the "openness to experiences" trait should be more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology.

Hypothesis 1B: Individuals who are stronger in the "agreeableness" trait should be more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology.

Hypothesis 1C: Individuals who score lower in the "emotional stability" trait should be more militant in their foreign policy ideology.

Core Values and Beliefs

Let us now turn to how an individual's core values and beliefs can influence his or her foreign policy ideology. According to Shalom Schwartz (1994, pg. 20), "a value is a (1) belief (2) pertaining to desirable end states or modes of conduct, that (3) transcends specific situations, (4) guides selection or evaluation of behavior, people, and events, and (5) is ordered by importance relative to other values to form a system of value priorities" (see also Schwartz 1992, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987,1990, Capara et al. 2006). In essence, values are an abstract way in which an individual sees his or her life and the world. Given their universal applicability across situations, they are much more abstract than ideology, and should have a causal relationship to more specific political beliefs and values. Capara and colleagues (2006, pg. 2) note, "As such, they [values] underlie and are broader than the political values and attitudes typically examined in research on voter preferences. We see basic personal values as the crucial grounding of ideology." This idea mirrors the "psychological constraint" argument of Converse (1964, pgs. 210-211). Converse (1964, pg. 211) notes, "Often such constraint is quasi-logically argued on the basis of an appeal to some super ordinate value or posture toward man and society, involving premises about the nature of social justice, social change, 'natural law,' and the like." In essence, individuals use their own abstract beliefs and values to help them understand the world and form their worldviews.

There is also extensive evidence demonstrating the power of values in influencing a wide range of social and political attitudes and behaviors (Feldman 1988, Miller and Shanks 1996, Schwartz 1996, Caprara et al. 2006, Davidov et al. 2008, Cohrs et al. 2005, Spini and Doise 1998, Schwartz 2007, Lieven 2004). For example, Caprara et al. (2006),

explored the connection between personality traits, Schwartz's (1992) ten personal values and vote choice in the 2001 Italian national election. Their analysis found a strong connection between values and vote choice, with some of the strongest correlations centering on the values universalism, benevolence, power and security. When put into a regression model, they find that values explain anywhere from 16% to 21% of the variance in voting. Feldman (1988) examined how three core beliefs (equality of opportunity, economic individualism, and support for the free enterprise system) structures political beliefs and evaluations. He finds that these three central beliefs had a substantial impact on both prospective and retrospective evaluations, along with evaluations of candidates. This leads to a second general hypothesis on proposition the connection between ideology and core values.

> Hypothesis 2: An individual's core values and beliefs should influence the formation of his or her foreign policy ideology.

As with personality factors, we need to identify a set of core values that lead to ideology formation. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) begin with two core values (morality of warfare and ethnocentrism) but admit many others could be considered. While they find strong support for these two values, by excluding a wide range of other values, they are presenting an incomplete picture of ideology formation. Extensive research into individual values (e.g. Rokeach 1973, Schwartz 1992) have identified dozens of individual values that may be useful. Certainly, we should not expect all values to have an impact on beliefs, but we should also attempt to provide a fuller model. Extensive work by Shalom H. Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz 1992, 1994, 1996, Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 1990, Schwartz and Boehnke 2004, Davidov, Schmidt and Schwartz 2008)

has identified ten motivational values which have been shown to be comprehensive across value sets and also largely universal across a large number of countries and cultures. These motivational values stem from the three universal requirements of the human condition: "needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and survival and welfare needs of groups" (Schwartz 1992, pg.4). These ten motivational values actually consist of sets of more specific individual values that combine to lead to the more abstract core value. For example, the motivational value of power consists of single values concerning social power, wealth authority, social recognition, and preserving public image. In essence, they are very general core values that we should expect to have a connection to a more specific foreign policy ideology.

The ten motivational values in the Schwartz typology consist of 1) Power, 2) Achievement, 3) Hedonism, 4) Stimulation, 5) Self-Direction, 6) Universalism, 7) Benevolence, 8) Tradition, 9) Conformity, and 10) Security. However, while Schwartz and colleagues identify ten motivational values that are comprehensive across value sets, we should not expect all to have a relationship with ideology. Each of these values key in on different aspects and only a few connect to issues that relate to ideology. Specifically, of the motivational values listed by Schwartz, I expect relationships between ideology and the following values: 1) security, 2) tradition, and 3) universalism[6]. I discuss each below.

Let us first consider the motivational value of security. The value of security consists of features such as safety, harmony, and stability. These features are important

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[6] My discussion and description of values will only focus on those I hypothesize to have a relationship with ideology. For a fuller discussion and description of each of the motivational values, see Schwartz (1992, 1994, 1996).

for the individual but also for the group (Schwartz 1992). So while individual security is important, group or collective security is also important. Also, within this value, is the notion of national security (Schwartz 1992). Given these features, we can see a connection between this value and the militant dimension. Individuals who possess a high need for security may be more likely to feel there is a lack of security, which may lead to seeing the world as more dangerous, and more militant. This leads to the following hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 2A: Individuals who are stronger in the security value should be more militant in their foreign policy ideology.

The value of tradition focuses on customs and ideas of the individual's culture or religion. "Traditional modes of behavior become symbols of the group's solidarity, expressions of its unique worth and presumed guarantors of its survival" (Schwartz 1992, pg. 10). To extend this, this respect for one's own tradition may lead to a sense of suspicion for other traditions, religions, and cultures. For the cooperative ideological dimension, we may suspect that those who favor their tradition may be less likely to accept other traditions and the notion of a global environment, compared to one who does not have such a favoritism. If an individual favors his or her group or traditions over others, then there is the likelihood of having a more "us versus them" mentality, which does not match well with the cooperativism's more global and harmonious mindset. From a militant dimension standpoint, those devout to their traditions may be more likely to see threats to their tradition and more likely to use force to protect it (as we have seen with thousands of years of religious and cultural conflicts). In that sense, those more devout to their tradition may be more militant in their foreign policy ideology. Again, if

this traditional value goal leads to a more "us versus them" mentality, then there is a higher likelihood of the individual believing in the need to maintain security for his or her tradition. This leads to the next set of hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2B: Individuals who are stronger in the tradition value should be more militant in their foreign policy ideology.

Hypothesis 2C: Individuals who are stronger in the tradition value should be less cooperative in their foreign policy ideology.

The universalism value focuses on the welfare of everyone and everything. Schwartz and colleagues (2010, pg. 425) define this value as "understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature." Given this very cosmopolitan focus, it is likely that an individual who has a high value for universalism would be much more likely to see a singular global international environment. With this focus on "welfare for all", we could expect this individual to be more likely to see global issues as a commons problem and not that of individual states. In that sense, we should expect this individual to be more cooperative compared to an individual who does not strongly hold this value. At the same time, an individual who is not tolerant or understanding of all people but focused more on his or her in-group may be more prone to seeing other groups as threats, and hence be more militant. For example, one of the summary dimensions of the universalism value is the idea of equality. A militant individual is less likely to see the world based on equality and more likely to see things from more of a security/zero-sum manner.

Hypothesis 2D: Individuals who are stronger in the universalism value should be more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology.

Hypothesis 2E: Individuals who are stronger in the universalism value should be less militant in their foreign policy ideology.

Sociological/External Factors

Certainly internal forces within an individual should have a strong influence on how he or she forms a worldview. At the same time, there is substantial evidence pointing to external and sociological forces that also have an influence on ideology formation (Bonanno and Jost 2006, Jost et al. 2008, Jost et al. 2003, Ulrich and Cohrs 2007, Winter 2003). Individuals are exposed to socialization from a wide array of sources, including: family, friends, groups, popular culture, the media, and external events. Certainly, many of these factors could possibly help shape the foreign policy ideology of an individual. However, the factor I will focus on in this exploration, is that of external events/life experiences. Individuals are exposed to a wide range of experiences throughout their life and some of these experiences may leave lasting impressions on individuals and their ideology.

External Environment/World Events

Environmental context is an incredibly important factor to consider because our environment shapes how we think and act. For example, we are keenly interested in what shapes individuals to select a Republican instead of a Democratic candidate. Yet, we must consider that individuals usually only have two choices to start with. Their behavior is shaped by their environmental context. For foreign policy ideology, the environmental context can shape a whole host of factors, from ideology to the other

factors leading into it. For example, despite the substantial amount of evidence to support the notion that personality traits are largely exogenous (e.g. Block and Block 2006, Bouchard 1997, Caspi, Roberts and Shiner 2005), some scholars argue that even personality traits may not be truly exogenous (Winter 2003, Roberts et al. 2006). Winter (2003, pg. 128) lists four reasons why scholarship should consider social context in regard to personality traits. Among these reasons, he notes that context interacts with genetics to determine the levels of personality variables. Context also provides networks of meanings, customs and relationship, as well as restricting what is "normal" or at least typical behavior in a culture. A number of psychological studies of ideology (Bonanno and Jost 2006, Jost et al. 2008, Jost et al. 2003, Ulrich and Cohrs 2007) have shown that events can lead to individuals shifting their ideology. Mainly, these studies have investigated how threatening situations or world events lead to more conservative shifts in individuals. For example, Bonanno and Jost (2006) found that individuals in or near the World Trade Center on 9/11 were much more likely to experience a conservative shift compared to a liberal shift.

What this means for a foreign policy ideology is that we need to consider environmental effects and how it may shape ideology formation. Individuals do not create their worldview in a vacuum but are exposed to a wide range of stimuli throughout their life. As mentioned above, 9/11 may have a substantial impact on how safe or dangerous an individual sees the world, which may in turn shift where they are on the militant dimension. A host of life experiences may be able to shift an individual's worldview. Even simply watching the world unfold through the television news media may shape how one sees the world (Baum 2004). This leads to the next hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Environmental effects should influence the formation of an individual's foreign policy ideology.

As with earlier hypotheses, the next step is to identify which environmental effects should have such an influence. Certainly a wide range of environmental effects could possibly influence ideology. Bonanno and Jost (2006) consider closeness to 9/11, but other "shock" type events have also occurred (e.g. London subway bombings in 2005, Madrid train bombings in 2004). General life experiences may also have an influence on worldview formation (i.e. serving in the military, serving in the Peace Corps, international traveling, having constant contact with individuals of other nations, being an immigrant). Unfortunately, the following more specific hypotheses are limited to what variables are available in this analysis, and those variables consist of connections to the military and war casualties. While this leaves a substantial amount of room for future exploration, it does begin the process of exploring the environmental/ideology connection. Also, this is a good place to start because of the impact a connection to the military or military casualties should have on individuals. Specifically, having a military background should be more likely to push an individual to see the world in a more security oriented and hawkish fashion (Lovell and Stiehm 1989, Russett 1974, Lau et al. 1978, Schreiber 1979). For example, Russett (1974) noted that military elites tended to have more hawkish foreign policy attitudes compared to business elites. Schreiber (1979) found that veterans were significantly more likely than non-veterans to take a more pro-military and pro-hawkish stance (e.g. believe in the value of national security, believe defense is important). This military connection to ideology may be driven by personal experiences in the military but also by military socialization. Being constantly

exposed to military propaganda and also being directly involved in combat operations should make individuals more likely to believe that the world is still a very dangerous place and that military strength and power is still necessary.

In regards to having a connection to military casualties, we can also expect a shift towards being more militant. While individuals who have personal connections to military casualties may be less supportive of leaders and policy (Gartner 2008a, 2008c, Gartner and Segura 2008), they may still see the loss was due to a dangerous and unsecure world. Believing the world as dangerous may serve to provide meaning and justification for the personal loss (Ben Ari 2005, Bartone and Ender 1994). In this sense, we may expect those individuals who have a personal connection to a military casualty to be pushed in a more militant direction.[7] These lead to the following hypotheses[8]:

Hypothesis 3A: Individuals who have experience in the military should be more militant in their foreign policy ideology.

Hypothesis 3A: Individuals who have personally known a military casualty should be more militant in their foreign policy ideology.

Research Design

What factors shape the formation of an individual's foreign policy ideology? To explore this, I turn to a unique survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in

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[7] As I will discuss in the conclusion, this variable does have its limitations. A "personal" connection to a military casualty could mean a very close family member (e.g. child or spouse) or a neighbor down the street. We could expect reactions to a casualty to be quite different if it is a close family member compared to someone who the individual "personally" knew.

[8] Unfortunately, the environmental variables available do not allow for hypotheses on the cooperative dimension.

April of 2011. This study consisted of an internet survey using the Decision Process Tracing Environment Program (Lau and Redlawsk 2006).[9] An email was sent to all students and staff within the University of Iowa system (approximately 40,000 individuals) advertising the study and including a direct link to the study if individuals wished to participate. A follow up email was sent approximately one week later. A monetary reward was offered in the form of a drawing for a $100 check (two prizes offered)[10]. The study was open for approximately three weeks and nearly 1200 subjects participated in the study. The study had a wide range of general foreign policy questions, an experiment on leader evaluations (discussed in chapter 6), and a wide range of questions tapping into values, personality, political dispositions, experience, and demographics.

The dependent variables of interest consist of the two foreign policy ideological dimensions (militant and cooperative). These dimensions are created by factor analyzing twenty-five questions aimed at tapping the general foreign policy beliefs of the individual. The questions mirror the foreign policy importance questions used in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Chittick et al. 1995) along with questions used by other studies exploring foreign policy ideology (e.g. Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Herrmann et al. 1999, Herrmann and Keller 2004). An iterated principle factor analysis was performed on these 25 items and the first two factors consisted of a militant dimension

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[9] http://dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/dpte/

[10] To qualify for the drawing, individuals needed to complete the study and provide their email address.

(Factor 1) and a cooperative dimension (Factor 2).[11] These two factors were then used to create a militant and cooperative continuous scale. (see Table 3.1)[12]

The primary independent variables consist of variables aimed to tap personality, core values, and environmental effects. Let us first begin with personality traits. There are a number of different question formats that have been used to create the Big Five personality measures. Some formats require a dozen or more questions per trait. While that allows for a much more refined measure of each trait, it was not a feasible strategy for the short survey experiment. Instead, the Ten Item Personality Measure (TIPI) (Gosling et al. 2003) was administered and used to create each of the five trait variables. Because of its compact size, it has become a very popular measure for social scientists (for example recent political science scholarship that have used the TIPI include Mondak et al. 2010 and Gerber et al. 2010). The TIPI provides a set of ten questions that ask respondents to rate whether they see themselves as one of ten traits. Respondents have seven categories to choose ranging from "Disagree strongly" to "Agree strongly". Each of the Big Five traits are created by combining the scores for two of the TIPI variables (see Gosling et al. 2003 for a fuller discussion).

To measure Schwartz's 10 core values, I include a 21 item battery of questions similar to that used by the European Social Survey (ESS). This 21 item battery is half the size of Schwartz's original 40 item Portrait Values Questionnaire and while not as robust

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[11] Three factors achieved an eigenvalue above 1. The third factor consisted of two variables that looked at support for the United Nations, but the factor only explained about 10% of the variance is accounted for by the factor.

[12] Militant range was -2.14 to 2.49. Cooperative range was -2.48 to 2.00. See Table A1 in Appendix A for summary statistics for all variables used in this analysis.

as the 40 item battery, the 21 item battery does well at distinguishing the values (Davidov et al. 2008). Each question is a short verbal portrait of an individual (matching the gender of the respondent). This portrait may describe a very specific goal, wish, habit, or aspirations and respondents are then asked to rate how much they are like the person described (6 point scale ranging from "very much like me" to "not like me at all"). For example, one questions states "Having a good time is important to him. He likes to 'spoil' himself." Each of the ten core values is then created by indexing two of the items (the universalism variable has 3 items).

To tap environmental context or life experiences, I include two variables that consider connections to the military and military causalties. The first is a question asking if the individual currently serves in the military, has in the past, or has never served. Respondents who currently or previously served in the military are coded 1 and those who have never served are coded as 0. The second variable is a question asking if the respondent personally knew any individual who was a casualty of a military conflict. Respondents who answered "yes" were coded 1. Those who answered "no" were coded 0.

A wide range of control variables are also included in the multivariate analysis. First, I control for partisanship and domestic ideology. For party identification, a seven point ordinal variable is used where a score of a 1 indicates the respondent is a strong democrat where a 4 indicates a pure independent, and a 7 indicates a strong republican. Likewise, for domestic ideology, another 7 point scale is used where a 1 indicates a strong liberal, a 4 indicates a moderate, and a 7 indicates a strong conservative. Second, is a small battery of religious measures to cover the three B's of religious influence

(Smidt et al. 2009). Indicator variables are included for religious traditions (Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, other Christian, and other non-Christian). Respondents who claimed no religious preference/agnostic/atheist are set as the reference category. Religious attendance is an ordinal variable where higher values indicate more frequent attendance. Finally, religious orthodoxy is a three point ordinal measure where a 3 indicates the individual has more traditional/orthodox beliefs and 1 indicates more progressive beliefs. Other controls include education (ordinal measure where higher values indicate more education), income (ordinal measure where higher values indicate more annual income), race (indicator variable for non-whites), age (age of respondent), gender (indicator variable for females), and political knowledge (five point subjective measure where higher values indicate the respondent feels more knowledgeable about politics).

Results

  Let us begin the empirical exploration the formation of a foreign policy ideology by considering some simple bivariate relationships. Figures 3.2 to 3.7 display the mean militant and cooperative scores for groups based on personality traits, values and environmental context. Indicator variables are created for external influences where the trait and value scales are broken up into three categories and the low and high categories are compared.

  First, let us look at the bivariate relationships with the militant dimension (Figures 3.2 to 3.4). With regard to personality traits (see Figure 3.2), there are a few noticeable relationships. The most substantive relationship appears to come from the openness trait

in that those scoring low in the openness trait appear to be much more militant, on average, compared to those scoring high on the openness trait. Less substantive relationships are also found with the conscientiousness and emotional stability traits. In both of these traits, individuals scoring lower in the trait tend to be less militant where those scoring higher in the trait tend to be slightly more militant. No relationship is uncovered for the extraversion and agreeableness traits.

Turning to core values (Figure 3.3), there are a number of sizable relationships to note. The two most substantive relationships come from the security value (with low security leading to less militantism and high security leading to higher militantism) and the universalism value (with low universalism leading to higher militantism and high universalism leading to lower militantism). Less sizable relationships are also seen among conformity and tradition (lower conformity/tradition leads to less militantism where higher conformity/tradition leads to higher militantism), and also self-direction and stimulation (lower self-direction/stimulation leads to higher militantism where higher self-direction/stimulation leads to lower militantism). Finally, minor to null relationships are found with benevolence, hedonism, achievement, and power.

Finally, let us consider the relationship between environmental context and militantism (Figure 3.4). With regards to personally knowing military casualties, we see a fairly small relationship where those who have known military casualties being more militant than those who had not. Having military experience displays a strong relationship with those individuals having a military background being much more militant, on average.

In general, Figures 3.2 to 3.4, provide some initial evidence to the bulk of the hypotheses. On average, there are relationships across all of the categories (personality traits, values, external environment). Also, with the exception of the hypothesized relationship on emotional stability, the more specific hypotheses seem to have some initial support. At the same time, some stronger relationships are uncovered that were not hypothesized (i.e. conformity, universalism, self-direction values, and openness trait).

Let us now turn to the cooperative dimension (Figures 3.5 to 3.7). Figure 3.5 displays two substantive relationships between personality traits and the cooperative dimension. First, the agreeableness trait relationship is quite large (low agreeableness equals less cooperative and high agreeableness equals higher cooperative). The relationship with conscientiousness is also sizable (with low conscientiousness equaling higher cooperative). Minor to null relationships are noted for the other three personality traits.

Turning to core values (Figure 3.6), only three values really show a sizable relationship. The universalism value appears to have the strongest relationship with low universalism leading to a lower cooperative score and high universalism leading to a higher cooperative score. Both security and power also display noticeable relationships (with low security/power leading to a higher cooperative score and high security/power leading to a lower cooperative score).

Finally, Figure 3.7 displays a minor relationships for the sociological factors and the cooperative dimension. I do not hypothesize a relationship between these two life experiences and the cooperative dimension, and results somewhat confirm my expectations. No relationship is found when considering military casualties but we do

see that those individuals with prior military experience are noticeably less cooperative compared to those with no military experience.

Similar to the militant dimension figures, we see some noteworthy relationships between the psychological factors and the cooperative dimension. However, a number of the bivariate relationships are not as hypothesized. Relationships between the openness trait, security value, tradition value, and conformity value were either not in the hypothesized direction, or in the hypothesized direction but had a minor effect.

The above bivariate exercise shows that there are some significant relationships between an individual's foreign policy ideology and his or her values, traits, and external environment. While some of the relationships were not as expected, they do show that, in general, these factors appear to be important in attempting to understand what drives ideology formation. Now that the bivariate exercise is complete, let us turn to a multivariate analysis to see how these factors hold when put together in a regression model with substantial controls. Table 3.2 displays OLS models for the militant dimension and table 3.3 displays OLS models for the cooperative dimension. Within each table, 3 models are displayed. The first model is only the psychological factors (values and traits). The second model adds the sociological factors (external environment). Finally, the third model adds a wide range of standard control variables. It should also be noted that all five personality traits and only eight of the ten values are included in the models. Regression recommendations for the motivational values indicate that including all ten values leads to substantial collinearity problems. Initial regressions that included all ten values confirmed these warnings.[13] It was recommended

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[13] The variance inflation factor average for all ten values in these regressions was 474.

to either only include eight of the ten values or the variables of interest. I chose to include eight of the variables and exclude the hedonism and achievement values since they appeared to have no relationship in the bivariate comparisons.

Table 3.2 provides OLS regression results for the determinants of the militant ideological dimension. Model 1 demonstrates that a wide range of psychological factors lead into the militant dimension (8 of the 13 variables were significant at $p < .05$). Also, with just the psychological variables included, the R-squared is a respectable .30. When we include the variables for the external environment (known military casualties and served in the military), all of the same eight variables maintain their significance and we also see that the two environmental variables are also significant. We also see a minor bump in the R-squared (up to .32).

When including the control variables (Model 3), much of the results from Model 2 hold, but a few of the variables drop out of significance. First of all, the security value is highly significant ($p < .01$) and in the expected direction indicating that individuals who score higher in the security value tend to be more militant. A similar relationship is uncovered with the emotional stability trait. While highly significant ($p < .01$), the positive coefficient is the opposite of what was hypothesized. As expected, the universalism value is significant ($p < .01$) and negative, indicating that those who score lower on the universalism scale are more likely to be militant. The power value is also slightly significant ($p < .10$) and positive indicating that those with a higher score on the power value were more militant. The self-direction value is negative and significant ($p < .05$). No expectations were set for this variable and it was only significant in the final model, but it does point to the notion that those who score lower in this value are more

likely to be militant. Finally, the tradition value is negative and significant (p < .05). This result is strange in that it is the opposite of expectations and also does not match the results from Model 1or 2 or what we would expect based off the bivariate relationship in Figure 3.3. At first glance, we would expect a collinearity issue between the tradition value and possibly domestic ideology or some religious variables. While there is a correlation between these measures, excluding domestic ideology or the religious measures does not change the sign of the tradition value back to positive. While this is a strange result, the changing of the sign by including additional variables is a possible outcome.

In addition, we see that one of the external environment variables maintains its significance (p < .01) and is in the expected directions. Individuals who served in the military are all more likely to be militant. Finally, a number of control variables achieve significance. First, age is positive and significant, indicating that the older one is, the more militant they are. Both party identification and domestic ideology are significant and positive, indicating the more republican/conservative the individual is, the more militant he or she is. Also, the indicator variable for mainline Protestant is positive and significant, indicating that individuals of this religious identification are more militant compared to those who claim no religious preference, agnostic, or atheist. While this matches findings from Guth (2010), we would also expect evangelicals to be militant as well, but that was not found.

Let us now turn to the determinants of the cooperative dimension (Table 3.3). Before looking directly into the variables, it is interesting to note that the R-squared for the cooperative models are half of the militant models. Also, while eight of thirteen

psychological variables are significant in model 1 (p < .05), six maintain significance (p < .10) when adding the external events and control variables (Model 3).

Let us focus the discussion on model 3. For core values, the traditional value is negative and slightly significant (p > .10), indicating that those who are more traditional tend to be less cooperative in their ideology. The universalism value is also significant (p < .01) and positive (as expected), indicating that individuals scoring higher in this value are more cooperative. Unexpectedly, the self-direction and power values are slightly significant and negative (p < .10). As for personality traits, the agreeableness trait is positive and significant (p < .01), where the conscientiousness trait is negative and significant (p < .05). I did not expect a significant relationship between the two environmental factors (military connection) and no relationship is uncovered. Finally, a number of control variables are significant. Ideology is negative and significant (p < .05), indicating that the more conservative, the individual is, the less cooperative he or she is. Religious attendance is positive and significant, age is negative and significant (p < .05), and finally, political knowledge is slightly significant (p < .05) and positive.

All in all, the models from Table 3.2 and 3.3 provide support for the notion that each of the factors (personality traits, core values, and external events) are important determinants to an individual's foreign policy ideology. When looking more specifically at each of these factors, the support for the hypotheses are somewhat mixed but generally the results support the more specific hypotheses (see Table 3.4 for a summary).

For militants, results mirror expectations for the security value, the universalism value, and if someone had prior military service. However, results are opposite of expectations for the tradition value and the emotional stability trait. A few possibilities

exist for these opposite findings. For tradition, this respect for and protection of tradition and one's group may not translate to international security viewpoints as I hypothesized. Possibly, the "us versus them" mentality that I hypothesized may work for more domestic viewpoints but foreign affairs are just too far of a stretch. At the same time, the bivariate relationship, along with models 1 and 2 of Table 3.2 show the hypothesized relationship; however no collinearity was uncovered in the full model. Future research should further explore this. As for emotional stability, it is difficult to explain the results. If we consider the bivariate relationships (Figure 3.2), the real difference seems to come from those lower on the emotional stability scale (who are less militant). Those higher on the emotional stability scale tend to have a mean militant score close to 0 (or largely indifferent on the militant scale). Possibly, these lesser emotionally stable individuals are simply wary of military use in general and the sense of vulnerability and anxiety does not translate well to international affairs. Finally, while I expected a positive relationship between personally knowing a military casualty and being more militant, no significant relationship was uncovered when controls were included, although weak relationships are found in the bivariates and in model 2 of Table 3.2. This lack of significant relationship in the full model may be due to the question wording of the variable. As I mentioned earlier, there is probably a difference in knowing a neighbor who was a military casualty, and having one's son/daughter or spouse be a military casualty. A more refined question would be better suited to explore this variable better.

For the cooperative dimension, results mirrored expectations for the tradition value, universalism value and agreeableness trait. Interestingly, the positive relationship expected on the openness trait was not found. This is strange given that the trait should

be one of the strongest influences for the cooperative dimension. Openness refers to qualities, such as curiosity, variety of experience so it would appear to be a close match to the cooperative dimension. Also, Schoen's (2007) research of Germans did show a strong relationship between this trait and positive attitudes towards the Euro and a European government, which also contradicts my findings here. Certainly, more exploration needs to be done on this trait.

<u>Discussion</u>

In many ways, this chapter is an initial and exploratory cut at figuring out what factors shape an individual's foreign policy ideology. This exploration builds upon the work of numerous scholars (e.g. Levinson 1957, Galtung 1964, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Page and Boutton 2006) and formulates one of the most comprehensive explorations to date. Where previous research explored one or two aspects leading into ideology or created largely a theoretical model with little empirical work, this chapter theoretically and empirically explored a wide array of factors. The results indicate that the formation of ideology is widespread across psychological factors and begins the exploration on sociological factors.

It is important to note that this chapter is not without numerous shortcomings and provides ample room for improvement and enhancement by future research. One major aspect left out of this research, that should be explored in the future, is the role of genetics in ideological formation. Exploring the role of genetics in political life has become an advancing field over the last few years (e.g. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005, Hatemi et al. 2009) and inroads into genetics and domestic ideology have also occurred

(e.g. Smith et al. 2012, Hatemi et al. 2011). Given the positive findings in much of this research, it would be surprising if there is not a genetic link to a foreign policy ideology. Secondly, improvements could be made in the variable measurements and operationalization. Given time and resource constraints, Schwartz's motivational values and the Big Five personality traits were measured by question batteries that were more compact to make them manageable for survey use. While this is important, and these batteries have been used extensively, there is an accuracy tradeoff to using these more compact batteries. While this may not make a difference with the argument that personality traits and core values matter, some of the conclusions as to the specific traits and values may suffer by the measurements used.

Also, only two measures were available for environmental effects, and neither related to the cooperative dimension. While these two measures showed that the external environment can be a powerful influence, much more can and should be done here. First, many more external "shock" type experiences and general life experiences should be considered. Second, a longitudinal study that was able to measure ideology before and after external events or life experiences would be ideal in parsing out the external environment's influence. Finally, matching techniques might be useful, especially if we suspect that there is a selection effect for some of these life experiences. For example, the case could be made of a selection effect of joining the military in the first place and this selection could be due to some psychological forces (among a host of other variables). Matching along these psychological forces may be useful at getting a better understanding of the role of some life experiences.

Despite these shortcomings, this chapter sets the stage for future explorations into the formation of foreign policy ideology. While this is not the purpose of the remaining chapters in this dissertation exploring what ideology looks like and what leads into ideology is an important piece to the overall puzzle. Now, this research shifts gears from what leads to ideology, to what role does ideology play in the larger role of attitude formation for foreign events.

Figure 3.1: Basic Theory of Foreign Policy Ideology Formation

Figure 3.2: Bivariate Relationships- Personality Traits and Militant Ideology

Figure 3.3: Bivariate Relationships- Core Values and Militant Ideology

Figure 3.4: Bivariate Relationships- Sociological Factors and Militant Ideology

Figure 3.5: Bivariate Relationships- Personality Traits and Cooperative Ideology

Figure 3.6: Bivariate Relationships- Core Values and Cooperative Ideology

Figure 3.7: Bivariate Relationships- Sociological Factors and Cooperative Ideology

Table 3.1: Factor Analysis of 25 Foreign Policy Items

	Factor 1 Militant	Factor 2 Cooperative
1. Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression		
2. Strengthening the United Nations		
3. Combating international terrorism	0.423	
4. Maintaining superior military power worldwide	0.705	
5. Protecting the jobs of American workers		
6. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations		
7. Securing adequate supplies of energy		
8. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	0.427	
9. Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations		0.794
10. Improving the global environment		0.448
11. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons		
12. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries		0.64
13. Promoting economic growth		
14. Combating world hunger		0.82
15. Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy		0.499
16. The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength.	0.846	
17. The use of military force only makes problems worse.	-0.711	
18. Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it is better for us to strike first.	0.555	
19. The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.		
20. The U.S. government should just try to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved with other nations.		
21. It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes.		
22. Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country's greatness.	0.64	

Table 3.1 Continued

23. The United States could learn a lot by following the example of other countries	-0.474
24. The United States should provide less economic aid to other countries	-0.408
25. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong	

Source: Author conducted survey at the University of Iowa, April 2011.

Note: Iterated Principle Factor analysis performed. Only items loading greater than .4 are displayed. Question 1 to 15 reads: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the U.S. might have. For each one, please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the U.S., a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = one of the most important and 1 = not important. Question 16 to 25 reads: Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = strongly agree and 1= strongly disagree.

Table 3.2: Determinants of Militantism

| | Model 1 | | Model 2 | |
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Security Value	0.254**	(0.034)	0.241**	(0.033)
Conformity Value	0.109**	(0.030)	0.099**	(0.030)
Tradition Value	0.088**	(0.025)	0.070**	(0.025)
Benevolence Value	0.026	(0.037)	0.007	(0.037)
Universalism Value	-0.287**	(0.038)	-0.273**	(0.037)
Self-Direction Value	-0.042	(0.036)	-0.059	(0.036)
Stimulation Value	0.096**	(0.035)	0.078*	(0.034)
Power Value	0.125**	(0.038)	0.112**	(0.038)
Extraversion Trait	0.038*	(0.016)	0.035*	(0.015)
Agreeableness Trait	0.012	(0.023)	0.015	(0.023)
Conscientiousness Trait	-0.023	(0.020)	-0.028	(0.020)
Emotional Stability Trait	0.079**	(0.018)	0.069**	(0.018)
Openness Trait	-0.020	(0.030)	-0.030	(0.030)
Known Mil. Casualties			0.169**	(0.048)
Prior Mil. Service			0.524**	(0.112)
Party ID				
Ideology				
Evangelical Protestant				
Mainline Protestant				
Catholic				
Other Christian				
Other Non-Christian				
Religious Attendance				
Religious Orthodoxy				
Education				
Income				
Nonwhite				
Age				
Female				
Pol. Knowledge				
Constant	0.235	(0.212)	0.245	(0.208)
R-Squared	0.3		0.32	
Root MSE	0.78		0.77	
N	1135		1132	

Table 3.2 Continued

	Model 3	
	β	(SE)
Security Value	0.157**	(0.035)
Conformity Value	0.016	(0.033)
Tradition Value	-0.073*	(0.035)
Benevolence Value	-0.065	(0.040)
Universalism Value	-0.163**	(0.047)
Self-Direction Value	-0.089*	(0.038)
Stimulation Value	0.035	(0.037)
Power Value	0.074	(0.043)
Extraversion Trait	0.025	(0.017)
Agreeableness Trait	0.010	(0.026)
Conscientiousness Trait	-0.033	(0.022)
Emotional Stability Trait	0.056**	(0.021)
Openness Trait	-0.009	(0.032)
Known Mil. Casualties	0.059	(0.052)
Prior Mil. Service	0.372**	(0.119)
Party ID	0.064**	(0.021)
Ideology	0.119**	(0.035)
Evangelical Protestant	0.057	(0.132)
Mainline Protestant	0.175*	(0.086)
Catholic	0.122	(0.089)
Other Christian	-0.018	(0.112)
Other Non-Christian	-0.002	(0.101)
Religious Attendance	0.021	(0.025)
Religious Orthodoxy	-0.010	(0.051)
Education	-0.031	(0.025)
Income	-0.002	(0.012)
Nonwhite	-0.101	(0.084)
Age	0.007**	(0.002)
Female	-0.032	(0.058)
Pol. Knowledge	0.007	(0.029)
Constant	-0.570	(0.304)
R-Squared	0.39	
Root MSE	0.72	
N	853	

Table 3.2 Continued

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Models measured with OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 3.3: Determinants of Cooperativeness

	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Security Value	-0.118**	(0.037)	-0.113**	(0.037)
Conformity Value	-0.053	(0.032)	-0.048	(0.032)
Tradition Value	-0.060*	(0.028)	-0.057*	(0.028)
Benevolence Value	-0.011	(0.040)	-0.007	(0.041)
Universalism Value	0.245**	(0.041)	0.245**	(0.041)
Self-Direction Value	-0.134**	(0.040)	-0.130**	(0.041)
Stimulation Value	-0.080*	(0.039)	-0.072	(0.040)
Power Value	-0.112*	(0.045)	-0.108*	(0.045)
Extraversion Trait	0.003	(0.017)	0.004	(0.017)
Agreeableness Trait	0.113**	(0.025)	0.112**	(0.025)
Conscientiousness Trait	-0.019	(0.023)	-0.018	(0.023)
Emotional Stability Trait	-0.040*	(0.020)	-0.039	(0.020)
Openness Trait	0.046	(0.032)	0.046	(0.032)
Known Mil. Casualties			-0.043	(0.053)
Prior Mil. Service			-0.034	(0.117)
Party ID				
Ideology				
Evangelical Protestant				
Mainline Protestant				
Catholic				
Other Christian				
Other Non-Christian				
Religious Attendance				
Religious Orthodoxy				
Education				
Income				
Nonwhite				
Age				
Female				
Pol. Knowledge				
Constant	-0.890**	(0.215)	-0.870**	(0.216)
R-Squared	0.15		0.15	
Root MSE	0.85		0.85	
N	1135		1132	

Table 3.3 Continued

	Model 3	
	β	(SE)
Security Value	-0.060	(0.043)
Conformity Value	-0.016	(0.036)
Tradition Value	-0.069	(0.039)
Benevolence Value	0.017	(0.046)
Universalism Value	0.221**	(0.050)
Self-Direction Value	-0.092*	(0.046)
Stimulation Value	-0.048	(0.045)
Power Value	-0.090	(0.051)
Extraversion Trait	-0.003	(0.020)
Agreeableness Trait	0.109**	(0.031)
Conscientiousness Trait	-0.056*	(0.026)
Emotional Stability Trait	-0.029	(0.024)
Openness Trait	0.010	(0.037)
Known Mil. Casualties	-0.035	(0.062)
Prior Mil. Service	0.090	(0.148)
Party ID	-0.004	(0.026)
Ideology	-0.088*	(0.035)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.011	(0.152)
Mainline Protestant	-0.075	(0.097)
Catholic	0.062	(0.098)
Other Christian	0.082	(0.131)
Other Non-Christian	-0.005	(0.133)
Religious Attendance	0.095**	(0.029)
Religious Orthodoxy	-0.036	(0.057)
Education	0.008	(0.029)
Income	0.007	(0.013)
Nonwhite	0.117	(0.089)
Age	-0.005*	(0.003)
Female	0.080	(0.067)
Pol. Knowledge	0.067*	(0.033)
Constant	-0.562	(0.336)
R-Squared	0.2	
Root MSE	0.84	
N	853	

Table 3.3 Continued

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** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Note: Models measured with OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 3.4: Summary of Expectations and Results

	Militant Dimension		Cooperative Dimension	
	Expected	Observed	Expected	Observed
Security Value	+	+		
Conformity Value				
Tradition Value	+	-	-	-
Benevolence Value				
Universalism Value	-	-	+	+
Self-Direction Value		-		-
Stimulation Value				
Power Value				-
Extraversion Trait				
Agreeableness Trait			+	+
Conscientiousness Trait				-
Emotional Stability Trait	-	+		
Openness Trait			+	
Known Mil. Casualties	+			
Prior Mil. Service	+	+		

CHAPTER 4

A THEORY OF THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

IN ATTITUDE FORMATION

<u>Introduction</u>

In the preceding chapters, I explored the structure and formation of a foreign policy oriented ideology. We now transition from this exploration of what makes up an ideology to what influence this ideology has on attitude formation. Below I provide a theoretical model that argues that ideology is an important consideration because it can not only influence foreign policy attitudes and policy preferences (a direct effect), but also modify how other external stimuli influence attitudes (an indirect effect).

The model itself is quite basic (see Figure 4.1). I will quickly summarize the logic and expand later in this chapter. Existing theories focus on either a context oriented or elite cue explanation. Certainly, these theories have provided scholarship with a much greater understanding of attitude formation for foreign policy events, but they focus on a more stimulus oriented approach to attitude formation and assume that stimuli will impact all individuals in a uniform manner. This research maintains the importance of these external stimuli but argues that their interaction with individual level variation, specifically, a foreign policy ideology is an essential component to understanding foreign policy attitude formation. Individuals have a varied foreign policy ideology, and this ideology should shape how individuals see events and should structure their preferences towards those events. Furthermore, this ideology has the potential to modify the impact of external stimuli on individual preferences. Following from research on "motivated reasoning" (Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002) the theory argues that ideology

colors the way new information is interpreted and accepted (i.e. external stimuli). In essence, it can act as a gatekeeper to new information.

Let me provide a quick example of this logic before going into more detail. Suppose an individual is considering if the invasion on Iraq was justified. To begin, this individual already has some sort of foreign policy ideology that provides an abstract worldview. This ideology helps form the individual's perceptions regarding the war and preferences for it. This is the direct effect. However, throughout the event, this individual was exposed to information regarding the war by the media and other information searches (number of casualties, accomplishments, etc) and also by messages and cues from party elites. These other sources of information should also influence the final policy preference, but how they influence that preference depends on the original foreign policy ideology. Context and elite cues may have a stronger or weaker impact on policy preferences, depending on if they are in agreement or conflict with the original preference, which is based off the foreign policy ideology. By modifying the influence of these external stimuli, foreign policy ideology is indirectly influencing preferences as well.

Now I will discuss the model in more detail. However, before going into the model, a discussion of the current state of the literature and the existing explanations for attitude formation is in order. Following this short literature review, I will explain the theoretical argument for a direct effect of a foreign policy ideology, followed by the indirect effect.

Current Explanations for Attitude Formation on Foreign Policy Issues

How are individual attitudes regarding specific foreign policy issues formed? In general, scholarship has focused on this through the context of war or conflict support, and the debate on attitude formation can largely be explained by two main explanatory factors: 1) a more contextual/perceptual driven explanation or 2) a media and party/elite cues explanation. I will begin by discussing the literature on how these two factors influence attitude formation.

Contextual Explanations

One major strand of theory argues that foreign policy attitude formation is done in a rational manner through information derived from event context. Some of these contextual situations studied include casualties, how vital is the interest, multilateralism, purpose, and prospect of success (e.g. Mueller 1973, Gartner and Segura 1998, 2008, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, 2007, 2009, Jentleson 1992, Larson 1996, 2000, Chapman and Reiter 2004). The essential argument is that context alters the costs and benefits of the conflict. For example, high casualties increase the costs for of the conflict for the public. An intervention that is vital to the country increases the benefits of the intervention. Individuals then use this contextual cue to form a preference regarding the specific foreign event.

One of the most influential factors influencing public support for US intervention, specifically for conflict situations, has revolved around casualties. Mueller's (1973) exploration of how casualties influenced public support for both the Korean and Vietnam wars set the stage for exploring what drives public support. He noted that as casualties

increased, public support for each of the wars decreased. Further research by Gartner, Segura and colleagues (Gartner et al. 1997, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner et al. 2004, Gartner and Segura 2008) expand the analysis on how casualties impact support. For example, Gartner and Segura (1998) argue that marginal casualties may have greater explanatory power for three reasons: 1) recent information is more salient, 2) marginal casualties are not correlated over time, and 3) marginal casualties capture crucial highly salient events. They find that when casualty rates are accelerating, marginal casualties provide a better measure for public support. Gartner (2008a) demonstrated that wartime casualties had both direct and indirect effects on public opinion regarding wartime support. Increasing casualties led to decreased support but at the same time, casualty levels created a "contextual lens" by which individuals would judge future casualty levels. Beyond nationwide casualty figures, Gartner and colleagues (Gartner et al. 1997, Gartner and Segura 2008) demonstrated that proximate casualties (local or state level casualties opposed to just aggregate national casualties) can also have an impact on public opinion and electoral behavior. Framing of casualty losses also appears to impact perception and support of conflict (Boettcher and Cobb 2006, 2009).

Beyond just the level of casualties, public perception of a conflict has been shown to drive support in a rational manner. For example, Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006) explored how two distinct factors: the perceived rightness/wrongness of a conflict and the likelihood of success influenced public tolerance for casualties in the current Iraq War. They discovered that both had a significant effect on casualty tolerance. However, the most important factor was the perceived likelihood of success. When the public was confident in success in the mission, casualties meant very little. When the public was not

so confident, casualties had a much larger impact on overall support. In addition, public perception of the overall importance of the mission can have a substantial impact on aggregate support. Larson (1996, 2000) found that the perceived importance of the military operation had a major impact on if the public supported the mission and how influential the level of casualties were. When a mission was perceived by the public as vital to the nation, casualties had a small effect on public support. When the mission is not perceived as important, the public is not tolerant of casualties.

The type of mission (Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998) and perception of conflict (Gelpi et al. 2005, Larson 1996, 2000) has also been shown to play a substantial role in overall public support for foreign intervention. For example, Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) looked at how the policy objective of the foreign intervention (specifically conflict intervention) had an effect on the overall public level of support. What they found is that not all foreign missions are the same in the eyes of the public, and the very nature of the mission can have a substantial impact on the support of the public. Objectives can be one of foreign policy restraint (FPR), internal political change (IPC), or humanitarian intervention (HI). Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) found that the public tended to support conflicts that were based on humanitarian intervention or foreign policy restraint; however, public support was not present for operations based on internal political change.

Beyond these contextual factors influencing public support for intervention, research has also explored how the context of multilateral support influences public opinion. A number of scholars (e.g., Kull 1995-1996, Kelleher 1994, Chapman and Reiter 2004, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006) have shown that multilateral support for foreign

intervention tends to have a positive effect on overall domestic public support. For example, Chapman and Reiter (2004) note that like elite and media cues, the United Nations Security Council also provides cues to the public. They discuss that domestic audiences tend to trust the UN Security Council because they have similar preferences; specifically to be more defensive in nature. The Security Council is also seen as a possible check on the President's power and is not a rubber stamp for US foreign endeavors. Because it is quite difficult to obtain Security Council endorsement for a military action, when it does authorize military action, it is seen as quite legitimate in the eyes of the general public. In their exploration of rally effects, Chapman and Reiter (2004) note that UN Security Council endorsement led to rallies of up to nine percentage points higher.

While rational choice explanations have made substantial inroads into understanding attitude formation, they are not without significant criticisms. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987, pg. 1103) comment that rational choice theory has problems with its application to foreign policy issues because people don't understand the policy connection to utility. The costs of conflict are usually well known (i.e. casualties [Mueller 1973, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner 2008a]) but the benefits of a foreign intervention may be much more difficult to calculate. Secondly, while the public is largely unknowledgeable on many issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), this may even be more pronounced on foreign policy issues where people have less of a connection to their daily lives and where foreign policy issues are generally "harder issues" (Carmines and Stimson 1980). Given this, can individuals rationally use contextual events to inform preferences or must individuals rely on cues from other sources (Johns 2009, Berinsky

2007, Baum 2002)? In addition, scholarship in political psychology has challenged the idea that individuals actually do act completely rational (e.g. Taber and Lodge 2006, Isbell et al. 2006, Redlawsk 2002, Redlawsk et al. 2010, Marcus 2003), and have provided many examples of where rational action is not followed by subjects. Finally, many context based explanations for individual preferences on foreign policy lack the incorporation of individual level variation in policy preferences. This can be problematic because it is highly unlikely that individuals will see a conflict the same way or have similar preferences on how it is handled. So everyone may believe in wanting to win a conflict, but we may have huge variation in preferences for how the conflict is won. For example, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006 noted that those individuals that opposed the use of force without UN approval were significantly less tolerant of US casualties in the Iraq War. Variation in conflict preferences between individuals led to substantial differences in tolerance for casualties.

Party, Elite, Media Cues and Heuristics

While people would ideally like to make fully informed and rational decisions, many do not have the time, or the capacity to do such. Instead, individuals rely on cues and heuristics to help them make their voting decisions and develop their policy opinions (Popkin 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 2001, 2006; McDermott 1997; Lupia 1994; Koch 2001; Rahn 1993). Popkin (1991, pg. 13) states "voters will rely on information shortcuts because they do not have much incentive to gather information about politics solely in order to improve their voting choices". Individuals don't have an incentive to gather lots

of political information so they need to find alternative means of making a worthwhile decision.

One of the most valuable heuristics is partisan identification. In looking at partisanship as an information shortcut, Rahn (1993) noted that even when given access to the policy positions of candidates, subjects still relied on the party identification of the candidate in making their decision because it was a much easier strategy for making their decision. Riggle et al. (1992) also showed that when comparing candidates, subjects preferred using party identification and stereotypes to using the candidates actual issue stances. The use of the partisan shortcut is incredibly useful to voters because they can infer much about issues purely based on which party supports which side. Rahn (1993, pg. 474) comments "Fortunately for voters, Democrats and Republicans have long differed in predictable ways…, and the public's perceptions of these cleavages have remained quite stable over time".

Certainly, the use of cues and heuristics, from party elites, is not limited to vote choice and has been easily ported over to foreign policy attitudes (Berinsky 2007, Baum 2002, 2004, Jacobson 2008, Larson 1996, Eichenberg 2006, Groeling and Baum 2007, Gaines et al. 2007). In exploring support for the war in Iraq, Berinsky (2007) argues that much of what drives support is based off partisan identification and elite cues. His basic argument is that knowledge of events is not widespread so rational decisions cannot be made. Even if misperceptions are corrected, little will change regarding war support. Instead, Berinsky shows that party identification, paired with political knowledge, can explain much variation in conflict support. Specifically, individuals with high levels of political knowledge show large differences in war support based off their party, where

little difference is seen in low knowledge individuals. Essentially, the high knowledge individuals are able to accept the party cues and base their attitudes off what the party says, where low knowledge individuals either don't receive the messages or do not understand them.

Groeling and Baum (2007) researched the complicated nexus between media, party elites, and individuals to get a firmer grasp on the important factors of rally effects. One finding from this research is that party cues certainly matter. Individuals turn to their party elites and assign much more credibility to their party elites opposed to elites from other parties. However, it is not simply a matter of individuals listening strictly to their party elites but involves the message and credibility of the messages being provided by these elites and also what and how the media chooses to cover. For example, criticism by members of the President's party carries much more weight compared to praise because criticism is much more costly for elites of the President's party, hence it should be more credible. The opposite could be said for elites not of the President's party: praise carries more weight because it is more costly. Also, these effects are conditioned on the context of the conflict as well. Specifically, criticisms appear to carry more weight during high casualty periods (a tie back to rational voter arguments).

The role of the media in attitude formation has also been widely discussed by scholars in how it can modify preferences in both domestic and foreign contexts (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar 1993; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Baum and Potter 2008). While some have relegated the media as simply transmitting elite and party cues to the masses (Brody 1991, Brody and Shapiro 1989), others have argued that the media has a much more significant role (Baum

2002, 2004, Iyengar and Kinder 1987, Baum and Potter 2008). For example, research by Krosnick and Kinder (1990) and Krosnick and Brannon (1993) showed that when the media focused on a foreign policy event, voters put much more emphasis on those foreign events when assessing the President. Beyond just setting the agenda for individuals, the media can also influence how individuals perceive issues and form preferences. Baum (2004) demonstrated significant differences in policy preferences between individuals who obtained their information from "soft" media sources compared to "hard" media outlets. Essentially, the media is another quick source of information for individuals. It can tell individuals what is important to consider and can frame the event for individuals.

The idea that party identification and media effects explains attitudes works well in the American Politics literature (e.g. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes 1960, Jacoby 1988, Hetherington 2001, Iyengar and Kinder 1987) and appears to work quite well when understanding foreign policy attitudes. However, there are some weaknesses to these arguments. First, as both Berinsky (2007) and Groeling and Baum (2008) have demonstrated, it is not as simple as party identification equals attitude. There are a number of conditional factors to consider, such as knowledge, context, media and the individual receiver. Inherent individual beliefs, in regards to foreign policy, may also be an important conditional or mediating factor here. Party cues may work differently depending on one's foreign policy ideology and foreign situation. Party is indeed important, but the conditionals may be just as important, if not more in some situations. The same applies to the media. Individual differences in knowledge, for example, may allow for significant differences in how media impacts individual preferences (Baum

2004, Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Krosnick and Brannon 1993). Also, individuals may completely discount media sources based on their ideological stances.

The motivated reasoning literature has shown that individuals can go out of their way to seek out congruent information with their beliefs and actively discount incongruent information (Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002, Taber et al. 2001). For example, conservatives believe Fox News is wholly unbiased where CNN is run by extreme liberals. For foreign policy, different ideological dispositions may lead some individuals to embrace certain media reports where others may discount (i.e. militants may be more likely to discount reports that a conflict is going poorly or that casualties are increasing).

Also, Feldman (1988, pg. 417) acknowledges that power of elite influences but makes the comment: "even if elites are responsible for structuring views in liberal and conservative packages, the question remains: Why do people gravitate toward one or the other perspective?" Why this comment was made for a left/right ideological argument, it works equally well here.

Finally, the party cue argument runs into problems when applying it to the 30% to 40% of Americans that consider themselves independents. While certainly a good portion of those people still do rely on elite cues to some degree, does this group possibly rely more on their inherent foreign policy beliefs in some situations? Essentially, while partisan and media cues are certainly important, there is more to the picture.

Foreign Policy Ideology

Current research has taught us much about public support for leaders and general attitudes towards foreign interventions. At the same time, this research is incomplete. The focus of both of these camps is on how a specific stimulus (cues, events, etc.) influence attitudes and evaluations. What these lines of research have not explored in great detail is how factors inherent in the individual may shape preferences and leader evaluations. What this research adds is an exploration into one specific individual level difference, the foreign policy ideology of the individual. Research on foreign policy ideology has been established for quite some time (e.g. Wittkopf 1990, Chittick et al. 1995, Holsti 1979, Herrmann et al. 1999) but rarely has the connection been made between an individual's ideology, and how that ideology impacts preferences, evaluations, and interpretations of a conflict (for an exception, see, for example, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999). Everyone is different, with a whole different set of beliefs and experiences. It is only natural that an inherent individual difference, like ideology, should shape preferences.

Looking at the structural relationship between foreign policy opinions, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) showed that a top-down organization of foreign policy attitudes exists among the general public. In essence, they showed that more general foreign policy postures had a direct influence on more specific issue stances. The argued that individuals begin with core values, specifically ethnocentrism and the morality of warfare, and these core values influence an individual's general postures (militarism, anti-communism, and isolationism), which then in turn influence their opinions on specific issues (defense spending, nuclear arms policy, military involvement, Soviet

policy, and international trade). Estimating a hierarchical model of foreign-policy attitudes, Hurwitz and Peffley demonstrated that there was a very strong vertical relationship from more general and abstract beliefs to general foreign policy belief structures, to specific issue attitudes.

Herrmann et al. (1999) expanded upon the vertical nature of a foreign policy ideology by interacting personal foreign policy dispositions within a range of different contextual situations. They explored how three separate types of dispositions (internationalist versus isolationist, militant and assertive strategies versus accommodative and cooperative approaches, and liberal versus conservative domestic ideologies) influenced individual support for the use of force in five contextually different experimental situations (was the intervention in the US's interest, the identity of the attacker, the relative power balance, the attacker's motivation, and political culture of the countries involved). Their findings indicate that core value dispositions did influence opinions regarding the use of force in these different experimental situations. They also noted significant interactions between the individuals political disposition (or ideology) and the context of the intervention. This work gives further credence that there is some causal connection between a foreign policy ideology and more specific foreign policy opinions, and furthermore demonstrated that not all core dispositions will have the same influence.

A Theory on the Effects of a Foreign Policy Ideology

Previous scholarship, most notably Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) and Herrmann et al. (1999) have made a convincing argument that ideology certainly matters when it

comes to foreign policy attitudes. This theory refines their arguments and provide a more complete picture of the role of ideology on attitude formation.

Let us begin by laying out a number of assumptions. First, I assume that individuals tend to be cognitive misers when it comes to politics in general (Fiske and Taylor 1984, Lau and Sears 1986), and even more so when it comes to foreign policy events. In many cases, the public has a hard time naming countries on a map, let alone understand foreign policy issues. Part of this stems from a second assumption, in that foreign policy tends to be a "hard" issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Domestic issues tend to be easier for individuals comprehend because they usually have some experience with the issue. For example, same-sex marriage is a fairly straightforward issue for many. However, the intricacies of foreign events can be daunting, especially for those who don't pay attention in the first place.

Direct Effect

Because people are cognitive misers and foreign events tend to be difficult issues to comprehend, they have to look to some source to assist in understanding and forming preferences around these events. The basic argument is that a source individuals will turn to is their foreign policy ideology (or worldviews). Individuals will draw on their foreign policy ideology as a schema to attempt to fill in the blanks on foreign policy issues and form an attitude (Feldman 1988, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Peffley and Hurwitz 1993, Lau et al. 1991, Hamill et al. 1985, Conover and Feldman 1984, Taylor and Crocker 1981). Hamill et al. 1985 (pg. 852) note that schemas have a wide range of influence on cognitive functions:

They (1) provide categories for labeling people, places, events, and processes, thereby simplifying the environment, (2) influence what new information will be attended to, encoded, and retrieved from memory, (3) enable the individual to make inferences from incomplete data by filling in missing information with best guesses, (4) provide a plan for solving problems and making more confident decisions, (5) influence the weighting of evidence brought to bear in making decisions and predictions, and (6) generate expectations against which reality is contrasted and one's experiences are compared.

In essence, schema theory would argue that in foreign policy situations, individuals draw from their prior generic foreign policy information and knowledge (which would be their foreign policy ideology) to structure how they interpret the entire situation, and also form preferences regarding this event. A key component here is that ideology will structure how the entire event is perceived. What this argues is that ideology does not just influence an attitude, such as support or oppose a conflict, but it influences every aspect of how the individual perceives the event; such as if the event is perceived as important to US interests, if the event actually poses a danger to his or her country, or if the country is doing the right thing by intervening or not intervening. When an individual encounters a new foreign conflict, they put on their ideological blinders, in a sense, and view the event through this lens. This leads to the first general hypothesis on the role of a foreign policy ideology in attitude formation.

Hypothesis 1: An individual's foreign policy ideology should directly influence his or her attitudes regarding foreign policy events.

As discussed in earlier chapters, a foreign policy ideology consists of two different dimensions: a militant dimension and a cooperative dimension. Individuals will vary in both of these dimensions, and each of these dimensions should influence how one perceives foreign events. However, one additional key aspect is the connection between

ideology and the event context. The nature of the event should determine which ideological dimension is triggered and used to interpret an event. Jentleson (1992) and Jentleson and Britton (1998) showed that foreign events can fall into a number of different policy objective categories. We should expect that events that tend to fall into a more security oriented fashion (e.g. rogue nation producing nuclear weapons [which would be one of Jentleson's foreign policy restraint missions]) would trigger the militant dimension to help interpret and form preferences around an event. At the same time, over the last few decades, the international community has become involved in a wide range of more humanitarian type of interventions (Jentleson and Britton 1998). We should expect that these types of interventions would trigger interpretations from the cooperative dimension.

As for expectations, we should expect individuals to interpret security related events through the lens of the militant dimension. Since individuals see the world through this more security oriented lens, they should support the use of force for these types of missions. They should also perceive leader actions and new events, tied to these missions, to be interpreted through this militant lens. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding how the militant dimension influences preferences and perceptions.

Hypothesis 2: Security oriented missions should be interpreted through the lens of the militant dimension and individuals who are more militant in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force compared to less militant individuals.

In the same respect, we should expect humanitiarian based missions to be interpreted through the cooperative dimension. Also, individuals with a stronger

cooperative orientation should be more supportive when the issue at hand is regarding humanitarian issues. Since individuals see the world as one global environment, they should believe in the need to help other states or people when facing harm or injustice.

Hypothesis 3: Humanitarian oriented missions should be interpreted through the lens of the cooperative dimension and individuals who are more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force compared to less cooperative individuals.

Let us take an example and trace this preference formation process. A rogue nation has developed the capability to attack the United States and has threated to do so. This situation is clearly security oriented. Given this, it will activate the militant ideological dimension and the individual will interpret the event through his or her placement on this dimension. Perceptions of the event (such as importance, level of threat, and rightness of the mission) all are viewed through this lens. In this case, we would expect this individual to perceive the event as highly important and threatening, and also believe that intervention is the right thing to do. At the same time, evaluations of policy and changing events throughout the intervention (for example, mission achievements) may also be interpreted by the individual's ideology. Again, in this case, we would expect this individual to evaluate the leader harshly if the leader backs down from the conflict or fails in the conflict, but positively if the leader successfully neutralizes the threat.

In summary, the theoretical argument from this section is that because individuals tend to have little information and knowledge on foreign policy, they turn to their foreign policy ideology as a schema to structure their interpretation of a foreign policy event.

Because a foreign policy ideology is multidimensional, the dimension that is triggered is dependent on the foreign event. Events that are security in nature will trigger the militant dimension where more humanitarian or global events will trigger the cooperative dimension. Once this ideological dimension is triggered, it will help shape the way the individual perceives the event and also the individual's preferences.

This assumes, however, that individuals are at least able to identify the basic feature of a military intervention (is it security in nature or global/humanitarian) and then trigger the appropriate ideological dimension to interpret the event. Certainly, there may be situations when this is more difficult. One example of this is the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011. While pushed as a humanitarian intervention, given the security and threatening history of Libya, it could be interpreted as a security issue as well. In this situation, ideology would still interpret the event, but hypothesizing which dimension is more difficult[14].

Indirect Effect

As mentioned previously, the theoretical underpinnings of the direct effects of a foreign policy ideology is not new (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999) but the connection is largely understudied. The second connection, the indirect effect, draws heavily from research on political psychology but has not yet been applied to foreign policy.

Like domestic ideology, a foreign policy ideology is a worldview that is formed well before an individual forms an attitude towards a specific foreign policy event. When

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[14] I explore this intervention in Chapter 5.

an event occurs, an established worldview is already in place for the individual. This is not to say that adjustments to ideology cannot be made over time, but it is simply that we should expect an ideology to come before an attitude or event (Peffley and Hurwitz 1993). Because this ideology is formed prior to foreign policy events, it can shape and bias how we perceive these events.

This theory that a foreign policy ideology biases how individuals interpret new information and indirectly influences attitude formation stems from research on motivated reasoning (e.g. Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002 Redlawsk et al. 2010, Taber et al. 2001). When individuals are tasked with making an evaluation on some aspect (i.e. candidate, issue, group), they tend to be motivated to maintain their existing evaluation, even in the face of new information (Redlawsk 2002, Taber and Lodge 2006). [15] Individuals prefer consistency and will actively seek out consistent information (Taber and Lodge 2006) while actively attempt to discredit inconsistent information (Redlawsk 2002, 2010). To maintain this consistency, new information will be shaped by the prior beliefs of the individual. Taber (2003, pg 436) notes, "external factors do not directly cause aggregate public opinion but rather pass through the perceptions and information processing of individual citizens." For example, Lau et al. (1991) found that when faced with two competing interpretations of a proposal, individuals were more likely to support the interpretation that was closer to their general beliefs. In essence, prior beliefs color the way new information is interpreted and accepted, and act as a gatekeeper to new information. Prior information may allow

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[15] When the goal is accuracy, individuals seem better able to process incongruent information (Redlawsk 2002). Also, there is a tipping point to incongruent information where individuals will move away from their original evaluation (Redlawsk et al. 2010).

consistent information to update beliefs where it may deny inconsistent information from doing that or altering the interpretation beforehand.

Individuals will maintain this biased reasoning because they do not like information that challenges their priors. Lodge and Taber (2005, pg. 456) note:

> People appear unable to break free of their prior sentiments when evaluating arguments on political issues, even when they are motivated to be impartial. They are apt to see congruent arguments as inherently stronger than those which are attitudinally incongruent; they spend time and cognitive resources counterarguing the points that challenge their priors; they seek to insulate themselves from challenging information by actively searching out congruent information.

What we essentially get is a situation where an individual has a prior belief on a certain issue or candidate. When this individual is exposed to new information from elites, the media, or other information sources, we should expect it to update this individual's preference or attitude in an even-handed way (all information is processed evenly). This updating is consistent with what rational theorists argue (e.g. Gerber and Green 1999). However, what Lodge, Taber and others have found (Taber and Lodge 2005, Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002 Redlawsk et al. 2010, Taber et al. 2001), is that this updating is heavily dependent on the prior beliefs of the individual where congruent and incongruent information are not treated the same.

Applying this to how a foreign policy ideology may indirectly influence attitudes is simply an extension of this theory to a foreign policy situation. Prior beliefs in a foreign policy situation consist of the individual's foreign policy ideology. Given that ideology is a collection of beliefs (Converse [1964] refers to ideology as a belief system) this extension seems logical. We can assume that an individual will go into a situation with a foreign policy ideology already established that can shape how the individual

perceives the event. Once this established evaluation for the event is created, new information from elites and context must pass through the ideological filter of the individual. This filtering can be especially powerful for an ideology because not maintaining consistency challenges an entire worldview. Jost et al. (2003, pg. 341) comment, "Ideology is perhaps the quintessential example of hot cognition, in that people are highly motivated to perceive the world in ways that satisfy their needs, values, and prior epistemic commitments." This leads to the another general hypothesis.

> Hypothesis 4: An individual's foreign policy ideology should influence how he or she interprets new information regarding a foreign policy event.

What this essentially tells us is that new information should not be interpreted uniformly by the public. For example, the concept of military casualties and their effect on opinion has been a long studied topic (Mueller 1973, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner 2008a). In general, the idea is that casualties impact preferences in a similar manner (i.e. when casualties increase, support among all individuals decrease). What the indirect effect theory argues is that casualties are first interpreted through the individual's ideological lens. If the event is seen as important to the individual, based on their ideology (i.e. militant sees a security event as important), then the individual would be more casualty tolerant compared to someone who did not see the event as important (i.e. non-militant sees a security event as less important). The same could be argued with partisan effects. In general, we should expect individuals who share the partisanship of the leader to be more supportive and forgiving of the leader compared to individuals who do not share the partisanship. However, this partisan effect may be altered by the individual's ideology. Partisan effects may not work for individuals who strongly

disagree with the leaders actions based off ideology where they may work if the individual does not have such a strong ideological push one way or another.

Going back to our two dimensions of foreign policy ideology, we should have the following expectations when it comes to how ideology indirectly impacts attitude formation.

The militant dimension covers the security aspect of foreign policy. We expect that those with more militant worldviews would be more supportive of the use of force in security oriented events (direct effect). At the same time, given the assumption that a foreign policy event is first interpreted through the ideological lens, future information regarding that event should be interpreted in a biased manner (Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk et al. 2010). Given this biased interpretation, stimuli that support the militant worldview should be more likely to be accepted by the individual and those stimuli that oppose the worldview of the individual be more likely to be ignored or explained away.

We can expect the same effect from the cooperative dimension and humanitarian events. An individual should first interpret an event through their ideological lens. Subsequent stimuli (cues and events) may be interpreted in a biased manner depending on if the stimuli agree or oppose the worldview of the individual. This leads to the following formal hypothesis.

Hypothesis 5: External stimuli (elite cues and contextual events) should influence foreign policy attitudes but the impact of the stimuli may be indirectly altered by how much the message agrees with the foreign policy ideology of the individual.

Let me finish with an example of expectations from the theory on the indirect effect. An individual with a free market economic ideology may read half a dozen media

reports blaming the economic downturn on the irresponsibility of the private sector and only one report blaming government intervention. Normally, we should expect the 6 reports to push the individual towards blaming the private sector, but given this individual's belief in small government and free business, he or she may discount these other reports while clinging to the one report that agrees with his or her worldview. In the same respect, a non-militant may discount elite calls for military action against a nation for posing a threat to the interests of the United States because he or she does not believe that military action is justified or will solve the problem. Instead, this individual may look for arguments supporting continued negotiations or sanctions to support his or her prior beliefs.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out the theory behind the hypotheses and empirical tests found in the remaining chapters. Essentially, the argument calls for researchers to consider that individuals have some internal feature driving their decision making, in addition to the current explanations, that rely on the role of the stimulus. It argues that an internal worldview can drive how individuals form preferences for foreign events and can also alter how individuals perceive stimuli regarding the that event.

This theory will be tested in a number of ways (see Table 4.1 for a chapter breakdown). First of all, chapter 5 will explore the direct effect argument by testing the role of ideology on policy preferences on a number of public opinion surveys. While public opinion survey's work well at attempting to identify a direct effect, an indirect effect is much more difficult to identify with public opinion surveys. Because of that,

survey experiments in chapters 6 and 7 will allow for a more proper test of an indirect effect. Chapter 6 uses data acquired through a survey experiment on audience costs to see if ideology alters individual evaluations of executives during an audience cost event. It also tests to see the impact of stimuli differ depending on the ideology orientation and intensity of the individual. Specifically, it explores if ideology can modify the partisan effect on leader evaluations. Chapter 7 also tests this indirect effect but uses a survey experiment regarding military intervention and casualties. In this experiment, I look to how ideology shapes tolerance of casualties. Casualties are traditionally used as an independent variable in analyses of support for military intervention. This chapter explores how ideology can indirectly influence support by shaping individual casualty tolerance.

Figure 4.1: Visual Presentation of the Direct and Indirect Effect Theory

Table 4.1: List of General Hypotheses

	Hypotheses	Chapter(s) Tested
Hypothesis 1	An individual's foreign policy ideology should directly influence his or her attitudes regarding foreign policy events.	5 to 7
Hypothesis 2	Security oriented missions should be interpreted through the lens of the militant dimension and individuals who are more militant in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force compared to less militant individuals.	5 to 7
Hypothesis 3	Humanitarian oriented missions should be interpreted through the lens of the cooperative dimension and individuals who are more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force compared to less cooperative individuals.	5 to 7
Hypothesis 4	An individual's foreign policy ideology should influence how he or she interprets new information regarding a foreign policy event.	6 and 7
Hypothesis 5	External stimuli (elite cues and contextual events) should influence foreign policy attitudes but the impact of the stimuli may be indirectly altered by how much the message agrees with the foreign policy ideology of the individual.	6 and 7

CHAPTER 5

IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON CONFLICT

PREFERENCES - SURVEY ANALYSIS

Introduction

The previous chapter developed a theoretical model to explain how individuals form their preferences when it comes to conflict events. Specifically, it called for the inclusion of a foreign policy ideology into the existing explanations that focus on the role of the stimuli in driving preferences. This chapter now tests one aspect of the theoretical model, the direct effect of ideology on conflict event policy preferences.

We begin with an empirical analysis of how ideology impacts policy preferences regarding conflict events for a number of reasons. First of all, one of the basic foundations of Democratic peace is that the public has the capability to check the actions of leaders (McGillivray and Smith 2006, Smith 1998, Fearon 1994). The public is indeed a powerful force in democratic governments and how it exercises this power is through voting. For decades, the way scholarship has attempted to get a sense of the public mood and how individuals will vote is through getting a sense of attitudes and policy preferences. Secondly, a focus on conflict events tends to be the most salient of foreign policy events. The United States is involved in a wide range of foreign relations, such as trade, environmental concerns, human rights, and, of course, conflict events. While all of these are important aspects of US foreign relations, conflict events tend to be the type of events that the public pays attention to and have the potential to impact elections (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006, Campbell 2004, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006). In addition, while foreign policy issues tend to be "harder" issues for the public (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987,

Carmines and Stimson 1980), conflict events may at least be the easiest of foreign policy issues for individuals to understand and conceptualize. With conflict issues the public usually understands issues, such as deploying troops or casualties , and war aims are usually defined[16] where trade issues get lost in a wide range of business, legal and diplomatic jargon.

To make this assessment, I turn to a number of different sources of public opinion data. The first comes from a 2006 public opinion survey from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA). From the 2006 CCGA, I explore how ideology influences preferences on military troop usage on a number of hypothetical scenarios. Secondly, I turn to the Fall 2010 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll to explore how ideology shapes preferences for troop maintenance in the Afghanistan war. Third, I turn to the Spring 2011 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll to assess attitudes towards the US military involvement in Libya.

The use of this wide range of data sources and empirical tests is important to truly parse out the relationship between ideology and event preferences. Specifically, it is hypothesized that ideology will influence preferences, but that influence is conditioned on the event context (ie. militant dimension should influence preferences for security related issues where cooperative dimension should influence preferences for humanitarian related issues). The use of these different data sources allow for a thorough analysis of this hypothesized relationship. The CCGA data allows for an analysis of how ideology drives preferences in hypothetical foreign policy situations of both a humanitarian and security nature. The two Hawkeye Poll surveys allow for the analysis

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[16] Or at least some goal or purpose is provided to the public by the President.

of ideology on preferences towards both the Afghanistan War (a security oriented conflict) and the airstrikes in Libya (an intervention argued to be humanitarian in nature but given Libya's history, can also be seen as security oriented).

The focus of this chapter is on the direct effect of a foreign policy ideology on policy preferences. Expectations from the theory in chapter 4 argue that along with existing explanations (elite cues and context/rational calculations), an individual's ideology should help determine his or her preferences on foreign policy events. Essentially, the focus of this chapter is on exploring the benefit of including a foreign policy ideology in models of attitude formation. Do we get a more complete model of attitude formation by including an individual's ideology? Results point towards the usefulness of including ideology in attitude formation models and that ideology can and does play a strong role where existing explanations may not always help explain the story. Below, I will discuss hypotheses for the direct effect. After explaining the chapter hypotheses, I move to describing the models and empirical results for each of the data sets. Finally, I will conclude with a discussion of the results.

The Direct Effect of Ideology on Attitudes - Hypotheses

As stated in chapter 4, the direct effect argument is that an individual possess a foreign policy ideology that represents his or her abstract view of the world. When new conflict events arise, ideology provides a guide by allowing individual's to draw from their prior abstract worldview in an attempt to analyze the event and form policy preferences around that event. Essentially, the individual's ideology will structure how he or she sees the event and the preferred action for that event. Depending on how an

individual sees the world (more or less militant along with more or less cooperative), this ideology should then influence the overall preference for that foreign event.

Let us now turn to each of the ideological dimensions. The militant dimension focuses on the notion of security. This dimension informs an individual as to how dangerous the world is, how international matters should be handled, or at least what is proper, and how important security matters should be to a state. Essentially, it focuses on how threatening the world is and how states should act in this threatening or non-threatening global environment. In regards to how this dimension should influence policy preferences, we should expect individuals with a stronger militant orientation to generally be more supportive when the issue at hand is regarding security issues. Since they see the world through this more security oriented lens, they should support the use of force for these types of missions. In contrast, individuals with a less militant worldview see the world as less threatening and more peaceful. These individuals would be more likely to support prolonged negotiations and continued stalling tactics because in the end they may not see a security issue to truly develop into a significant problem. For example, if a state threatens to launch a missile at the US, an individual with a more militant ideology will take the threat seriously, and may even overreact to the threat, where a less militant individual may see it as an empty threat. This leads to the following hypotheses regarding how the militant dimension influences attitudes.

H1: The more militant an individual is in their foreign policy ideology, the more likely he or she should support the use of force in security oriented missions.

The cooperative dimension focuses on the idea of a global society. This dimension informs individuals as to how cooperative the global environment is and should be. Should the global community work together to solve the ills of the world or should states only concern themselves with their best interest? Should states make sacrifices to help other states in crisis situations? In regards to how this dimension should influence policy preferences, we should expect individuals with a stronger cooperative orientation to generally be more supportive of the use of force when the issue at hand is regarding humanitarian issues. Since they see the world as one global environment, they should believe in the need to help other states or people when facing harm or injustice. Individuals without this more cooperative worldview would see injustices in other states as their own problem and not something that our country should be concerned with. This leads to the following hypotheses regarding how the cooperative dimension influences attitudes.

> H2: The more cooperative an individual is in their foreign policy ideology, the more likely he or she should support the use of force in humanitarian oriented missions.

I now turn to the empirical analysis for each of the different data sets, beginning with the 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs Survey and then following with two different national samples from the University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll.

2006 Chicago Council Data

A good start to this exploration of ideology influence on attitude preferences for foreign policy is to see how ideology shapes preferences for military use. For this, I turn

to data from the 2006 CCGA. The 2006 CCGA contains a wide range of foreign policy questions to tap into different ideological dimensions and also preferences for military use.

The dependent variable in this set of models is preference for use of troops in a number of different hypothetical scenarios. The question asks:

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops:

Four scenarios were used as dependent variables: 1) to ensure the oil supply, 2) to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, 3) to deal with a humanitarian crisis, and 4) to be a part of an international peacekeeping force to stop the killing in Darfur. We should expect the militant dimension to be a significant predictor at explaining preferences for troop use in the first two scenarios (with individuals scoring higher in the militant dimension to be more supportive of troop use). At the same time, we should not expect the cooperative dimension to explain preferences for these first two scenarios since they are security issues. Also, we should expect the cooperative dimension to be a significant predictor at explaining preferences in the second two scenarios (with individuals scoring higher in the cooperative dimension to be more supportive of troop use in these scenarios), where we should expect no relationship from the militant dimension. The dependent variable is measured dichotomously (1=support and 0 = oppose) and measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors that are clustered by state.

The primary independent variable of interest consists of the two foreign policy ideological dimensions (militant and cooperative). These dimensions are created by

factor analyzing the 14 foreign policy importance questions in the CCGA[17] (Chittick et al. 1995). These 14 questions ask respondents how important the specific issue should be as a foreign policy goal of the United States. Respondents can answer "very important," "somewhat important," or "not very important." Only factor loadings greater than .4 are displayed in Table 5.1. The cooperative dimension consisted of 5 items that loaded over .4 and the militant dimension consisted of 3 items that loaded over .4.[18]. The measures are continuous and range from -3.64 to 1.17 for the militant dimension and -2.40 to 1.80 for the cooperative dimension. Higher values indicate more militant/cooperative.

Beyond these primary explanatory variables, a wide range of control variables are used in the model. First, and most importantly, are controls for partisan identification. Party identification is a strong predictor of attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960) and has been shown to be quite important in foreign policy attitudes (Berinsky 2007, Groeling and Baum 2007, Sulfaro 1996). Party identification is controlled for by a seven point ordinal scale with 1 indicating strong Democrat and 7 indicating strong Republican.

Domestic ideology, from a liberal and conservative standpoint, has been used widely in public opinion studies, but its usefulness has been suspect, especially in foreign policy areas (Feldman 2003, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009, Kinder 1998, Herrmann et al. 1999). While some connection between ideology from left/right perspective has been

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[17] The use of the foreign policy importance questions in the CCGA most closely resembles the research of Chittick et al. (1995), who used the importance questions in the 1974, 1978, 1982 and 1986 CCGA, along with other studies. While questions on this "importance" battery have somewhat changed, the dimension loadings match fairly closely to Chittick's mulitlaterlaism-unilateralism scale and militarism-nonmilitarism scale.

[18] An iterated principle factor analysis was performed on the 14 items. The first factor consisted of the cooperative dimension. The second factor consisted of the militant dimension. I then use the factor analysis to predict the militant and cooperative variables.

noted with dimensions such as militant or cooperative (Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004), left right does not match directly to any foreign policy worldviews. However, it is still important to control for domestic ideology. Ideology is measured by a 6 point variable where 1 indicates extremely liberal and 6 indicates extremely conservative.

Political knowledge may also be important variables to consider given that foreign policy issues tend to be "hard" issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). Knowledge may be a prerequisite for having strong attitudes on foreign policy issues or may interact with other stimuli to form attitudes (Berinsky 2007, Krosnick and Kinder1990, Krosnick and Brannon 1993, Baum 2002, Zaller 1992). Knowledge is measured by a 3 point scale indicating if the respondent was able to correctly answer two foreign policy knowledge questions (name of Europe's common currency, and name of UN Secretary General).

Demographic factors have also been shown to play a part in an individual's foreign policy opinions. Fite et al. (1990) explored how gender differences played a role in public opinion towards foreign policy. They found that gender differences did have a significant effect on foreign policy opinions. Specifically, women were less supportive of military use and military aid, less supportive of containment, and more supportive of communication with the USSR. I control for gender by including an indicator variable for females.

Work by both Mayer (2004) and Baumgartner et al. (2008) explored how a religion played a role in foreign policy opinions. Mayer (2004) found that those individuals who identified as Christian fundamentalists were significantly more likely to show support for Israel. Baumgartner et al. (2008) found that Evangelical Christians

were also found to be much more supportive of Israel. In addition, they also found that Evangelicals were strong supporters of the war in Iraq and had much more negative views towards Islam. To control for religious effects, indicator variables for different religious traditions are included (Protestant, Catholic, Secular)[19].

Finally additional standard socio-demographic variables are included. Controls for the age, education, income, and race/ethnicity of the respondent are included. Education and income are measured as ordinal variables, where age is measured continuously. Race/ethnicity is measured with indicator variables for nonwhites.[20]

Empirical Results – CCGA

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide logistic regression results for support for the use of US troops in four hypothetical foreign policy situations. Table 5.2 presents the models without foreign policy ideology and 5.3 presents with ideology included. Comparing the two tables, we see that the inclusion of ideology improves the model fit considerably (as shown by the Pseudo R-squared doubling in the models as well as the proportional reduction in error increasing over 10 points).

When considering the role of foreign policy ideology on troop usage support (Table 5.3), the results line up closely with expectations. For more security oriented issues (ensuring the oil supply [Model 1] and preventing Iran from acquiring nukes [Model 2]), the militant dimension is positive and strongly significant. Substantively,

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[19] Measures for religion are somewhat lacking in the CCGA, specifically a measure for Evangelicals was not possible.

[20] See Table B1 in Appendix B for summary statistics for all variables used in the CCGA analysis.

this is also highly important.   The probability of support for one standard deviation below the militant dimension mean, the mean level, and one standard deviation above the militant mean goes from .36 to .50 to .64 for Model 1 (ensuring the oil supply) and .49 to .69 to .83 for Model 2 (preventing Iran from acquiring nukes). What we see is a considerable difference in support for individuals depending on where they are on the militant dimension. Individuals with a highly militant ideology see the world in a much more security oriented manner and are willing to use troops in these areas. On the other hand, individuals who score very low on the militant ideology dimension are highly unlikely to engage in such actions.

Turning to Models 3 and 4 (Table 5.3), now the cooperative dimension of a foreign policy ideology matters significantly and substantively. Both of these cases involve a more humanitarian type of intervention (Model 3 involves a humanitarian crisis and Model 4 involves peacekeeping) and individuals who score more highly on the cooperative dimension are much more likely to support troop usage in these scenarios. The probability of support for one standard deviation below the cooperative mean, the mean level, and one standard deviation above the cooperative mean goes from .52 to .72 to .86 for Model 3 (humanitarian crisis) and .50 to .69 to .83 for Model 4 (peacekeeping mission). Not surprisingly, the militant dimension is not significant in these two models. These two scenarios do not cover issues that should fall within the realm of the militant dimension and so this dimension really should not matter in explaining preferences.

Turning to the wide number of control variables, there are some additional interesting results. First, party identification is significant for only security oriented missions but not on humanitarian issues. This indicates that Republicans are generally

more likely to support troop usage on security issues but there is no difference between the parties when it comes to humanitarian issues[21]. Another interesting result comes from political knowledge. Individuals with higher levels of political knowledge are less supportive of troop use in security oriented areas (Models 1 and 2) but tend to be more supportive in humanitarian issues (only Model 4). Finally, we see that domestic ideology does not perform well in these models. Ideology is only significant at the .10 level in models 3 and 4 and indicates that conservatives tend to be less supportive of troop usage in humanitarian issues.

The results from these first tables provide a number of insights. First, a foreign policy ideology certainly matters when it comes to the use of troops and different dimensions of this ideology matter depending on the context of the intervention (similar to Herrmann et al. 1999). The militant dimension of a foreign policy ideology explains support for more security oriented issues where the cooperative dimension explains support in more humanitarian types of missions. Secondly, we see that the generic liberal/conservative ideology performs extremely poor. Left/right just doesn't work in the vastly complex foreign policy arena. This gives addition support to the notion of a separate ideology for foreign policy. Also, party identification was significant but only for security oriented issues. This makes sense given that Republicans tend to be considered hawks in general. However, the lack of significance of party identification in some areas may be due to a lack of elite cues in these situations (Popkin 1991, Lau and Redlawsk 2006, Berinsky 2007). If individuals were faced with the same situation but

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[21] Correlations between party identification and the militant dimension is only .19 and party identification and the cooperative dimensions is only -.08. Correlations between domestic ideology and the militant dimension is .25 and party identification and the cooperative dimensions is only -.03.

were given elite cues, it is highly likely that we would have seen a stronger effect from party. Nonetheless, these results tell us that without party cues, an individual's ideology, or worldview, is a strong driver for intervention preferences.

The lack of partisan cues should not discount ideology for a number of reasons. First, the lack of partisan cues is not unrealistic. Brody (1991) and Brody and Shapiro (1989) argue that rally effects are based on the idea that the administration has a monopoly of information and opposition elites refrain from directly criticizing the government. In essence, partisan cues are incomplete in these situations because the opposition is not talking. Also, there is the possibility that an individual may learn of a foreign event from the media and does not have an immediate partisan cue to help interpret the information. So at the start of a conflict, individuals may not be able to turn to partisan cues in forming an attitude, and may only have their worldview to turn to. Once that attitude is formed, it may be difficult to alter by elite/partisan cues (Redlawsk et al. 2010, Taber and Lodge 2006).

Also, a lack of partisan cue is not unrealistic when the parties, themselves, are in disagreement over conflict support. The most recent example of this is the conflict in Libya. President Obama strongly defended his decision but many democratic elites were not convinced. Some democrats, such as Representative Kucinich, went as far as to accuse the President of violating the constitution and international law.[22] In the same token, some Republicans elites, such as John McCain, supported the conflict where others, such as Ron Paul, did not. Another sign of conflict within Republican elites is on

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[22] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-dennis-kucinich/libya-and-beyond-how-did_b_934101.html, accessed 2-7-2012

June 24, 2011 where 89 House Republicans voted not to authorize military action in Libya, but flipped in a second vote that would have cut off funds to the intervention[23]. This is an example of a conflict where party identification is a worthless predictor but where ideology should prove quite useful.[24]

However, even if partisan cues were present, there is additional reason to believe that ideology would still play a strong role. While many have argued that partisanship does not actually stop at the water's edge (e.g. Berinsky 2007, Jacobson 2008), party cohesiveness is more strained on foreign issues compared to domestic issues (see Libya). Also, the confluence of ideologies within parties, themselves, can lead to a weakness of party. For example, a libertarian Republican (i.e. Ron Paul) opposes nearly any form of military intervention. While Republican, this libertarian would be much closer to dove Democrats on foreign issues.

The Afghanistan War – Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll Data

In hypothetical foreign policy scenarios, we see that an individual's foreign policy ideology has strong explanatory power. Now let us turn to a real world event: the war in Afghanistan. In the fall of 2010 a nationwide poll was conducted by the University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll, and a number of questions regarding Afghanistan were asked of respondents. Specifically, respondents were asked the following question regarding troop maintenance:

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[23] http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/house-takes-up-a-rebuke-to-obamas-libya-policy/, accessed 2-7-2012

[24] I actually do analyze Libya attitudes at the end and show exactly this.

> From what you know about the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, how much longer would you be willing to have U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan: less than a year, one to two years, two to five years, or as long as it takes?

This question forms the dependent variable for the analysis in this section. A three point measure is created where 1 indicates wanting to have troops remain for less than a year, 2 indicates having troops remain between one and five years, and 3 indicates a willingness to keep troops indefinitely.[25] Essentially, preference for troops to remain or leave could be seen as a proxy for conflict support. There is a good split between these individuals with 42% of respondents wanting troops out within a year where 35% supported an indefinite timetable. Given the categorical nature of this dependent variable, multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors is used.[26] Also, hypotheses will be tested in a similar manner to that of the CCGA analysis.

Measures for a militant and cooperative dimension are formed using four foreign policy questions in the Hawkeye Poll. Individuals were given four different general statements about foreign policy and then asked how much they agreed with the statements (a five point scale was used). Using iterated principle factor analysis (similar

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[25] I modeled and analyzed this dependent variable a number of ways and maintained similar results regardless of how the dependent variable was coded. One way was by breaking this question into two dependent variables (immediate withdraw vs other) and (indefinite stay vs other) and ran two separate logit models. I also ran the three point dependent variable as an ordered logit model and received nearly identical results. I chose a multinomial logit over an ordered logit because the ordered logit model failed parallel regression assumption tests and the dependent variable is more categorical in nature.

[26] See Table B2 in Appendix B for summary statistics of all variables used in the Afghanistan analysis.

to the earlier analysis), two of the questions tap into a militant dimension and the other two tap into a cooperative dimension (See Table 5.4).[27]

A wide range of control variables are also included in the two models. First, party identification is measured as a 7 point ordinal scale with 1 being strong Democrat and 7 being strong Republican. Ideology is measured as a 7 point scale with 1 being extremely liberal and 7 being extremely conservative.

In addition, a number of questions were asked to get a sense of the respondent's context in regards to the war. First, we have numerous measures for casualty context (Mueller 1973, Gartner et al. 1997, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gartner et al. 2004, Gartner and Segura 2008). In one question respondents were asked to estimate the total number of US troop casualties in the Afghanistan war. That value was then logged. A second measure attempts to get at a current casualty rate/context. Respondents were asked if they believed the monthly US casualty rate in Afghanistan was increasing, decreasing, or staying the same. Indicator variables are created for decreasing and staying the same with increasing as the reference category. Finally, following Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, we measure if respondents believe the US will eventually win the war in Afghanistan. Respondents who believed the US would eventually win were coded 1 and those who did not were coded 0.

Many other controls are very similar to those used in the earlier analysis. Knowledge is measured by a subjective self-identified measure of how well the respondent feels they understand politics. It is a 5 point scale where higher values equal

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[27] The questions used in the Hawkeye Poll mirror questions used in other foreign policy ideology/belief studies (Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Herrmann et al. 1999, Herrmann and Keller 2004) and factor analysis placed the variables in dimensions similar to where they were placed in these other analyses.

higher knowledge. Ordinal measures are also included for education and income.

Race/ethnicity is measured by an indicator variable where 1 equals nonwhite and 0 white.

Gender/sex is measured by an indicator variable where 1 equals female and 0 male. Age

is measured as a continuous variable. Finally, two measures for religion are included.

First is a measure of religious attendance is included. It is a 6 point ordinal measure

where higher values indicate greater attendance. Also, indicator variables for

Evangelicals, Catholics, and seculars are included.

Empirical Results - Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll

Table 5.5 provides the multinomial logistic regression results for preferences in

maintaining troops in Afghanistan. Pulling troops out within a year is the baseline

category for comparison and much of this analysis will be comparing this baseline to

keeping troops indefinitely. In essence, I am comparing the extremes. As in the earlier

models, foreign policy ideology again plays a statistically significant role in policy

preferences. Individuals with a more militant ideology are more likely to support

maintaining troops indefinitely and much less likely to support withdrawing troops within

a year. Substantively, going from one standard deviation below the mean to the mean to

one standard deviation above the mean militant levels increases the probability of

supporting an indefinite stay from .10 to .18 to .30. The probability of wanting to pull

troops within a year drops from .61 (-1SD) to .51 (mean) to .40 (+1SD). Not

surprisingly, the cooperative dimension is not significant in either model. Given that

Afghanistan is largely a security issue, we should not expect this dimension to explain

preferences here.

In addition to the militant dimension being highly significant, party identification is also significant. Republicans are much less likely to support an immediate withdraw and much more likely to support an indefinite troop presence. The probability of supporting an indefinite stay goes from .11 for strong Democrats to .18 for independents to .28 for Republicans, with the probability of supporting removal of troops within a year going from .62 (strong Democrats) to .51 (independents) to .40 (strong Republicans). This significance is not terribly surprising since Republican elites have largely supported an extended timetable where Democratic elites have called for a more rapid withdraw. As in the earlier models using the CCGA data, domestic ideology (left/right) once again plays no role in explaining policy preferences. Another variable that is highly significant is views on the likelihood of winning the war. Similar to results on Iraq from Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, individuals who believe the war will be won are significantly more likely to prefer to keep troops indefinitely and not withdraw immediately. Believing in eventual victory increases the probability of supporting an indefinite stay from .18 to .37 and decreases supporting a withdrawal within a year from .51 to .29. Finally, the log of estimated casualties is also significant ($p < .05$). Individuals who believed the number of casualties were high were more likely to withdraw troops sooner rather than later. Substantively, supporting an indefinite troops stay goes from .21 (-1SD) to .18 (mean) to .15 (+1SD). The probability of wanting troops out within a year goes from .48 (-1SD) to .51 (mean) to .55 (+1SD).

Looking at the results from the Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll, we get an interesting insight into what aspects are driving preferences for troop usage in the Afghanistan war. Not surprisingly, party identification plays an important role. Party identification tends to

be a strong influence on attitudes across both domestic and foreign issues. At the same time, there is evidence for the idea that context influences preferences. Individuals who see the war as more costly, in the form of US troop casualties, are less likely to support an indefinite troop presence and more likely to support a quick withdrawal. Along with this, belief in an eventual victory appears to have a strong influence on maintaining troops indefinitely as opposed to withdrawing quickly. Also, the perception of casualties seems to push preferences. Finally, one of the strongest factors driving preferences in Afghanistan appear to an individual's foreign policy ideology, and specifically the militant dimension of that ideology. Individuals with a more militant worldview are much more likely to prefer to keep troops in Afghanistan indefinitely.

Essentially, evidence is shown that supports the two major lines of thought (elite cues and rational choice) as helping to explain foreign policy preferences. What is also shown; however, is that individual differences in how people see the international environment is also an important consideration for attitude formation. It is not just about the stimuli but also the individual as well. Evidence for this can be viewed by comparing the models in Table 5.5. Model 1 runs without ideology as predictors where model 2 is run with ideology. While there is an improvement in the model fit, it is minor. However, including ideology shows that even when controlling for all the traditional explanations, ideology still matters, and more so than the other explanations. Finally, by not including ideology, we are overstating the impact of the other variables.

The 2011 Libya Intervention – 2011 Hawkeye Poll Data

The Afghanistan intervention is based on the notion of security. However, the US

and NATO intervention in Libya in 2011 was based on the notion of humanitarian

intervention. In a national speech on March 28th, 2011, President Obama laid out the

reasons and goals for the Libya intervention. The President was very clear that the

mission was humanitarian based. For example, the President stated:

> Confronted by this brutal repression and a looming humanitarian crisis, I
> ordered warships into the Mediterranean. European allies declared their
> willingness to commit resources to stop the killing. … Qaddafi declared he
> would show "no mercy" to his own people. He compared them to rats,
> and threatened to go door to door to inflict punishment. In the past, we
> have seen him hang civilians in the streets, and kill over a thousand people
> in a single day. Now we saw regime forces on the outskirts of the city.
> We knew that if we wanted -- if we waited one more day, Benghazi, a city
> nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have
> reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world
> (The White House, 2011).

Jentleson and Britton (1998) state that in general, the public is largely supportive

of humanitarian based interventions. In addition, the public is also supportive when

interventions are multilateral (Chapman and Reiter 2004). However, for the Libya

intervention, many polls place aggregate public support at 40 to 50% approval in the

early months of the operation (www.pollingreport.com/libya). The low level of public

support is certainly an interesting question on its own, but more importantly, for this

research, the question becomes: what are the characteristics of an individual who

supports the intervention.

In a national poll, conducted between April 4 and April 11, 2011, the University

of Iowa Hawkeye Poll asked the following question: "Do you approve or disapprove of

the current US military intervention in Libya?" Respondents could answer approve or

disapprove. This question is the dependent variable for the following analysis. Given the dichotomous nature of the question, logistic regression is used for the analysis.[28] The testing of the hypotheses will be conducted in a similar manner to the earlier two analyses.

The key independent variable in the analysis is the foreign policy ideological stance of the individual. As in the Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll analysis, an iterated principle factor analysis was used on four general foreign policy questions to create a militant and a cooperative dimension for foreign policy ideology. Two of the questions tapped the militant dimension and two of the questions tapped the cooperative dimension (see Table 5.6).[29]

A wide range of control variables were also included in the models. Party identification is measured as a 7 point ordinal scale with 1 being strong Democrat and 7 being strong Republican. Ideology is measured as a 7 point scale with 1 being extremely liberal and 7 being extremely conservative. Knowledge is measured by a subjective self-identified measure of how well the respondent feels they understand politics. It is a 5 point scale where higher values equal higher knowledge. Ordinal measures are also included for education and income. Race/ethnicity is measured by an indicator variable where 1 equals nonwhite. Gender/sex is measured by an indicator variable where 1 equals female. Age is measured as a continuous variable. Religious attendance is a 6

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[28] 46% of respondents supported the Libya intervention. See Table B3 in Appendix B for summary statistics on all variables in the Libya analysis.

[29] Like the Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll, the four questions used to create the dimensions pull from other studies exploring foreign policy ideology (Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Herrmann et al. 1999, Herrmann and Keller 2004) and factor analysis placed the variables in dimensions similar to where they were placed in these other analyses.

point ordinal measure where higher values indicate greater attendance. Finally, indicator variables for Evangelical, Catholic, and Secular are included.

Empirical Results - Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll

Table 5.7 provides logistic regression results for explaining individual level support for the intervention in Libya. Model 1 provides results with the foreign policy ideology measures excluded where model 2 includes the ideology measures. One striking inference when looking at the two models is how important ideology is at explaining support for the Libyan intervention. In model 1, only domestic ideology and income are significant if we bump the significance level to $p < .10$. The ideology variable indicates that conservatives are less supportive of the intervention. The income measure indicates that the richer are more supportive. Switching to model 2, the foreign policy ideology measures are both highly significant where no other variable is significant, and the model fit is substantially improved. Surprisingly, both high militants and high cooperatives are more likely to support the Libyan intervention. For militants, the probability of support moves from .36 at one standard deviation below the mean to .49 for the mean score on the militant dimension to .63 for one standard deviation above the mean. For cooperatives, the corresponding probabilities are identical (.36, .49, and .63).

Results from Table 5.7 offer a number of interesting insights. First of all, both militants and cooperatives support the intervention. Given that the administration has claimed that the mission is humanitarian in nature, it is not surprising that cooperatives would be more supportive of the intervention. However, while this mission may be

officially titled a humanitarian mission, the removal of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi may be supported by militants given the history of al-Gaddafi's rouge dictatorship and militant actions (i.e. Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in 1988, nuclear ambitions). Secondly, party identification is not significant in this intervention. Certainly, the Libya conflict is confusing for partisans when support for the conflict splits the parties themselves. In this situation with conflicting partisan signs, it appears that individuals may only be able to rely on their ideology to form a policy preference.

Discussion

When researchers usually talk about what drives preferences about foreign policy issues, they tend to fall upon either an elite cue argument or some sort of rational choice/contextual argument. For example, if we discuss what drives attitudes in the Iraq war, we see aspects such as casualties (Gartner 2008a, Gartner and Segura 2008), belief in eventual victory or rightness of the conflict (Gelpi et al. 2005/2006), or elite cues (Berinsky 2007). One aim of this chapter is to bring research back to looking at the individual instead of focusing only on the stimuli. Specifically, one important individual level difference that we should devote more attention to is the idea that differing ideologies can shape foreign policy preferences. Using data from three different data sets regarding two different aspects of troop involvement, we see that a foreign policy ideology has a strong effect on individual level preferences. How a foreign policy ideology drives preferences also seems to depend on the context of the foreign event. Events that are more humanitarian in nature are driven by the cooperative dimension where security issues seem to be driven by the militant dimension. When specifically

exploring the current war in Afghanistan, we see that those with a much more militant oriented mindset are much more supportive of keeping troops indefinitely. Those who do not see the world as overly dangerous seem to be more likely to support a much more immediate withdrawal. In regards to the Libyan intervention, both the militant and cooperative dimensions of foreign policy ideology influence preferences. At first glance, this seems odd, given that the Libyan crisis is claimed to be humanitarian. However, as stated earlier, it is likely, although not certain, that this intervention may also be perceived from a more security standpoint given the history of its dictator.

What all this shows is that ideology matters, and it appears to matter more than some of the traditional explanations commonly used. In highly partisan foreign events, such as Afghanistan, party identification certainly matters, but it doesn't work in non-partisan events, such as Libya. Also, context and perception can play a predictive role. However, across the board, ideology plays a strong statistical and substantive role in driving preferences. In the end, I think this analysis highlights some very important points.

First, one could argue that it is not entirely surprising that ideology influences attitudes in such a way. This is a valid argument. However, if this is such a well-known concept, why do we rarely, if ever, see it in models of preference formation for foreign policy events? For domestic issues, models routinely include domestic ideology and find significant effects, so why should we not want to consider a foreign policy version of ideology and its impact? This analysis pushes the argument for considering a foreign policy ideology by demonstrating that ideology is empirically valid and needs to be considered in order to complete the preference formation picture. It shows that it is not

all about external stimuli but also about the individual. In addition, it adds clarity to the effects of the other traditional explanations. For example, models are presented with and without ideology included and excluding ideology overstates the impact of these other explanations considerably.

Second, this analysis clarifies the ideology/context interaction. While ideology does matter, it needs to have some context in order to really inform preferences. Specifically, the militant dimension appears to truly matter only in security issues where the cooperative dimension only matters in humanitarian issues. This shows that it is more than just an individual being more internationalist or more isolationist. There is a complex relationship between ideology <u>and</u> context and preference formation requires both pieces. It also shows that people do pay attention to events when they occur and are able to make the connection between the event itself and their worldview. People are not simply mindless partisans but conscious and rational individuals.

In the end, this chapter has shown that ideology does matter in directly influencing how individuals form their policy preferences when it comes to foreign policy events. The following chapters now move beyond the direct effect to exploring the indirect effect of ideology on preferences. Specifically, that ideology can influence how we receive external stimuli and perceive events.

Table 5.1: Factor Analysis of 14 Foreign Policy Items in 2006 CCGA

	Factor 1 Cooperative	Factor 2 Militant
1. Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression	0.6184	
2. Strengthening the United Nations		
3. Combating international terrorism		0.6784
4. Maintaining superior military power worldwide		0.6261
5. Protecting the jobs of American workers		
6. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations	0.4605	
7. Securing adequate supplies of energy		
8. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration		
9. Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations	0.7712	
10. Improving the global environment		
11. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons		0.5884
12. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries	0.7352	
13. Promoting economic growth		
14. Combating world hunger	0.6253	

Source: 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the United States

Note: Iterated Principle factor analysis conducted. Only items loading greater than .4 are displayed. Question reads as: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the U.S. might have. For each one, please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the U.S., a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all.

Table 5.2: Individual Level Support for Troop Usage in Specific Contexts (Without Foreign Policy Ideology)

	Model 1 Ensure Oil Supply		Model 2 Iran Nukes	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Party ID	0.123**	(0.040)	0.164**	(0.038)
Ideology	0.165*	(0.068)	0.206**	(0.066)
Female	0.124	(0.137)	0.118	(0.118)
Protestant	-0.103	(0.215)	0.037	(0.155)
Catholic	-0.080	(0.213)	0.010	(0.177)
Secular	-0.189	(0.200)	-0.163	(0.189)
Education	-0.097	(0.054)	-0.130*	(0.052)
Age	0.000	(0.004)	-0.005	(0.005)
Income	-0.051**	(0.016)	0.007	(0.017)
Nonwhite	0.084	(0.126)	-0.020	(0.159)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.386**	(0.111)	-0.392**	(0.078)
Constant	0.096	(0.417)	0.321	(0.410)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.06		0.07	
Percent Correctly Pred.	60%		68%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	17%		10%	
N	1135		1143	

Table 5.2 Continued

	Model 3 Humanitarian Crisis		Model 4 Peacekeeping	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Party ID	0.026	(0.033)	-0.079*	(0.036)
Ideology	-0.125	(0.066)	-0.068	(0.048)
Female	0.113	(0.150)	0.135	(0.139)
Protestant	0.040	(0.167)	0.454**	(0.175)
Catholic	0.202	(0.167)	0.112	(0.160)
Secular	-0.068	(0.210)	0.226	(0.178)
Education	0.043	(0.056)	-0.023	(0.033)
Age	-0.012**	(0.004)	0.002	(0.004)
Income	-0.040	(0.021)	0.005	(0.020)
Nonwhite	0.053	(0.197)	0.061	(0.118)
Pol. Knowledge	0.090	(0.106)	0.393**	(0.100)
Constant	1.781**	(0.502)	0.750*	(0.322)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.02		0.02	
Percent Correctly Pred.	70%		70%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	0%		0%	
N	1142		1130	

** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Source: 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Note: Models measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors.

Table 5.3: Individual Level Support for Troop Usage in Specific
Contexts (with Foreign Policy Ideology)

	Model 1 Ensure Oil Supply		Model 2 Iran Nukes	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.706**	(0.084)	0.980**	(0.101)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.012	(0.083)	-0.015	(0.090)
Party ID	0.097*	(0.042)	0.131**	(0.043)
Ideology	0.112	(0.078)	0.095	(0.078)
Female	0.124	(0.143)	0.122	(0.143)
Protestant	-0.140	(0.238)	-0.023	(0.166)
Catholic	-0.086	(0.236)	0.071	(0.204)
Secular	-0.094	(0.216)	0.054	(0.183)
Education	-0.076	(0.053)	-0.077	(0.047)
Age	-0.008	(0.004)	-0.014**	(0.005)
Income	-0.055**	(0.016)	0.001	(0.019)
Nonwhite	0.045	(0.140)	-0.130	(0.166)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.406**	(0.114)	-0.375**	(0.096)
Constant	0.707	(0.405)	1.086*	(0.430)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.11		0.15	
Percent Correctly Pred.	65%		72%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	27%		21%	
N	1086		1093	

Table 5.3 Continued

	Model 3 Humanitarian Crisis		Model 4 Peacekeeping	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.021	(0.086)	0.167	(0.093)
Cooperative Dimension	0.953**	(0.088)	0.904**	(0.068)
Party ID	0.054	(0.042)	-0.067	(0.042)
Ideology	-0.140	(0.080)	-0.107	(0.055)
Female	-0.002	(0.171)	-0.021	(0.151)
Protestant	0.062	(0.176)	0.451*	(0.201)
Catholic	0.182	(0.185)	0.040	(0.191)
Secular	0.024	(0.214)	0.315	(0.192)
Education	0.039	(0.067)	-0.023	(0.036)
Age	-0.014*	(0.006)	0.002	(0.004)
Income	-0.030	(0.023)	0.023	(0.021)
Nonwhite	-0.101	(0.207)	-0.075	(0.131)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.036	(0.115)	0.323**	(0.104)
Constant	1.998**	(0.609)	0.964**	(0.332)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.12		0.12	
Percent Correctly Pred.	74%		74%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	12%		11%	
N	1097		1085	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Source: 2006 Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Note: Models measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors.

Table 5.4: Factor Analysis of 4 Foreign Policy Items in 2010 Hawkeye Poll

	Factor 1 Militant	Factor 2 Cooperative
1. The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength	0.6612	
2. A strong military for the US is no longer necessary in today's world	0.6214	
3. It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes		0.5607
4. Solving common international problems, such as hunger and human rights should be an important goal of the US		0.5186

Source: Fall 2010 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: Iterated Principle factor analysis performed. Question reads: Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements. For each, please say if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Table 5.5: Individual Level Support for Afghanistan Troop Timetable

	Model 1			
	Less than 1 Year vs. 2-5 Years		Less than 1 Year vs. Indefinite Timetable	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension				
Cooperative Dimension				
Party ID	0.094	(0.061)	0.290**	(0.063)
Ideology	-0.051	(0.068)	0.082	(0.075)
Estimated Casualties (Log)	-0.073	(0.075)	-0.160*	(0.072)
Rec. Casualties Same	0.240	(0.216)	0.161	(0.219)
Rec. Casualties Decrease	0.404	(0.290)	0.291	(0.318)
Will Win in Afghanistan	0.748**	(0.247)	1.438**	(0.227)
Income	-0.005	(0.046)	0.089	(0.050)
Education	0.287**	(0.075)	0.211**	(0.070)
Nonwhite	-0.469	(0.319)	-0.239	(0.314)
Religious Attendance	0.030	(0.065)	0.043	(0.069)
Evangelical	-0.146	(0.286)	0.439	(0.266)
Catholic	-0.206	(0.244)	0.111	(0.245)
Secular	-0.189	(0.300)	-0.278	(0.338)
Female	0.098	(0.193)	-0.126	(0.199)
Age	-0.009	(0.006)	-0.001	(0.007)
Pol. Knowledge	0.064	(0.108)	0.085	(0.115)
Constant	-1.443	(0.952)	-3.053**	(0.942)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.12			
Percent Correctly Pred.	56%			
Prop. Reduction in Error	23%			
N	766			

Table 5.5 Continued

| | Model 2 | | | |
| | Less than 1 Year vs. 2-5 Years | | Less than 1 Year vs. Indefinite Timetable | |
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.277*	(0.138)	0.951**	(0.179)
Cooperative Dimension	0.310	(0.173)	0.097	(0.167)
Party ID	0.098	(0.062)	0.234**	(0.067)
Ideology	-0.047	(0.076)	0.016	(0.081)
Estimated Casualties (Log)	-0.079	(0.076)	-0.172*	(0.075)
Rec. Casualties Same	0.213	(0.220)	0.251	(0.228)
Rec. Casualties Decrease	0.432	(0.300)	0.354	(0.331)
Will Win in Afghanistan	0.648*	(0.252)	1.285**	(0.239)
Income	-0.007	(0.047)	0.058	(0.052)
Education	0.311**	(0.076)	0.236**	(0.075)
Nonwhite	-0.524	(0.322)	-0.161	(0.339)
Religious Attendance	0.042	(0.068)	0.031	(0.072)
Evangelical	-0.192	(0.293)	0.375	(0.271)
Catholic	-0.261	(0.250)	0.003	(0.263)
Secular	-0.143	(0.306)	-0.186	(0.354)
Female	0.045	(0.199)	-0.110	(0.205)
Age	-0.012*	(0.006)	-0.005	(0.007)
Pol. Knowledge	0.068	(0.114)	-0.025	(0.122)
Constant	-1.326	(1.006)	-1.915	(1.008)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.15			
Percent Correctly Pred.	59%			
Prop. Reduction in Error	28%			
N	744			

** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Source: Fall 2010 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: All models measured with multinomial logit with robust standard errors.

Table 5.6: Factor Analysis of 4 Foreign Policy Items in 2011 Hawkeye Poll

	Factor 1 Militant	Factor 2 Cooperative
1. The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength	0.639	
2. The use of military force only makes problems worse.	0.66	
3. It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution.		0.631
4. America needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes.		0.66

Source: Spring 2011 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: Iterated Principle factor analysis performed. Question reads: Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements. For each, please say if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree.

Table 5.7: Individual Level Support for Libya Intervention

	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension			0.744**	(0.157)
Cooperative Dimension			0.722**	(0.159)
Party ID	-0.095	(0.059)	-0.072	(0.064)
Ideology	-0.132	(0.069)	-0.141	(0.081)
Income	0.089	(0.047)	0.094	(0.050)
Education	0.072	(0.064)	0.052	(0.069)
Nonwhite	0.228	(0.334)	0.294	(0.372)
Religious Attendance	-0.039	(0.069)	0.008	(0.075)
Evangelical	0.315	(0.259)	0.097	(0.271)
Catholic	-0.225	(0.231)	-0.421	(0.256)
Secular	-0.153	(0.307)	-0.056	(0.330)
Female	-0.166	(0.194)	-0.103	(0.209)
Age	0.001	(0.006)	0.008	(0.007)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.006	(0.101)	-0.000	(0.112)
Constant	0.135	(0.650)	-0.446	(0.711)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.04		0.11	
Percent Correctly Pred.	60%		67%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	15%		30%	
N	520		490	

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Source: Spring 2011 University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll

Note: All models measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors.

CHAPTER 6

IDEOLOGY AND ASSESSMENTS OF LEADERS

DURING CONFLICT SITUATIONS

<u>Introduction</u>

The previous chapter explored how ideology directly influenced individual preferences during conflict situations, and showed that ideology is a strong predictor of individual attitudes. We now expand this analysis by exploring how ideology shapes preferences and leader evaluations through an international conflict situation. Specifically this chapter investigates how ideology shapes leader evaluations at numerous stages of a conflict situation and also assesses how ideology modifies the formation of audience costs. In addition, this chapter begins the indirect analysis of ideology by exploring how ideology modifies the impact of partisanship on leader evaluations.

An exploration of how ideology shapes leader evaluations is fruitful for a number of reasons. First of all, foreign policy events can have an impact on elections (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006, Campbell 2004, Abramson et al. 2007), and how the public judges leaders matters greatly. For example, Abramson et al. 2007, argue that two facets of foreign policy played a huge role in the 2004 Presidential election, and how President Bush was judged on those issues impacted the vote. In the war on terror, Bush was evaluated positively and that benefited him greatly, where at the same time, the negative elevation of Bush in the Iraq war hurt him. However, since the war on terror appeared to be more important to voters, that facet had a stronger impact on the election. Certainly, foreign policy will not be the primary influence in every election (for example, 2008 was focused on the economy), but can play a substantial role in many instances (for example, the 2004

election). Secondly, leader evaluation is the cornerstone to a number of IR theories, such as diversionary theory (i.e. Morgan and Bickers 1992, Smith 1996), rally effects (Mueller 1973, Groeling and Baum 2008, Baker and Oneal 2001), and audience costs (Fearon 1994, McGillivray and Smith 2005, Tomz 2007). Exploring the individual level connection between ideology and leader evaluations can contribute to micro-foundation understandings in all of these areas. Specifically with audience costs, scholarship has recently begun empirically exploring the conditions leading to the formation of audience costs (Tomz 2007, Trager and Vavreck 2011), but these explorations have yet to really look at what individual factors may lead people to be more or less likely to penalize leaders for backing down in a conflict.

In the pages that follow I explore this ideological role in leader evaluation. Expectations from chapter 4 argue that ideology should shape how individuals assess their leader by 1) forming an individual preference regarding the event and then 2) comparing the leader's action to that expected action. Assessments of a leader will then be made by comparing the preferred action of the leader to the actual action. To make these evaluations, this chapter relies on a survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in April of 2011. Overall results show that ideology strongly shapes conflict preferences, leader evaluations, and also the formation of audience costs. At the same time, evidence to support the idea that ideology can modify how party identification influences approval (the indirect effect) is not found.

Leader Evaluations

Before discussing the theory and hypotheses of this chapter, let us first quickly
visit some of the literature around leader evaluations, why the topic of leader evaluations
is so important, and how this chapter fits into the research surrounding leader evaluations.

A positive evaluation by the public is vitally important to leaders of democratic
governments. Positive evaluations can lead to reelection for a leader, where negative
evaluations can lead to being thrown out of office. Many IR theories are anchored by this
notion that public evaluations of leaders are important in democracies, and that leaders
care about how the public assesses them.

The "rally around the flag" literature has heavily focused on the unique ability of
wars to drastically alter public support for leaders. Mueller (1973, pg. 209) provided
three criteria that would lead to a rally effect: "In general, a rally point must be associated
with an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United States and
particularly the president directly; and it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply
focused". Rallies occur because Mueller (1973) claims that there is a surge of patriotism
among the electorate. This patriotism argument is challenged by Brody and Shapiro
(1989) and Brody (1991), who argue that rally events occur when opposition elites refrain
from directly challenging the administration during a crisis event. Despite the lack of
agreement of why rallies form, additional research has attempted to understand what
specific conditions and circumstances help or hurt the size of rally effects (Oneal and
Bryan 1995, Baker and Oneal 2001, Chapman and Reiter 2004, Parker 1995). One
finding is that the way the foreign crisis is presented to the public has a substantial
influence on the size of the rally. For example, Baker and Oneal (2001) note that the

level of media coverage, the level of bipartisan support, and effort by the President to draw attention to the conflict can all have effects on the size of a rally. Oneal and Bryan (1995), note that how a crisis is covered by the media substantially influences the magnitude of audience costs.

In a similar manner, the diversionary theory literature has focused on the idea that leaders look to foreign crises in an attempt to move public attention away from domestic issues and towards foreign issues. The expectation by leaders is that public evaluation of the leader will strengthen as the public focus goes to foreign issues (hence the rally effect) and away from problems domestically. With mixed empirical evidence to support these theoretical expectations (e.g. Levy 1989, Meernik and Waterman 1996), scholarship has looked more for the conditionals of when we should see diversionary theory (Mitchell and Prins 2004, Morgan and Bickers 1992, Smith 1996, DeRouen 2000). For example, Morgan and Bickers (1992) argue that diversionary tactics are more likely when support has dropped within the ruling coalition and not simply when support has dropped across the entire public.

The role and implications of audience costs have been widely discussed issue since Fearon's (1994) APSR article. The idea behind audience costs is that citizens disapprove of leaders who do not live up to their international threats or promises. Leaders who make threats but then back down may face domestic repercussions. Because of this, if a state with high audience costs goes public, then it is committing itself to that action because if it backs down later, it will face high domestic costs for backing down. In essence, we would expect that states with high audience costs would only commit to an action if they are truly willing to go the distance. Greater audience costs

improve a state's ability to signal its resolve because audience costs are costly signals. Extensions of the audience cost theory can be found in numerous areas. For example, Leeds (1999) takes the idea of audience costs and applies the notion to the ability of democracies to make more credible commitments in the international environment. She argues that once democratic states make a commitment, they may face domestic costs by changing the policy. Leader competence is judged by willingness to uphold agreements (Smith 1998), and so if a leader breaks an agreement, they are more likely to face audience costs at home. McGillivray and Smith (2005) note the ease of removal of the executive should be directly related to the executive's compliance. As executives become easier to remove from office, as is typically the case for democracies, they should be more reliable in their commitments for fear of a public backlash for violating international commitments.

Each of the three theories relies on the idea of leader evaluations, and an enduring theme here is that leader evaluations matter greatly. While scholarship has convincingly shown that evaluations matter, what leads to these evaluations tends to consist of the same explanations that lead to policy preferences; namely, a stimulus driven explanation. For example, Groeling and Baum (2008) show that a complex interaction between the public, elites, and media can influence leader support. Edwards and Swenson (1997) note that those most likely to support the President in the first place were those who more likely to rally, which were those most predisposed to support the President in the first place. Gelpi et al. 2005/2006 rely on contextual interpretations of the conflict at hand (right/wrongness of conflict and likelihood of victory). However, to the best of my knowledge, there is little to no research that has looked directly at the individual,

specifically an individual's ideology, and explored how that may influence leader evaluations.

The Role of a Foreign Policy Ideology

As discussed in previous chapters, individuals possess a worldview and this worldview drives the interpretation of a foreign event as well as preferences for that event. At the same time, individuals are observing the actions of their leaders regarding the foreign event. What we have is a situation where individuals can compare their preferred action to the actual action. Let me give a quick example of the logic before going into a more detailed explanation. A highly militant individual would see a rogue nation developing a nuclear weapon as a highly threatening situation. This individual would be more likely to support military intervention to end the threat. This individual also observes the President's action. Finally, the individual would compare his or her preferred response to that of the leader and then assess the leader based on this comparison.

Now let me explain the logic in more detail. I will begin with general intervention support. This ties back to the direct effect argument and exploration in chapter 5. To quickly recap, individuals will use ideology as a schema to structure their interpretation of a foreign event. They pull from their prior abstract worldview to analyze the event and form preferences. There are two dimensions of ideology and each plays a role depending on the intervention context. Specifically, the militant dimension will structure preferences around security oriented events where the cooperative dimension will structure around humanitarian oriented events.

Along with influencing preferences, ideology should also influence how individuals assess the actions of leaders in foreign events. An individual's ideology will forms preferences for the event which can then be compared to the actions of the leader. In regards to the militant dimension, we should expect individuals with a stronger militant orientation to generally be more supportive of leaders taking a hardline or security oriented approach to foreign events. Since they see the world through this more security oriented lens, they should support the use of force when security issues are at stake and expect their leaders to do so. Leaders who do not address security issues should be looked upon less favorably among higher militants compared to lower militant individuals. This leads to the following hypotheses regarding how the militant dimension influences leader evaluation.

> H1: Individuals who are more militant in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force in security oriented missions, and should expect their leaders to use force in such missions. Leaders who do not address security threats should suffer a decrease in approval by individuals with a more militant ideology.

In regards to the cooperative dimension, we should expect individuals with a stronger cooperative orientation to generally be more supportive of leaders who militarily engage in humanitarian issues. Since these individuals see the world as one global environment, they should believe in the need to help other states or people when facing harm or injustice. Leaders who do not address humanitarian issues should face a loss of approval from high cooperatives. This leads to the following hypotheses regarding how the cooperative dimension influences leader evaluation.

H2: Individuals who are more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology should be more supportive of the use of force in humanitarian oriented missions, and should expect their leaders to use force in such missions. Leaders who do not address humanitarian issues should suffer a decrease in approval by individuals with a more cooperative ideology.

While I argue that ideology should directly influence leader evaluations, certainly ideology will not be the only influence. Stimuli, such as context and partisanship, should also have an influence on how individuals evaluate a leader. For example, partisans of the President's party should be more likely to evaluate a leader more positively than a partisan of the opposition party, all things equal. With this, we should expect additional influences on evaluations.

However, ideology may indirectly influence the effect of these outside stimuli by shaping and biasing how individuals perceive them. I demonstrated in Chapter 5 (and I will do so again in this chapter) that initial conflict evaluations and preferences are largely driven by ideology. I also discussed in Chapter 4 that individuals seek out information to maintain consistency with their prior beliefs or preferences and attempt to discount incongruent information (Taber 2003, Taber and Lodge 2006, Redlawsk 2002). So in effect, an individual largely uses his or her ideology to form initial preferences for a conflict. New information about the conflict (e.g. partisan cues, event context) now passes through this ideological filter and is biased to maintain consistency with the individual's prior preferences (see Figure 6.1).

Let us apply this logic to partisanship. While we should expect partisans of the leader to be more supportive, this may depend on if the leader's action matches the

preferred action of the individual. If the leader's action agrees with the individual's ideology, then we should expect the individual to accept additional positive information, such as a partisan cue. However, if the leader's action does not match the individual's preferred action, then additional information that would push the individual to be more supportive of the leader, such as partisanship, may have a lesser impact due to the individual biasing against additional positive information. The individual's initial impression of the event is a negative one (based off ideology), and once that impression is made, it is difficult to overcome the bias (Redlawsk 2002, Taber and Lodge 2006). In essence, outside stimuli should matter, but the effect should differ depending on how the leader's action compares to the preferred action. Where these two are in accordance, external stimuli should not be filtered out by the individual, but when they are not, we should expect external stimuli to have a lesser impact.

This leads us towards a number of expectations with regards to how ideology should influence the impact of external stimuli (in this case, partisanship) on leader evaluations. First, we should expect the impact of stimuli to not be uniform across all individuals. Since ideology should modify how external stimuli influence attitudes, the impact of a stimulus should be dependent on how it interacts with the worldview of the individual. Secondly, we should expect that the influence of external stimuli to be modified most in situations where the ideology and external stimuli are in conflict. For example, an individual whose ideology moves him or her towards opposing the leader's decision in a conflict situation should be less likely to look more favorably upon the leader's actions simply because the leader is of the same party. This leads to my final hypothesis.

H3: The impact of event stimuli on individual leader evaluations should not be uniform across individuals and should be altered by the foreign policy ideological stance of the individual. Specifically, external stimuli should have the least impact on leader evaluation in situations when the stimuli and ideology of the individual are in conflict.

Assessing the Role of Ideology on Leader Evaluation – Research Design

We now turn to empirically exploring the role of ideology on how individuals assess a leader during times of conflict. To do this, I turn to a unique survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in April of 2011. This study consisted of an internet survey using the Decision Process Tracing Environment Program (Lau and Redlawsk 2006).[30] An email was sent to all students and staff within the University of Iowa system (approximately 40,000 individuals) advertising the study and including a direct link to the study for anyone interested in participating. A follow up email was sent approximately one week later. A monetary reward was offered in the form of a drawing for a $100 check (two prizes offered)[31]. The study was open for approximately three weeks and nearly 1200 subjects participated.

The study consisted of two parts. The first consisted of a battery of survey questions covering a wide range of topics, including an extensive set of questions used to tap into an individual's foreign policy ideology. The second part consisted of a survey

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[30] http://dpte.polisci.uiowa.edu/dpte/

[31] To qualify for the drawing, individuals needed to complete the study and provide their email address.

experiment that explored how individuals assessed the actions of the President in a foreign intervention scenario. The experiment was set up in a fashion similar to Tomz (2007) but altered to better suit the needs of this research project.

To begin, subjects were told that they were about to read about a foreign scenario and the actions of the President. They were also informed that they would then be asked if the approved or disapproved of the actions of the President. Subjects would then read about the foreign policy scenario. The scenario was manipulated to consist of either a state committing genocide or attempting to produce a nuclear weapon. The theory proposes that different dimensions of a foreign policy ideology should influence preferences and evaluations dependent on the foreign context. This manipulation should test that aspect of the theory. Once subjects read the scenario, they were asked if the US should intervene in the situation.

Once a baseline level of support is ascertained from the subjects, the subjects then learn about the initial action of the President and presented with partisan tags for the President and opposition leaders in Congress. The initial reaction can consist of two actions: 1) threaten to send troops to end the situation, or 2) the US would stay out of the situation. This manipulation is important because similar to Tomz (2007) and Trager and Vavreck (2011), this initial action sets the basis of assessing the possible presence of audience costs because in the end, the President always declines to send troops. What this does is given two comparison groups at the end of the experiment: 1) where the President threatened troops and then backed down, and 2) where the President followed through with not sending troops. As for partisanship, I randomize if the President is Republican, Democrat, or not named. At the same time, opposition leaders in Congress

are always the opposite party of the President, unless the President is not given a party reference, in which case neither are opposition leaders. This gives three different options: 1) Republican President and Democratic opposition leaders, 2) Democratic President and Republican opposition leaders, or 3) no party mentioned for either. This manipulation allows for an analysis of how partisanship influences leader evaluations but also how ideology may interact with partisanship. Finally, once this is all revealed, subjects are asked if they approve of the actions of the President (1-7 scale of approval).

Finally, subjects learn that the country did not end their nuclear enrichment or genocide and the President did not send troops. A summary of the entire event is also presented to the subjects. One last assessment of the President is ascertained (1-7 scale of approval).[32]

By design, this experiment allows for a look at leader evaluations at a number of different stages in the conflict. Specifically with ideology in mind, we can explore if ideology influences preferences for the conflict in the first place, and how ideology shapes initial and final evaluations of a leader. Also, given the inclusion of partisan effects, we can analyze how partisanship interacts with ideology. Finally, by including the audience cost manipulation, we can explore how evaluations change and what factors may drive the assessment change.

From this experiment, three dependent variables are analyzed. The first is a measure of the individual's initial support for intervention in the specific scenario in the first place. This is important in that it provides an initial level of baseline support for the

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[32] See Figure 6.2 for a diagram of the experimental design and Appendix C for the experiment text.

intervention. The variable is measured as either 1=support or 0=no support. With this measure, I can explore how ideology influences policy preferences in the first place (similar to the previous chapter). This measure is also used as an independent variable in assessing the other two dependent variables.

The second dependent variable is an assessment of the President when subjects have learned about the event context, partisanship of the President, and initial plan of action by the President (threaten troops or promise not to intervene). This variable is measured on a seven point scale where 1 indicates strongly disapprove and 7 indicates strongly approve. The final dependent variable is the final assessment of the President when the respondent has gone through the entire simulation. While the context, partisanship of President, and initial plan of action by the President varies among subjects, the final action is always that the President backs down. The initial question was measured as a seven point scale where 1 indicates strongly disapprove and 7 indicates strongly approve.

The primary independent variable of interest consists of the two foreign policy ideological dimensions (militant and cooperative). These dimensions are created by factor analyzing twenty-five questions aimed at tapping the general foreign policy beliefs of the individual. The questions mirror the foreign policy importance questions used in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Chittick et al. 1995) along with questions used by other studies exploring foreign policy ideology (e.g. Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Herrmann et al. 1999, Herrmann and Keller 2004). An iterated principle factor analysis was

performed on these 25 items (see Table 6.1) and the first two factors consisted of a militant dimension (Factor 1) and a cooperative dimension (Factor 2).[33]

In this analysis, partisanship is the external stimuli that I explore. The assumption is that the partisanship of the President should be an external influence on the individual's evaluation of the President. Individuals mirroring the partisanship of the President should be more supportive of the President where those not matching the President should be less supportive. This measure is captured by a set of indicator variables for if the President and the individual are 1) of the same party or 2) of different parties.[34] A third indicator variable captures the instances of where partisanship of the President is not mentioned or the subject self-identifies as independent.

For the first half of this analysis, a wide range of control variables are used. The standard socio-demographic controls are included along with questions on ties to military service or personal connections to military casualties, political knowledge, and an extended battery of religious questions.[35] Table C1 in Appendix C provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.

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[33] Three factors achieved an eigenvalue above 1. The third factor consisted of two variables that looked at support for the United Nations, but the factor only explained about 10% of the variance is accounted for by the factor.

[34] Individual partisanship is assessed through a set of questions asking for partisan identification and then strength of identification or leaning Republican or Democrat if independent. Independent leaners were considered partisans.

[35] For "Known Military Casualties", respondents are coded 1 if they personally knew a military casualty and 0 otherwise. For "Served in Military", respondents are coded 1 if they ever served in the military and 0 otherwise. Party identification is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher scores are more Republican. Domestic ideology is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher scores equal more conservative. Education is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher values indicate more education. Income is a 9 point ordinal variable where higher values indicate more education. Race/ethnicity is measured by an indicator variable (1=nonwhite, 0=white). Age is a continuous variable of the respondent's age. Female is an indicator variable (1=female, 0=male), Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Secular are all indicator

Assessing the Role of Ideology on Leader Evaluation
– Results

Before exploring how ideology influences leader evaluation, let us first visit how ideology modifies preferences in the first place. Table 6.2 explores how ideology influences initial preferences for military intervention. Model 1 explores the nuclear scenario, where model 2 explores the humanitarian scenario. The dependent variable is dichotomous (1=support, 0 = no support) and is measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors.

Like the overall findings in chapter 5 we again see a strong statistical and substantive effect coming from foreign policy ideology. For model 1 (nuclear scenario), we see that the militant dimension is significant where the cooperative dimension is not (as expected). When the militant dimension is set at the mean, the probability of support is .56. Moving one standard deviation below the mean lowers that probability to .38, where going one standard deviation above the mean raises the probability to .73. When looking at the extremes, the minimum militant value leads to only a .2 probability of support where the maximum value leads to a .9 probability. Essentially, the higher an individual scores on the militant dimension, the more supportive the individual is towards using troops in the nuclear scenario.

For model 2 (humanitarian scenario), we see a strong effect coming from both the cooperative and the militant dimension. The strong effects were expected from the cooperative dimension but not the militant dimension. Interestingly, this looks very

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variables where 1 = the specific religious tradition and 0 otherwise. Religious attendance is a 6 point ordinal variable where higher values equal more attendance. Religious beliefs is a three point ordinal variable where higher values equal more orthodox/traditional religious beliefs. Political knowledge is a five point ordinal variable of self-identified political knowledge. Higher values equal more knowledge.

similar to the results in the previous chapter in regards to support for the Libya intervention. Nonetheless, the substantive effects were moderate and very similar. At the mean score for the militant and cooperative dimensions, the probability of support for intervention was .92. One standard deviation below the mean dropped the probability of support to .85 for the militant dimension and .84 for cooperative dimension. One standard deviation above the mean raised the probability to .96 for both dimensions. At the extremes, the probability of support at the minimum level was .69 for militants and .58 for cooperatives where at the maximum level it was .99 for the militant dimension and .98 for the cooperative dimension. Essentially, the higher an individual scores on the militant dimension and cooperative dimensions, the more supportive that individual is towards using troops in the humanitarian scenario.

Unlike chapter 5, we do see a strong effect coming from domestic ideology as well. In both models, we see domestic ideology significant ($p < .05$) and substantively important. In model 1 (nuclear scenario), the probability of support for strong liberals (coded 1) is .4, for moderates (coded 4) it is .63, and for strong conservatives (coded 7) it is .82. In the humanitarian scenario (model 2), the roles are reversed. The probability for support is .97 for strong liberals, .89 for moderates, and .68 for strong conservatives.

What do the results from Table 6.2 tell us? Essentially, it repeats much of the story from chapter 5. The initial impression of a conflict is driven heavily by one's worldview (in this case, both domestic and foreign). This is important in showing that while individuals may tend to rely heavily on partisan cues; they can still make coherent foreign policy preferences without them. When individuals only have the context of a

foreign policy scenario presented to them, the only place to turn is to their inherent beliefs, and the effect is substantial.

Beyond this, we see some additional interesting results. For one, the level of support for a humanitarian (genocide) intervention is substantially higher compared to a nuclear scenario. The more moderate effects uncovered in the humanitarian scenario may simply be because there is not much more room to go for support. Also, domestic ideology plays a substantial role here as well. In rare occurrences ideology was significant in the models of chapter 5 but surprisingly it is highly significant in both models here. While domestic ideology is not a consistent predictor for foreign policy preferences, it may have its selective uses (as shown here). Now, that this baseline level of support is assessed, we can see how ideology, along with this baseline support influences leader evaluations.

Table 6.3 explores individual assessment of the President at the initial stage of a conflict (when the President's initial plan and partisanship of the President has been revealed). Beginning the analysis at this stage is useful because it provides an insight into what factors initially influence assessments of a leader during wartime. Since there are a number of manipulations in the experiment at this early stage, four models are presented to cover the four different scenarios that may be found in the dependent variable (1: nuclear weapon situation where the President threatens troops, 2: nuclear weapons situation where the President plans to stay out of the situation, 3: genocide situation where the President threatens troops, and 4: genocide situation where the President plans to stay out of the situation). Given the seven-point nature of the

dependent variable, OLS regression is used.[36] The independent variables included in these models mirror that of Table 6.2, with the exception of the inclusion of the individual's support for intervention (the dependent variable of Table 6.2) and if the participant matched the partisanship of the President (same party, different party, or independent/no party mention).

Models 1 and 2 explore the nuclear weapon scenario and provide support to the notion that foreign policy ideology matters. In a security oriented scenario, we see that the militant dimension is significant and in the proper direction for model 1. Substantively, the effect is also quite large. When the President threatens troops, a one unit movement up the militant scale (range goes from -2.14 to 2.49) leads to a .42 increase in the seven point approval scale. In addition, partisanship also appears to be significant. In both nuclear situations (Model 2), partisanship is significant and being of the same party of the President appears to lead to about a half point increase in approval (on the seven-point scale).[37] Finally, the strongest predictor of these models is the individual's initial support for intervention. If the individual supported intervention and the president sends troops, approval is almost 2 points higher. In contrast, if the president declines to send troops, approval drops over 1 point.

Turning to the genocide scenarios (Models 3 and 4), we see similar results. Once again, foreign policy ideology is significant. And for a more humanitarian issue, the

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[36] Results look very similar using ordered logistic regression.

[37] I elected to maintain both a measure of the individual's partisanship (seven point scale) and indicator variables for if the individual matched the partisanship of the leader. While there may be some redundancy with including both measures, they do tap two different aspects of the individual. If the seven point partisan identification measure is removed, results are nearly identical. Also, collinearity does not appear to be a problem with the models.

cooperative dimension of foreign policy ideology is statistically and substantively significant. When the President threatens troops, a one unit movement up the cooperative scale (range goes from -2.49 to 2.0) leads to about a .34 point increase in the seven-point approval scale. In the "stay out" scenario, a one unit increase in the cooperative scale leads to about a .2 decrease in approval (significant at p =.06). Surprisingly, the militant dimension is also statistically significant in one of the humanitarian event models and is has a little over a .2 increase in the "send troops" scenario. In addition to ideology, we also see that partisanship plays an important role here. Compared to no partisanship mentioned, being of the same party as the President leads to about a .4 increase in the "send troops" scenario and a .7 increase in the "stay out" scenario". Finally, we again see the strongest effect coming from the initial preference. If the president sends troops, support from an individual who preferred the intervention increases over 2 points. If the president does not send troops, support drops nearly 2 points.

Results from Table 6.3 provide a number of insights. First of all, it adds additional support to the argument that stimuli matter in leader evaluations. Individuals who shared the same party identification as the President were more supportive of the President compared to those who did not or where partisanship was not brought up. This is hardly surprising, but at the same time, provides some support to the validity of the experiment. Secondly, these results provide strong support for the notion that an individual's inherent foreign policy ideology shapes how he or she assesses a leader. While partisanship certainly matters, ideology does as well. One surprise with the results is that the militant dimension is highly significant for humanitarian events as well. Theoretically, I expected the militant dimension to explain security events and the

cooperative dimension to explain humanitarian events. Instead, it may be that whenever the use of force is concerned, the militant dimension still plays a role in leader assessment. This mirrors the results in chapter 5 regarding support for the intervention in Libya as well. A future test should explore if the militant dimension explains attitudes on humanitarian issues when force is not threatened (possibly in sanction scenarios). That analysis would better tease out the full effect of this dimension. Finally, the strongest predictor of support comes from an individual's initial preference for intervention. Depending on the individual's preferences along with the president's action, support can move over 2 points on a seven point scale.

Both tables 6.2 and 6.3 paint a pretty clear picture that ideology has a strong effect on initial preferences and also on leader evaluations. One important point to note with table 6.3 is that it only measures the direct effect of ideology on leader evaluations. However, we saw in table 6.2 that ideology is a strong predictor of initial intervention preferences, which is the strongest predictor of leader evaluation in table 6.3. So in essence, there is an indirect effect from ideology that is not being measured here. If initial preferences are removed from the models in table 6.3, the role of ideology increases substantially. It becomes highly significant in all models and the substantive effect nearly doubles. So while the impact of ideology is substantial now, in reality it is much larger.

Ideology and Audience Costs

An interesting piece to audience costs is that they are difficult to test for and measure. Fearon made the argument for audience costs but never really tested if they

actually existed. Schultz (2001) attempted to find evidence of audience costs but failed to find any significant effect. He argued, however, that this was mainly due to not being able to really measure them in the first place.

> Whether we can find statistically significant evidence of audience costs depends on how well we can actually measure these costs when they are incurred. Above, we assumed that these costs are perfectly measurable whenever they are incurred; in actual practice, we cannot measure audience costs perfectly, but only through their impact on political survival. Because the latter depends on a number of other factors -some measurable, some not- any measurement of audience costs is bound to be noisy. Thus, the fact that observed audience costs are smaller than those in the full population does not rule out finding them, but it does reduce the tolerance for error from other sources. The smaller the audience costs that survive the selection process, the smaller the noise must be to detect them (Schultz 2001; 53).

Over the last few years, researchers have begun exploring audience costs through the use of experiments. Michael Tomz (2007) was the first to devise an experimental situation where subjects are exposed to a number of experimental treatments that differ on the foreign policy situation of the United States and the President's actions in that situation. Using this method, Tomz has been able to show that audience costs actually do exist and have such an effect. Trager and Vavreck (2011) extended Tomz's work by comparing possible audience costs outcomes to actually going to war and also exploring the role of partisanship in conditioning approval levels. While these few studies have finally begun the exploration of audience costs, a more individual level analysis is certainly lacking.

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 take this individual level exploration of audience costs; with a specific focus on the role of ideology. The last assessment that subjects made in the simulation occurred after subjects learned the President decided to not use troops. All groups received this same information. This allows a look at leader where a leader

backed down compared to one where the leader maintained a promise of non-intervention. The dependent variable in this next analysis is the seven point ordinal scale where higher values indicate more approval of the President. The analysis will consist of comparing group means between the experimental groups and different individual groups. Because of this, the two ideology dimensions have been collapsed into a three point category (high, indifferent, low). What this allows is an exploration of leader approval at different points in the ideological spectrum and with different experimental conditions. Along with this, I explore how the partisan connection influences approval. Finally, I consider if ideology is able to modify this partisan influence on approval.

Turning to Table 6.4, a number of interesting results are found. First of all, similar to results from Tomz (2007), overall results confirm that individuals, on average, appear to be more likely to look negatively upon leaders who back down after promising action. In the scenario where the President threatened troops but backed down, overall approval was only 2.84. For leaders who maintained their non-intervention stance, approval was significantly higher at 3.5. When broken up into the two different scenarios, significant drops in approval are found in both scenarios, but results also show that the context shapes approval. There is a much wider gap in approval for the nuclear scenario (3.13 for escalating and backing down vs. 4.22 for staying out) compared to the genocide scenario (2.58 for escalating and backing down vs. 2.79 for staying out). At the same time, subjects in general were much less supportive of the President in the genocide context regardless of backing down or simply staying out. It appears that subjects found the genocide scenario as a more worthy use of US troops compared to the nuclear scenario.

Secondly, Table 6.4 shows that ideology certainly matters in shaping approval. In both scenarios, those subjects most likely to support the intervention (high militants in the nuclear situation and high cooperatives in the genocide situation) are the least likely to support the leader for either backing down or staying out. The difference in approval between high militants and low militants is -0.66 (p =.01, two-tailed) for backing down and -1.35 for staying out (p < .01, two-tailed). The difference between high and low cooperatives is -0.4 (p < .05, one-tail) for backing down and -1.14 (p < .01, two-tailed) for staying out.

Third, there are mixed results supporting a partisan effect. Surprisingly, in the scenarios where the leader backed down, subjects with the same party affiliation show less approval compared to those of the opposite party. While the difference is not statistically significant, just the fact that approval is going the opposite way is noteworthy. At the same time, in the scenarios where the President stayed out of the conflict, subjects of the same party were more supportive overall. This difference is moderate and statistically significant. While not a focus of this research (and something for future exploration), this is definitely an interesting situation where partisans are more forgiving if the President keeps his word but more punishing if the President does not.

Finally, initial support for intervention also has a role in approval and audience costs. If an individual supports intervention, approval is nearly identical (2.53 for backing down and 2.65 for staying out). In other words, the individual supporting the intervention is disappointed either way. However, audience costs are uncovered among those who did not support intervention in the first place. Among those individuals who did not support intervention, approval is 5.23 if the president simply stayed out.

However, if the president threated but backed down, approval drops considerably to 3.56. Again, if the President keeps his word with this group, he is rewarded. However, if the President breaks his word, he is punished by this group.

Turning to Table 6.5, I look for support for the indirect influence of ideology (hypothesis 3) by looking at how ideology modifies the influence of partisanship on Presidential approval. Based on the hypothesis, I expected that the partisan effect to not be uniform across different levels of the militant and cooperative dimension. More directly, I expect partisanship to not play a role for high militants and cooperatives because they should largely disapprove of the actions of the President in the first place. Because of this initial disapproval, they should be less likely to allow partisanship to sway their approval compared to individuals in the indifferent or low categories. For those indifferent militants and cooperatives, I expect partisanship to have a large impact. Since the ideological push, in either direction, is not great for these "indifferent" individuals, the ideological bias should also be less (or non-existent). Finally, for the low militants and cooperatives we should again expect a partisan effect. Since the individual already supports the actions of the President, he or she should be willing to accept additional positive information, such as a partisan tag, and be even more supportive.

Unfortunately, the results do not support the hypothesis, and actually reveal the opposite effect in some areas. First, in the "back down" manipulation, there appears to be no substantive influence from ideology on the partisan effect. In all of the ideological categories, except indifferent militants, individuals of the opposing party are more supportive than individuals of the same party. This may hint at a partisan effect given that partisanship seems to only work in the indifferent militant group, but then we should

also see this in the indifferent cooperative group, and do not. As for the "stay out" manipulation, ideology does seem to modify the partisan influence, but opposite to what was hypothesized. In all but one group (low cooperatives) partisans are more supportive than non-partisans (as we would expect). However, against the expectations of H3, the partisan effect is actually the strongest among the high militant and high cooperative groups. The partisan difference is only significant among these high militant/cooperative categories and the difference is quite large (nearly double for militants and well over that for cooperatives). So in these two categories where support should be the lowest overall, it appears that partisans of the President are more likely to bump up their approval; so the partisan effect is quite strong and not negated as expected. However, one other important point should be noted. Even with this partisan effect accounted for, ideology still has a strong influence on approval and in a manner expected.

Finally, I would like to comment on one final observation. While not tied to the goals of this chapter, I feel it noteworthy to mention an interesting trend found in Table 6.4. Specifically, if we look within the different subgroups of individuals, we see that the most substantive change in approval is found among those most likely to support the leader in the first place. For ideology, the most likely to support the President are the low militants and cooperatives because their preference is nonintervention. For partisanship, it is those sharing the same party as the President. For preference on the intervention, those who did not support intervention would be most likely to approve of the President's non-intervention. In each of these groups, we see the largest approval level in the "stay out" manipulation (President said he was not intervening and maintained that commitment). This makes sense since this was the preference of the individual and the

President kept his word. However, we also see the largest gap in approval (or possible audience cost) between "staying out" and "backing down" among these same groups. In looking at the difference column in Table 6.4, the largest difference in approval (between backing down and staying out) is among these groups, and in a number of cases, this is the only place where the difference is statistically significant. For example, if we consider the militant ideology and the nuclear scenario, the low militants show the largest audience cost. The difference in approval between "backing down" and "staying out" is only .69 for high militants (since they do not support either move) but is nearly double (1.35) for low militants. This presents a consistent theme that if a president escalates but backs down, he loses the most support from those who would have supported the President if he simply stayed out. Among those who are more disposed to not support the President (opposite party, high militant/cooperatives), it doesn't seem to matter as much because either way they are upset.

Addressing Validity Concerns

Before moving to a discussion of the results, let me address some validity concerns with the experiment. Certainly this experimental design is not perfect and does have some concerns with both internal and external validity. At the same time, no experiment is completely perfect and given the resource constraints on this experiment, I attempted to structure the design to minimize these validity problems. For the internal validity problems, there is a control problem by removing subjects from a controlled lab environment to where they can participate in the study from any location. However, by randomly assigning subjects to groups, there is no reason to believe that one group would

be systematically taking the study less serious that the others. Also, by placing the study online, subjects are most likely participating in the study from a more natural setting (their home). This may allow for more distractions, which may actually bolster the strength of the results because given more distractions, I would expect less of an effect to be discovered. This way, I am biasing against finding results.

As for external validity, there are some concerns here as well. There is no doubt that providing a few paragraphs of text is not an accurate representation of what subjects would face by learning about a foreign event through television news or even newspapers. At the same time, it is about as close as we can get to exploring the causal connection for leader evaluations.   In addition, given the online nature of the experiment, subjects may be in a more natural setting since they are most likely taking the experiment from home, a coffee shop, etc and exposed to a wide range of distractions, which is exactly what they would face in the real world.

<u>Discussion</u>

Overall, this analysis has provided a number of insights into what factors influence individual assessments of leaders during times of war. First of all, it has shown that an individual's foreign policy ideology certainly plays an integral role in his or her assessment process. Across the board, ideology was highly significant and had a very strong substantive effect on how individual's assessed the President in this survey experiment. Individuals who scored high on the militant dimension of ideology were much more likely to disapprove of leaders for not intervening in a security oriented scenario and more likely to disapprove if the leader threatened troops but then backed

down. Similar results were uncovered for individuals scoring high on the cooperative dimension when faced with a humanitarian event. In addition, the role of ideology appeared to play a much more substantive role than that of partisan effects.

While ideology certainly has a strong impact on shaping assessments of leaders directly, no evidence was uncovered for the idea that ideology may be able to modify the impact of external stimuli (partisan effects in this experiment). This may be due to the more limited impact that party played in the first place. However, even within the area where partisan effects were present, the partisan impact on approval was strongest among those groups expected to be most likely to ignore the partisan attachment (the high militant/cooperatives). So in the end, the partisan effect is alive and well and not subject to manipulation by ideology (at least in this experiment).

Finally, while not directly tied to the main focus of this chapter, one interesting theme from these results is that audience costs appear most substantive among those who should be more likely to support the President in the first place. In the scenarios where the President stayed out of a conflict, much higher percentages of individuals who scored low on the militant/cooperative dimension, who shared the same partisan affiliation approved of the President, or who simply preferred to just stay out in the first place supported the President. However, in the "back down" scenario, those same groups didn't look all that different from the groups of individuals who would have disapproved of the President in either scenario (high militant/cooperatives or those of a different party). There was a huge decrease in approval among these groups more likely to support the President when the President backed down. While these results can't speak to the idea of it being more prudent for leaders to simply fight instead of backing down (Trager

and Vavreck 2011), it does show that if a leader escalates conflict, he or she faces disapproval across the board if he/she decides the then back down. If a leader simply stays out of a conflict, he or she will at least maintain some support from those more likely to support the President. If anything, is this certainly something leaders should consider before even considering engagement in a conflict.

This chapter has extended the empirical exploration of ideology on foreign policy preferences to a look at how this also influences leader evaluations, and specifically audience costs. Similar to the empirical results from the earlier chapter, we see that foreign policy ideology is a strong predictor of both policy preferences and leader evaluations. This chapter also began the indirect exploration of ideology and how it can modify the impact of external stimuli; specifically how ideology modified partisan effects. Unfortunately, the indirect effect hypotheses were not confirmed. However, the next chapter furthers this exploration by attempting to understand how ideology modifies the impact of contextual stimuli; specifically casualties.

Figure 6.1: Diagram of Theory

Figure 6.2: Experiment Progression Chart

Stage 1 | Stage 2 | Stage 3 | Stage 4 | Stage 5 | Stage 6

Scenario Explained (Nuclear or Genocide) → Question 1: Initial Support → President Initial Action (threaten troops or will stay out) Revealed → Party Identification of Leadership (Republican, Democrat, or No Mention) Revealed → Question 2: Support of President's Initial Action → President does not intervene in event → Question 3: Support of President Handling of Event

Table 6.1: Factor Analysis of 25 Foreign Policy Items

	Factor 1 Militant	Factor 2 Cooperative
1. Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression		
2. Strengthening the United Nations		
3. Combating international terrorism	0.423	
4. Maintaining superior military power worldwide	0.705	
5. Protecting the jobs of American workers		
6. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations		
7. Securing adequate supplies of energy		
8. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	0.427	
9. Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations		0.794
10. Improving the global environment		0.448
11. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons		
12. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries		0.64
13. Promoting economic growth		
14. Combating world hunger		0.82
15. Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy		0.499
16. The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength.	0.846	
17. The use of military force only makes problems worse.	-0.711	
18. Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it is better for us to strike first.	0.555	
19. The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.		
20. The U.S. government should just try to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved with other nations.		
21. It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes.		
22. Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country's greatness.	0.64	

Table 6.1 Continued

23. The United States could learn a lot by following the example of other countries	-0.474	
24. The United States should provide less economic aid to other countries		-0.408
25. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong		

Note: Iterated Principle Factor analysis performed. Only items loading greater than .4 are displayed. Question 1 to 15 reads: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the U.S. might have. For each one, please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the U.S., a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = one of the most important and 1 = not important. Question 16 to 25 reads: Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = strongly agree and 1= strongly disagree.

Table 6.2: Individual Level Support Military Intervention

	Model 1 Nuclear Scenario		Model 2 Humanitarian Scenario	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.808**	(0.161)	0.754**	(0.199)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.153	(0.133)	0.857**	(0.196)
Party ID	-0.102	(0.091)	0.061	(0.145)
Ideology	0.319*	(0.134)	-0.440**	(0.170)
Education	0.032	(0.104)	0.115	(0.155)
Income	-0.018	(0.051)	-0.066	(0.070)
Known Mil. Cas.	-0.062	(0.227)	0.047	(0.316)
Served In Military	-0.523	(0.532)	-1.354	(0.858)
Nonwhite	0.349	(0.370)	-0.832*	(0.409)
Age	-0.014	(0.009)	-0.032**	(0.012)
Female	-0.177	(0.251)	-0.129	(0.369)
Evangelical Protestant	0.285	(0.557)	0.220	(0.831)
Catholic	0.160	(0.317)	-0.088	(0.441)
Secular	-0.205	(0.304)	-0.134	(0.477)
Religious Attendance	0.037	(0.102)	0.145	(0.154)
Religious Beliefs	-0.405	(0.214)	-0.017	(0.284)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.273*	(0.124)	-0.291	(0.202)
Constant	1.701	(0.986)	5.158**	(1.336)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.15		0.203	
Percent Correctly Pred.	70%		88%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	33%		13%	
N	427		425	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: Models measured with logistic regression with robust standard errors.

Table 6.3: Individual Level Approval of President (PID and President Action Revealed)

	Model 1 Nuclear - Send Troops		Model 2 Nuclear - Stay Out	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Supports Intervention	1.878**	(0.210)	-1.316**	(0.204)
Militant Dimension	0.418**	(0.132)	-0.032	(0.137)
Cooperative Dimension	0.041	(0.113)	0.090	(0.109)
No Party Manip or Ind.	0.366	(0.206)	0.569*	(0.241)
Same Party as Pres.	0.551*	(0.237)	0.527*	(0.240)
Party ID	-0.001	(0.065)	-0.066	(0.075)
Domestic Ideology	-0.025	(0.096)	-0.316**	(0.105)
Education	-0.064	(0.077)	-0.026	(0.094)
Income	0.047	(0.043)	-0.089*	(0.041)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.258	(0.170)	0.119	(0.207)
Served In Military	0.092	(0.478)	-0.082	(0.475)
Nonwhite	-0.180	(0.286)	0.191	(0.270)
Age	-0.003	(0.007)	-0.005	(0.008)
Female	0.228	(0.197)	0.356	(0.205)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.083	(0.483)	-0.576	(0.460)
Catholic	0.016	(0.218)	-0.478	(0.283)
Secular	-0.149	(0.248)	-0.151	(0.247)
Religious Attendance	0.118	(0.079)	-0.060	(0.088)
Religious Beliefs	-0.198	(0.189)	-0.030	(0.180)
Pol. Knowledge	0.100	(0.112)	-0.087	(0.106)
Constant	2.963**	(0.854)	7.351**	(0.815)
R-Squared	0.51		0.49	
Root MSE	1.21		1.3	
N	216		209	

Table 6.3 Continued

| | Model 3 | | Model 4 | |
| | Genocide - Send Troops | | Genocide - Stay Out | |
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Supports Intervention	2.302**	(0.285)	-1.902**	(0.288)
Militant Dimension	0.209*	(0.092)	-0.204	(0.142)
Cooperative Dimension	0.343**	(0.093)	-0.218	(0.115)
No Party Manip or Ind.	0.472**	(0.161)	0.262	(0.268)
Same Party as Pres.	0.396*	(0.169)	0.718**	(0.265)
Party ID	-0.043	(0.058)	0.025	(0.088)
Domestic Ideology	-0.022	(0.082)	-0.162	(0.125)
Education	0.041	(0.066)	0.031	(0.109)
Income	0.039	(0.031)	0.016	(0.051)
Known Mil. Cas.	-0.018	(0.147)	-0.091	(0.212)
Served In Military	0.148	(0.413)	0.457	(0.579)
Nonwhite	-0.018	(0.183)	0.308	(0.381)
Age	-0.012	(0.006)	-0.012	(0.009)
Female	-0.186	(0.143)	0.492*	(0.217)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.187	(0.438)	0.532	(0.505)
Catholic	-0.274	(0.229)	-0.238	(0.296)
Secular	0.002	(0.200)	-0.359	(0.324)
Religious Attendance	0.122	(0.075)	0.051	(0.102)
Religious Beliefs	-0.132	(0.125)	-0.162	(0.206)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.021	(0.078)	-0.183	(0.102)
Constant	3.618**	(0.710)	6.037**	(0.943)
R-Squared	0.57		0.31	
Root MSE	1.00		1.44	
N	213		212	

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed

Note: Models measured with OLS with robust standard errors.

Table 6.4: Measure of Audience Costs (Mean Approval Comparison)

		Back Down	Stay Out	Difference
Overall		2.84	3.5	-.66***
Nuclear Weapon Context		3.13	4.22	-1.1***
Genocide Context		2.58	2.79	-.21*
Nuclear Weapon Context				
Militant Ideology				
	High	2.78	3.47	-.69***
	Indifferent	3.27	4.31	-1.04***
	Low	3.44	4.82	-1.38***
	Difference	-.66***	-1.35***	
Genocide Context				
Cooperative Ideology				
	High	2.43	2.37	.07
	Indifferent	2.49	2.51	-.02
	Low	2.82	3.51	-.68***
	Difference	-.4**	-1.14***	
Same Party		2.8	3.74	-.94***
Different Party		2.88	3.21	-.33**
	Difference	-.08	.53***	
Nuclear Weapon Context				
Same Party		3.15	4.49	-1.34***
Different Party		3.2	3.85	-.65***
	Difference	-.05	.64***	
Genocide Context				
Same Party		2.49	2.93	-.44**
Different Party		2.61	2.46	.15
	Difference	-.12	.47**	
Supported Intervention		2.53	2.65	-.13
Did Not Support Intervention		3.56	5.23	-1.68***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p < .10, one-tailed

Table 6.5: Ideology Influence on Partisanship (Mean Approval Comparison)

	Back Down	Stay Out	Expectation
Nuke/High Militant			
Same Party	2.69	3.87	
Different Party	3.3	3.12	**No Difference**
Difference	**-.61***	**.75****	
Nuke/Indifferent Militant			
Same Party	3.59	4.51	
Different Party	2.78	4.27	**Higher Support**
Difference	**.81****	**0.24**	**for Same Party**
Nuke/Low Militant			
Same Party	3.32	4.85	
Different Party	3.56	4.47	**Higher Support**
Difference	**-.24**	**.38**	**for Same Party**
Genocide/High Cooperative			
Same Party	2.48	2.85	
Different Party	2.59	1.69	**No Difference**
Difference	**-.11**	**1.16****	
Genocide/Indifferent Cooperative			
Same Party	2.3	2.61	
Different Party	2.5	2.45	**Higher Support**
Difference	**-.2**	**.16**	**for Same Party**
Genocide/Low Cooperative			
Same Party	2.7	3.33	
Different Party	2.73	3.43	**Higher Support**
Difference	**-.03**	**-.1**	**for Same Party**

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p < .10, one-tailed

CHAPTER 7

IDEOLOGY AND CASUALTY TOLERANCE

<u>Introduction</u>

The last two chapters have provided convincing evidence to point at the importance of a foreign policy ideology in shaping attitudes and leader evaluations. More specifically, both chapters have demonstrated how strongly the direct effect is on attitudes and evaluations. One goal of the previous chapter was to also explore the indirect effect of ideology on preferences, specifically how ideology modified the partisan impact on leader evaluations. This indirect effect was not uncovered in regards to partisanship. However, this chapter continues the exploration of the indirect effect on external stimuli by analyzing how ideology shapes individual perceptions of casualties and individual level casualty tolerance.

For decades, scholarship has understood how important casualties were in shaping public support for conflict and wartime events. The basic idea is that as casualties increase, support decreases (Mueller 1973). Extensions of this theory have looked at a wide range of conditions on when casualties should or should not impact support (for example, Gartner et al. 1997, Gartner and Segura 1998, Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Boettcher and Cobb 2006, 2009). I extend this analysis by looking at how individual differences, specifically ideology, shape the impact of casualties. If it is shown that casualty tolerance is driven by individual factors, such as ideology, then this questions how exogenous casualties are in impacting preferences. Perhaps a different model specification would be required to accurately understand how casualties shape preferences and how ideology plays a role.

Also, the role of casualties on preferences has tended to assume a uniform impact on individuals. For example, as casualties increase, all individuals should decrease in support for a conflict. There are some deviations from this assumption (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Gartner et al. 1997), but largely the assumption has been of uniformity. By looking at individual differences, this chapter directly challenges the assumption that all individuals will react in a similar manner to casualties. This chapter argues that a uniform response is not correct and that how individuals perceive casualties is driven largely by their ideology and the context of the conflict.

In the pages that follow, I explore the role that ideology plays in casualty tolerance. First, I begin with a short literature review on the role of casualties on conflict preferences. Then I move to applying the theory in chapter 4 to casualty tolerance. The indirect effect argument from chapter 4 argues that while we should expect casualties to impact preferences during conflict situations, this impact should be modified by the ideological stance of the individual. To explore this theory, this chapter relies on a survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in November of 2011. Results indicate that ideology plays a moderate role in shaping the impact of casualties. The perceptions of the intervention appear to be the most substantive predictors but ideology still plays an important role in shaping tolerance as well as perceptions of the intervention.

Casualties and Casualty Tolerance

With war come casualties. While leaders and the public should expect casualties whenever military forces go into harm's way, it doesn't mean that casualties are

meaningless. In fact, casualties are one of the most influential forces on public support regarding conflict events and scholarship has long studied its impact. An influential book by John Mueller (1973) was one of the first endeavors into exploring the connection between casualties and public support. In researching support for the Korean and Vietnam wars, Mueller noted that as casualties increased, support decreased. Extensions of this research has attempted to refine our understanding of casualties and also the conditions on which casualties should or should not matter. For example, Scott Gartner and Gary Segura have spent over a decade refining the conditions on which casualties matter. One argument they make is that total casualties should not matter as much as marginal casualties (Gartner and Segura 1998). They find support for their argument in that when casualty rates are accelerating, marginal casualties seem to provide better explanatory power. In addition, they refined scholarship's understanding of how an individual's connection to casualties impacted conflict support. For example, Gartner, Segura and Wilkening (1997) found that local or proximate casualties also mattered greatly in shaping conflict support. Gartner (2008b) noted that a personal connection to casualties (if the individual personally knew someone who was a wartime casualty) also shaped support for conflicts. Another article by Garner (2008a) demonstrated the significance of the casualty "context". Beyond the total or marginal casualties, the casualty trend mattered in that in created a standard by which individuals would judge future casualties. So, if casualties numbers neither increased or decreased in a month, it would look good in a situation where there was an increasing casualty trend but look poor in the context where casualties had been decreasing.

Another line of research has extended the exploration of casualties into attempting to understand what drives casualty tolerance and casualty's impact on support. Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006) explored public tolerance for casualties, in the Iraq War, based on two distinct factors: the perceived rightness/wrongness of a conflict and the likelihood of success. They discovered that both had a significant effect on casualty tolerance. However, the most important factor was the perceived likelihood of success. When the public was confident in success in the mission, casualties meant very little. When the public was not so confident, casualties had a much larger impact on overall support. In addition, public perception of the overall importance of the mission can have a substantial impact on aggregate support. Larson (1996, 2000) found that the perceived importance of the military operation had a major impact on if the public supported the mission and how influential the level of casualties were. When a mission was perceived by the public as vital to the nation, casualties had a small effect on public support. When the mission is not perceived as important, the public is not tolerant of casualties. The framing and reporting of casualties has also been shown to shape public preferences. Boettcher and Cobb (2006) demonstrated that individuals were significantly more supportive of conflicts when a body count ratio (American casualties vs. enemy casualties) is presented compared to just a report of American casualties. A recent book by Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler (2009) also looked at how individual level support for conflict in security oriented and humanitarian oriented missions drove support for casualty tolerance, and generally noted that those who supported the use of troops in each situation were also more likely to tolerate more casualties in such situations.

In summary, we know quite well that casualties matter and have a strong impact on public support for conflict situations. We also know that there is a myriad of conditions that shape the impact of casualties on support. However, one area that we know less about is how an individual's ideology interacts with the casualty cue to shape conflict preferences.[38] That is the goal of this chapter.

Theory

Casualties are an external stimulus to individual attitude formation. The general role of casualties is that individuals are exposed to casualty information and then update their preferences for a conflict accordingly. As I have stated earlier, there is no disputing the significant role that casualties play on attitude formation. What I challenge is the assumption that casualties have a uniform impact on individual preference formation and propose that the impact of casualties is biased by the ideological worldview of the individual. This is important in that it signifies that some individuals are more or less tolerant to casualties depending on the interaction of his or her ideology and the intervention context (one based on security or one based on humanitarian issues). Both pieces are important in assessing the impact of ideology on casualty tolerance.

Stemming from the theory on ideology's indirect effect (chapter 4), we should expect an interaction between the event context and the individual's ideology. First,

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[38] Gelpi et al. (2009) explore this to some degree by considering how general support for security and humanitarian issues shaped casualty tolerance. While somewhat similar to a foreign policy ideology, their conceptualization is simply a more general attitude and not an ideology. While I do not wish to enter into a battle of which concept is better, their measures are very focused on conflict issues where my concepts of a foreign policy ideology follow this more worldview conceptualization (similar to Wittkopf 1990, Holsti 2004) that should have explanatory power outside of conflict situations as well.

depending on the event context (security oriented or humanitarian), either the militant or cooperative dimensions should influence preferences regarding the conflict event. When an individual is provided information regarding a foreign event, they should be able to label the event as security oriented, humanitarian oriented, etc. Once the individual has labeled the event, he or she can then draw from his or her ideological worldview to help inform preferences for the specific event. As discussed, and tested in earlier chapters, we should expect the militant dimension to influence preferences for security issues (with higher militants being supportive on such issues) and the cooperative dimension for humanitarian issues (with higher cooperatives being supportive on such issues). This leads to the first set of hypotheses.

> H1A: The more militant an individual is in their foreign policy ideology, the more likely he or she should support the use of force in security oriented missions.

> H1B: The more cooperative an individual is in their foreign policy ideology, the more likely he or she should support the use of force in humanitarian oriented missions.

Beyond simply supporting or opposing an intervention, ideology should shape the way an individual perceives the event. Prior literature has argued that how an individual perceives an event, is quite important in shaping their support for the event and their tolerance for casualties (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Larson 1996, 2000, Boettcher and Cobb 2006). While I don't challenge this argument, I question how perceptions are formed in the first place and argue that ideology can explain much of this. As discussed in chapter 4, individuals should use their foreign policy ideology as a schema to understand the event. If an individual is looking at an event through their "ideological"

lens, then we should expect ideology to go beyond simply influencing preferences, but also shape how an individual perceives key aspects of the event, such as if the event is just or worthwhile. Essentially, ideology forms the entire perception of the event, not just support or opposition for the event. This leads to the next hypothesis.

H2: An individual's foreign policy ideology should shape how individuals perceive foreign policy events.

The perception of casualties is an extension of this discussion. Prior chapters have demonstrated that individuals with a more militant/cooperative ideology to be more supportive of conflicts that are security/humanitarian, respectively. Also, as I have discussed in the previous hypotheses, we should also expect that ideology influences how an individual perceives foreign events. What this argues is that ideology shapes much about the initial impression, perceptions, and preferences regarding a foreign policy event. Given these initial preferences and perceptions, new information, such as casualties, should be biased by the individual to conform to their initial preferences and perceptions. This differs greatly from rational choice explanations that argue casualties send information about a war, which then influences preferences. My argument is that individuals will bias the incoming casualty information to fit in with their initial perceptions and preferences (which is dictated by their foreign policy ideology). So, for example, if an individual is supportive of a conflict or perceives it as important, then he or she should be more likely to discount casualties, where a less supportive individual would be influenced more strongly by casualties.

Let us explore this within the ideological dimensions. High militants will look at security events as inherently vital to the wellbeing of the country. Because they see the

world in a more threatening and realist manner, they should consider any security issue as a real and potential threat and support eliminating such threat. Because of this, these individuals would be more likely to discount casualties to support their initial preferences and perceptions. Casualties are discounted by high militants because the mission is too important or just to not intervene. On the other hand, low militants would be less likely to support intervention in a security oriented mission because they are less likely to see the event as a threat in the first place. To them, casualties should magnify their opposition and perceptions. So in effect, when exposed to casualties, higher militants should be willing to continue an intervention compared to low militants due to this discounting of casualties. This leads to the next hypothesis.

> H3: Individuals who are more militant in their foreign policy ideology should be more tolerant of casualties in security oriented missions compared to less militant individuals.

When considering the cooperative dimension, we should expect the same type of casualty tolerance in humanitarian issues as militants in security issues. High cooperatives will see addressing humanitarian issues as important and so they are more likely to discount the information brought on by casualties. Lower cooperatives, on the other hand, use casualties to reinforce their initial preferences and perceptions. Similarly, when faced with casualties, high cooperatives should be willing to continue an intervention compared to low cooperatives due to this discounting of casualties.

> H4: Individuals who are more cooperative in their foreign policy ideology should be more tolerant of casualties in humanitarian oriented missions compared to less cooperative individuals.

Finally, this section has also discussed how ideology influences perceptions of events and these perceptions should also influence casualty tolerance. Individuals whose perceptions lead them to supporting an intervention, believing in its importance, and merit should be more likely to discount casualties compared to individuals who perceive an event as non-important, unjust, or are simply not supportive of the event.

> H5: Individuals who perceive a foreign policy event in a supportive manner should be more tolerant of casualties compared to those who perceive the event in a non-supportive manner.

In summary, the above discussion argues that individuals begin considering a foreign policy intervention through the lens of his or her foreign policy ideology. This ideology will help the individual form preferences and perceptions of the intervention (i.e. how important is the mission, it is just, should it proceed). In addition, when casualty information is provided to individuals, the individual's tolerance to conflict casualties will be based on two aspects. The first is the individual's foreign policy ideology, and the second is the individual's perceptions of the mission (which is largely caused by the individual's ideology). Now let us empirically evaluate this theory.

Research Design

To further understand the relationship between ideology and casualty tolerance, I turn to data from a survey experiment conducted at the University of Iowa in November of 2011.[39] There were three main parts to the survey. First, there was a 25 item battery

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[39] Survey was conducted between November 9 and 27, 2011. An email was sent to all staff and students at the University of Iowa (approximately 43,000 emails were sent) advertising the study and providing a link to an online site for the study. A follow up email was sent one week after the initial email.

of foreign policy belief questions which are used to identify the foreign policy ideology

of the individual (similar to the study in Chapter 5). Second, an experiment closely

resembling Gartner's (2008a) casualty tolerance panel experiment is included. The

experiment consisted of numerous parts and I will explain each in order below.[40]

Finally, a battery of demographic questions was also gathered from each of the

participants.

At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were asked to read about a possible

foreign policy intervention scenario. The scenarios were manipulated to consist of either

a foreign policy restraint scenario or a humanitarian intervention scenario (Jentleson

1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998). One scenario consisted of a South American nation

attempting to enrich uranium to produce a nuclear weapon and threating US allies and the

US itself. The second scenario consisted of a South American nation committing ethnic

genocide[41]. In both scenarios, the President of the United States decided to commit

airstrikes and 30,000 US troops to this nation to either end the genocide or stop the

nuclear ambitions (depending on the scenario). Subjects also learn that opposition

leaders in Congress strongly oppose this intervention, but the President asserts that the

intervention is vital to the interests of the nation. Tied to this is a second manipulation

that reveals the partisanship of the President and opposition leaders. The President is

either Republican or Democrat and opposition leaders are always the opposite party of

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All participants who completed the study and provided their email address were entered into a drawing for one of three $100 rewards. The study was conducted with the Decision Process Tracing Environment software (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). A total of 1125 subjects participated in the study.

[40] See Figure 7.1 for a diagram of the experiment design.

[41] See Appendix D for the experiment text.

the President. Once the scenario is described, participants are asked a small battery of questions to tap into his or her feelings regarding the importance of the mission, the rightness of the mission, how successful he or she believes the mission will be, and an overall support level for the mission.

The next stage of the experiment consists of 10 rounds of casualty information for the mission. Each round consists of one month of the intervention. At each round, subjects are informed to the number of casualties for that month and provided a table showing the casualty trend throughout the mission. In this stage a third manipulation is included: the casualty trend. The casualty numbers either start high in round 1 and the 10 round trend decreases or they start low and have an increasing trend over the 10 rounds.[42] After being informed of the casualties for the month, participants are asked if the intervention should continue. If the participant answers "Yes", the study continues. If the participant answers "No", the study ends at that point. This occurs at each round so the participant can end the intervention at any of the rounds. If the subject supports continued intervention at round 10, the scenario ends and the observation is right censored.

By design, this experiment allows for an exploration of the connection between ideology and casualty tolerance in a number of different ways. First of all, I can explore how ideology influences support for the intervention when faced with starkly different casualty numbers. In the first round, participants are provided with casualty figures that are very high (191 casualties in the first month) or very low (7 casualties in the first month). The scenarios are the same but the casualties differ substantially so this provides

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[42] See Table D1 of Appendix D for the casualty trend figures.

a good exploration into what drives some individuals to wish to end the intervention at round 1 versus others who wish to continue the intervention. This first dependent variable asks if the intervention should continue, with 1 indicating "yes" and 0 indicating "no". Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression with robust standard errors will be used.

Secondly, given the duration style of the experiment, I can explore how ideology shapes casualty tolerance over time and see who is more or less likely to end the intervention earlier compared to who is willing to go the distance. What are the characteristics of individuals willing to continue military intervention when faced with different casualty contexts (increasing or decreasing), and how does ideology shape these preferences? The dependent variable for this analysis is an ordinal variable that indicates at which round the participant wished to end the intervention. The variable ranges from 1 to 11 with each value indicating the round the participant ended the scenario and 11 indicating if the subject wished to continue beyond round 10 (and are right censored). Similar to Gartner (2008a), I analyze this variable with a cox hazard model with robust standard errors.

With these two dependent variables, we have two different ways to explore casualty tolerance, and the factors that lead to such a tolerance. Also, the models are analyzed so that the different experimental manipulations for scenario (genocide or nuclear) and casualty context (increasing or decreasing) are split up so we have four different groups (1:genocide scenario with an increasing casualty tend [but low initial casualties], 2: genocide scenario with a decreasing casualty tend [but high initial casualties], 3: nuclear scenario with an increasing casualty tend [but low initial

casualties], 4: nuclear scenario with a decreasing casualty tend [but high initial casualties]). By doing this, it allows for a very specific exploration into how ideology and the other variables shape casualty tolerance in these very specific scenarios. One downside to this is it breaks to models down into smaller population samples (N is a little over 200 in each sample), but with the substantial differences within the experimental groups, it is necessary to break up the groups in such a manner.

Also, a set of variables concerning the individual's perception of the intervention are used as both dependent (as part of hypotheses 1 and 2) and independent variables (as part of hypothesis 5). First, we have if the participant supported the intervention in the first place. Naturally, we should expect those who support the mission to be more tolerant of casualties compared to someone less supportive. Support is measured as a five point variable with 1 indicating "no support" and 5 indicating "very supportive". Second, is the perception concerning the importance of the mission. Individuals who perceive the mission as important should be more tolerant of casualties in such a mission (Larson 1996). This is a seven point measure where higher values indicate more importance. Third, is the success potential of the mission. Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006) found that individuals who perceived a mission to be more likely to be successful would be more casualty tolerant. This is a four point measure where higher values indicate the participant believes the mission will be more successful. Finally, we have the perceived rightness/wrongness of the mission. Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006) also showed greater casualty tolerance among individuals who believed the mission was just or right. This is a dichotomous variable where 1= right and 0=wrong.

The primary independent variable of interest consists of the two foreign policy ideological dimensions (militant and cooperative). Similar to the process in chapter 6, these dimensions are created by factor analyzing twenty-five questions aimed at tapping the general foreign policy beliefs of the individual. The questions mirror the foreign policy importance questions used in the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (Chittick et al. 1995) along with questions used by other studies exploring foreign policy ideology (e.g. Holsti and Rosenau 1990, Herrmann et al. 1999, Herrmann and Keller 2004). An iterated principle factor analysis was performed on these 25 items (see Table 7.1) and the first two factors consisted of a militant dimension (Factor 1) and a cooperative dimension (Factor 2). Also, the factor analysis results closely resemble the analysis of chapter 6. In both studies, the factor tables look nearly identical which provides support to the stability of the dimensions.

Another important concept of interest is the partisan effect. Individuals mirroring the partisanship of the President should be more supportive of the President where those not matching the President should be less supportive. This measure is captured by a set of indicator variables for 1) if the President and the individual are of the same party or 2) the individual is a self-identified independent (with the President and individual being of differing parties as the reference category).[43] In addition, partisan strength is also controlled for.

Finally, the standard socio-demographic controls are included along with questions on ties to military service or personal connections to military casualties,

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[43] Individual partisanship is assessed through a set of questions asking for partisan identification and then strength of identification or leaning Republican or Democrat if independent. Independent leaners were considered partisans.

political knowledge, and an extended battery of religious questions.[44] Table D2 in Appendix D provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.

Results

Ideology and Intervention Perception

Before delving into an analysis of how ideology impacts casualty tolerance, let us first consider how ideology shapes an individual's perception of an intervention. As hypothesized, ideology should directly influence how individual perceive an intervention and these perceptions should work with ideology in shaping casualty tolerance. So essentially, ideology influence casualty tolerance directly and also indirectly through perceptions. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 consider how ideology shapes perceptions. Table 7.2 looks at the nuclear scenarios where table 7.3 considers the genocide scenarios. Table 7.4 displays the substantive effects. Because there are four different dependent variables and all on different scales, the empirical test used in each model differs. For models 1 (support) and 2 (success), I used ordered logistic regression. For model 3 (right/wrong), I use logistic regression. Finally, for model 4 (importance), I use OLS.

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[44] For "Known Military Casualties", respondents are coded 1 if they personally knew a military casualty and 0 otherwise. For "Served in Military", respondents are coded 1 if they ever served in the military and 0 otherwise. Party identification is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher scores are more Republican. Domestic ideology is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher scores equal more conservative. Education is a 7 point ordinal variable where higher values indicate more education. Income is a 9 point ordinal variable where higher values indicate more education. Race/ethnicity is measured by an indicator variable (1=nonwhite, 0=white). Age is a continuous variable of the respondent's age. Female is an indicator variable (1=female, 0=male), Evangelical Protestant, Catholic, and Secular are all indicator variables where 1 = the specific religious tradition and 0 otherwise. Religious attendance is a 6 point ordinal variable where higher values equal more attendance. Religious beliefs is a three point ordinal variable where higher values equal more orthodox/traditional religious beliefs. Political knowledge is a five point ordinal variable of self-identified political knowledge. Higher values equal more knowledge.

Let us first consider the role of ideology in shaping preferences in the nuclear scenario (Table 7.2). One variable truly stands out as shaping perceptions and that is ideology; specifically, the militant dimension. In all four models, the militant dimension is highly significant ($p < .01$) and has a very large substantive effect. For example, for model 4 (importance), the OLS coefficient for the militant dimension is .52. The range for the importance variable is 1 to 7 and the range of the militant dimension is -2.11 to 2.5. So the militant dimension has the potential of shifting the perception of importance over two and a half points. In a similar manner, if we consider model 3 (right/wrong), going from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean shifts the probability of believing the intervention is right from .22 to .73. Models 1 and 2 also show strong substantive effects (although given the larger number of categories in the dependent variables, the probabilities are not as high). For model 1, the probability of being very supportive (score 5 of 5) moves from .01 (- 1 SD on the militant scale) to .15 (+ 1 SD on the militant scale). Likewise for model 2, the probability of believing the conflict is "very likely to succeed" (score 4 of 4) goes from .11 (- 1 SD on the militant scale) to .34 (+ 1 SD on the militant scale).

Beyond the militant dimension, we also see a significant impact from partisanship. Particularly, those that share the party affiliation of the President seem to have more positive perceptions of the intervention in three of the four models ($p < .05$). Substantively, however, the impact is not very large. For model 1 (support), the probability of being very supportive (score 5 of 5) moves from .05 (different party) to .07 (same party). For model 3 (right/wrong), the probability of believing the intervention is right goes from .47 (different party) to .59 (same party). Finally, in model 4, the OLS

coefficient is .28 so going from not having the same party affiliation as the President to having the same affiliation only has a change of .28 on the 7 point scale of importance. Also, the cooperative dimension is only significant in model 1. It has a negative effect, meaning the more cooperative the less supportive, but the substantive effects are minor (.02 decrease in probability of being "very supportive" when going from – 1 SD to + 1 SD).

Turning to the genocide scenario (Table 7.3), we see a very similar story. With the exception partisanship being significant in model 3, foreign policy ideology is the only significant influence on these perceptions. This time both the militant and cooperative dimensions are significant (p < .01) and have large substantive effects. For model 1 (support), 1 standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean moves the probability of being "very supportive" (5 on the 5 point scale) from .05 to .18 for the militant dimension and .06 to .15 for the cooperative dimension. Likewise, for model 2 (success), the probability of believing the intervention is "very likely to succeed" goes from .09 (- 1 SD) to .26 (+1 SD) for the militant dimension and .11 to .21 for the cooperative dimension. For model 3 (right/wrong), the probability of believing the intervention is right goes from .44 (-1 SD) to .85 (+1 SD) for the militant dimension and .55 to .79 for the cooperative dimension. Finally, the OLS coefficients in model 4 (importance) again show a substantial impact out of ideology. The militant dimension has the potential to shift the seven point scale a little under a point and a half and the cooperative dimension (range goes from -2.4 to 2.2) has the potential to shift the scale over two points.

In looking at these first tables, we get a very good sense of how foreign policy ideology shapes perceptions of foreign intervention. Included with a host of variables including partisanship and domestic ideology, foreign policy ideology is truly the only consistent influence on how individuals perceive an intervention. Also, the substantive effect from ideology is substantial. While partisan identification was significant in a number of models, most notably in the nuclear scenario, its substantive effect was minor. These results give strong support to hypotheses 1 and 2. How an individual sees the world has a major influence, and according to these models is the largest influence, on how he or she perceives foreign events. This is immensely important because we will discover later in this chapter that perceptions of the intervention (which I have just shown is driven by ideology) have a strong influence on casualty tolerance.

Ideology and Casualty Tolerance –
Intervention Continuation

Now that we have analyzed how ideology shapes perceptions of foreign intervention, now let us explore the role ideology plays on casualty tolerance. Let us first consider preferences for staying in the conflict at the first round. Recall that in this part of the experiment, subjects have read the scenario and have been exposed to the first round of casualties (month one). While subjects got a scenario based on nuclear enrichment or genocide, we can compare these subjects who got the same scenario and see how individual factors interact with casualties to inform preferences. The one major difference subjects are exposed to in round one is the number of casualties. Subjects either got a high casualty manipulation (191 casualties) or a low casualty manipulation (7 casualties).

Before delving into a multivariate analysis of the relationship, let us first consider some bivariate tables between ideology and intervention continuation beyond the first round. Table 7.5 presents six separate bivariate tables. The first three tables (A, B, and C) explore the relationship between continuing the intervention and the initial casualties at different militant levels (for presentational purposes, the militant dimension is condensed from its interval scale into a three point ordinal scale (low ½, middle 1/3 [titled indifferent] and high 1/3).[45]

A few insights are derived from these three models. First of all, there is a stark contrast in continuing beyond round 1 between low militants and high militants. In both the high and low casualty scenario, over 80 percent of high militants continue the intervention beyond the first round. In contrast, only 33 percent of low militants do so in the high casualty scenario and 48 percent do so in the low casualty scenario. Secondly, we see that low militants are much more sensitive to casualties compared to high militants. Where there is very little difference in high militants regardless of the number of casualties, there is a 15 point difference for low militants. What these bivariate tables imply is that casualties don't seem to matter much for high militants but casualties do seem to matter for low militants. Low militants are more likely to continue an intervention when faced with low casualty numbers where high militants don't care. In addition, the "indifferent" militants (middle 1/3) appear to have a sensitivity to casualties that is somewhat in-between the high and low militants (about 7 points).

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[45] 64% of subjects go beyond round 1 in the nuclear scenario and 70% continue past round 1 in the genocide scenario. When including casualties in the nuclear scenario, 68% continue with low initial casualties and 61% continue with high casualties. For the genocide scenario, the percentages are 73% for low initial casualties and 67% for high initial casualties.

Models D, E and F of Table 7.5 now look at the genocide scenario and the cooperative dimension. Similar to the militant dimension, the cooperative dimension is also condensed into three categories. A few interesting findings are noteworthy here as well. First of all, there is a substantial contrast between high cooperatives and low cooperatives in regarding to intervention continuation (on average, about a 20 point difference). The difference is not nearly as substantial as that found among militants in the nuclear scenario but it is still a large difference. A second interesting finding is that there does not appear to be much of a sensitivity to casualties in the low and high cooperatives but there does appear to be a sensitivity among the indifferent group. Low cooperatives have a 2 point difference between the high casualty and low casualty scenarios, high cooperatives have about a 5 point difference but the indifferent group has about a 13 point difference. This differs from the tables looking at the militant dimension but makes some sense in that the indifferent group is probably less committed in their preferences so may also be likely to be swayed by the casualty cue.

Now that we have looked at this relationship in a bivariate manner, let us turn to multivariate models to see how ideology holds in the presence of additional important factors. Table 7.6 provides logistic models for the nuclear enrichment scenario (Model 1 for the high initial casualty scenario and Model 2 for the low initial casualty scenario).[46] The models include the same variables as the models in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, but also include the four perceptual variables (support, importance, success potential, and

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[46] Splitting the sample into high initial casualties and low initial casualties was selected over including the casualty type as a control and interacting with ideology because the focus was not simply to explore the role of ideology but also the other variables involved in the model. By splitting the sample, I am able to explore the role of all the variables at different casualty contexts.

rightness) that were the dependent variables in those tables.[47] Looking at Table 7.6, we see some evidence for the role of ideology but more so for some of the perceptual variables. In the high casualty scenario, the militant dimension is significant at p= .101. While outside the normal range of significance, given the small N (220), and high statistical and substantive influence of ideology on perceptions (see Table 7.2 and 7.3) it is a noteworthy relationship. If we consider the substantive effect of the militant dimension, one standard deviation below the militant dimension mean provides a probability of .80 of staying in the conflict. At one standard deviation above the mean, this probability is .93. As for the perceptual variables, both support and right/wrong are highly significant (p < .01). Substantively, not supporting the intervention at all (scored 1 on the 5 point scale) leads to a probability of .47 of staying in the conflict. At moderate support (score of 3), the probability is .9, and at "very supportive" (scored 5), the probability is .99. As for right/wrong, if the individual feels the intervention is wrong, probability of staying in the conflict is .48 where it is .88 if the individual felt the intervention was right. Beyond ideology and perceptions, both being female and having more traditional religious beliefs are significant and negative.

Turning to the low casualty scenarios (model 2), a slightly different story is revealed. Ideology is not significant at all for this model but two perceptual variables are again significant (p < .01): right/wrong and importance. In this low casualty scenario, if the respondent feels the intervention is wrong, probability of staying in the conflict is .48

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[47] While collinearity problems were not detected in the full models, these perceptual variables are correlated with each other and also with ideology (mostly the militant dimension). Most notably, in the nuclear scenarios support is correlated .58 with the militant dimension, .67 with rightness, and over .5 with success and importance.

and it is .93 if the individual felt the intervention was right. As for importance, the probability of staying in the intervention is .79 if the respondent felt it was "not at all important" (score 1 of 7). This probability shifts to .96 at a score of 4 on the 7 point scale and moves to .99 if the respondent felt the intervention was "extremely important" (score 7 of 7). Beyond these two perceptual variables, only religious attendance is significant ($P < .05$) and negative.

Table 7.7 provides a set of models based on the genocide scenario, with model 1 considering the high casualty scenario and model 2 considering the low casualty scenario. Let us first turn to model 1. Surprisingly, the ideology variables are not significant in the model. This is possibly due to reasons I will outline a little later. Once again, the strongest predictor is the belief in the rightness of the intervention. Believing the conflict was wrong leads to only a .19 probability of continuing the intervention, where believing the conflict was right leads to a .89 probability.   Believing the conflict is important is also significant ($p < .10$) and also provides a strong substantive effect (from .64 for "not important" [scored 1] to .96 for "extremely important" [scored 7]). There is also a partisan effect but the effect is a bit strange in that only independents are more likely to continue the intervention (compared to the reference category of those of the opposite party). The probability of continuing the intervention for independents is .55 where it is .89 for opposing partisans.[48]

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[48] An initial inclination with this result is it may be due to some modeling or collinearity issue. Rerunning the model as OLS and checking the VIF shows no collinearity issue. Also, running a simple cross tab with same party, different party, and independents along with continuing the intervention shows a substantial difference between both individuals of the same and different party compared to independents (7 points higher for respondents of the opposite party and 19 points higher for respondents of the same party.

Results from the low casualty scenario (model 2) paint somewhat of a similar picture. We again see ideology as not being significant. Also, similar to model 1, the strongest predictor is if the respondent believes the conflict is right. The probability of continuing the conflict goes from .4 to 1 if the respondent believes the intervention is right. Support for the intervention is also significant at p =.06. The probability of continuing the intervention for respondents who did not support the intervention at all (coded as 1) was .69. For those who were "very supportive" the probability was .99 (coded as 5).

Results from Tables 7.6 to 7.8 paint an interesting picture regarding the relationship between ideology and casualty tolerance. First of all, my main hypothesis regarding the role of ideology finds some support but only in the nuclear scenario. When faced with high casualties at the onset, high militants seem to be more likely to continue the intervention in the nuclear scenario compared to other militants. Again, the significance is p = .101, but still noteworthy for the reasons mentioned before. With low initial casualties, there doesn't appear to be a difference. Interestingly, ideology does not seem to play a role in the genocide context. To a degree, this questions the impact of ideology on casualty tolerance. However, before jumping to that conclusion, we must consider that ideology is an important predictor of each of these four perceptual variables (as shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3). Theoretically, ideology would be considered a longer term factor and these perceptions would be shorter term attitudes. We should expect that ideology would influence the formation of these attitudes and results from Table 7.2 and 7.3 provide support for this expectation. So while only significant in one of the models, ideology is also working through the perceptual variables to influence intervention

continuation. Also, if the models are rerun without the four perceptual variables, ideology is highly significant in all the models. This lends support that there is a relationship between ideology and perceptions, and as Tables 7.2 and 7.3 have shown, the relationship is from ideology to perceptions.

Also, perception of the intervention matters significantly (Gelpi et al. 2005/2006, Larson 1996, 2000). In line with Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006), the perception of the rightness of the intervention is consistent across all models and has a very large substantive effect. However, not in line with Gelpi and colleagues (2005/2006), the prospect for success does not seem to influence continuing the intervention. We also see that importance perception and general support play a role although they are not consistent predictors like perceptions of the rightness.

Finally, given the focus of a partisan battle over the significance of the intervention within the experiment text, I expected some partisan effect to be present but, strangely, it was not. I also ran these models, as well as the other models of this chapter, without the 7 point partisan measure and found no difference. Also, instead of having two indicator variables (same party as President and different party as President, with independents as the reference category), I ran the models with just an indicator for the same party and still did not find anything. Like ideology, some impact from partisanship may be running through the perceptual variables. But as Tables 7.2 and 7.3 showed, the partisan influence was not consistent, and when it was the substantive effects were minor.

Panel Analysis - Hazard Models

The above models demonstrated the moderate importance of ideology and how it ties in with casualties at one specific point in time: the beginning of an intervention. Now we turn to the entire experiment (10 rounds) to see how ideology plays a role in tolerance of casualties over time.

Let us first consider a set of bivariate tables to explore the relationship between ideology and the involvement duration. Table 7.9 (A to C) explore the relationship between the nuclear scenario and the militant dimension and Table 7.9 (D to F) explore the relationship between the genocide scenario and the cooperative dimension. Turning to nuclear scenario (Table 7.9 [A to C]) we see some very interesting findings that mirror much of the results from the cross tabs in Table 7.5. First of all, in both the increasing and decreasing casualty scenarios, high militants are much more likely to stay in the conflict longer and for the full duration compared to low militants. Looking at the decreasing casualty scenario, 75 percent of high militants go beyond round 10 where only 20 percent of low militants do so. Likewise, only 11 percent of high militants end in round one where 67 percent of low militants do so. In the increasing casualty scenario we see similar, but not quite as stark, results. Forty-nine percent of high militants go beyond round 10 where only 15 percent of low militants do so. Again, when looking at ending in round 1, only 17 percent of high militants do compared to 52 percent of low militants. A second noteworthy point is the difference in duration between the increasing and decreasing casualty trends. In the decreasing trends, a larger percentage of individuals drop in round 1 since this group begins with a very high casualty figure. After round 1, however, between 10 and 20 percent of respondents drop in the remainder

of the scenario, where the remainder ends up never stopping. Compare that to the increasing trend where 30 to 40 percent of subjects drop out between rounds 2 and 10. This points to the overall notion that context does make a difference (Gartner 2008a), and while high militants are still much more likely to maintain a longer duration, they are not completely immune to an increasing casualty trend. There does seem to be a tipping point (Redlawsk et al. 2010) for some high militants.

Tables 7.9 (D to F) look at the relationship between duration in the humanitarian intervention and the cooperative dimension. Overall, these tables provide a similar story to the one above but uncover a weaker relationship. High cooperatives are more likely to stay in the intervention longer compared to low cooperatives but the difference is not as great. For example, in the decreasing trend, 24 percent of high cooperatives drop in round 1 where 52 percent never drop, compared to 41 percent of low cooperatives dropping in round 1 and 42 percent never dropping. Secondly, we again see a much higher percentage of individuals dropping in rounds 2 through 10 in the increasing casualty scenarios compared to the decreasing scenarios. Between 15 and 25 percent of subjects dropped during these rounds in the decreasing trend scenario where between 45 and 60 percent did so in the increasing context. Again, while high cooperatives were still more likely to have a longer duration (i.e. be more casualty tolerant), they were impacted substantially by an increasing casualty trend (as were the indifferent and low cooperatives).

Now let us turn to a set of multivariate models. Tables 7.10 and 7.11 provide the Cox Hazard model estimates. Table 7.10 presents models for the nuclear scenario and Table 7.11 presents models for the genocide scenario. Within each table, multiple

models are used for the two different casualty trends (increasing trend and decreasing trend [Gartner 2008a]). Following Gartner (2008a), I use a Cox Hazard Model to explore how ideology shapes the duration of staying in the conflict.[49] Hazard ratios are reported in the tables.[50]

Let us first begin by exploring the role of ideology on casualty tolerance in the nuclear scenario (Table 7.10). Generally, the story is quite similar to results from looking strictly at the initial round and preferences for continuation (Tables 7.6 to 7.8). In both the increasing and decreasing trend, the militant ideology is not significant. Instead, many of the perceptual variables are significant across both models. Support for the intervention is significant in both models and leads to between a 20 and 30 percent decrease in the hazard rate depending on the casualty trend. Also significant in both models is the perception of the rightness of the intervention. Again, the substantive effect is quite large with about a 50 percent decrease in the hazard rate for both models. Success and importance are also significant but only in the increasing trend. Both lead to about a 25 percent decrease in the casualty trend. Finally, the cooperative dimension is significant in only the increasing trend. A unit increase in the cooperative dimension leads to about a 27 percent increase in the hazard rate. In addition, a wide range of control variables are significant with the most notable being that females lead to a 110%

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[49] I also ran Weibull models and the Weibull results (not shown) were very similar to the Cox results.

[50] With hazard ratios, the baseline hazard is 1.Ratios above 1 indicate an increase in the hazard of failure (or end the conflict) where ratios below 1 indicate a decrease in the hazard of failure (less likely to end the conflict).

increase in the hazard rate for the increasing trend and a 40 percent increase in the hazard rate for the decreasing trend.

Table 7.11 explores the genocide scenarios. Again, we see a strong influence on the hazard rate coming from perceptions of the intervention. Perception of the rightness of the intervention leads to around a 70 percent decrease in the hazard rate in both casualty trends where support leads to about a 25 percent decrease in the increasing trend and importance leads to about a 16 percent decrease in the decreasing casualty trend. In addition, foreign policy ideology plays a role in these models. In the increasing casualty trend, the cooperative dimension is significant and a unit increase leads to about a 21 percent decrease in the hazard rate. In the decreasing trend, the militant dimension is significant at $p = .051$, and a unit increase also leads to about a 21 percent decrease in the hazard rate. In addition, a wide range of controls are again significant, with female again being the most notable with a 94 percent increase in the hazard rate for the decreasing trend.

In general, the results from Tables 7.10 and 7.11 provide a similar story to that of Tables 7.6 to 7.8. Once again, perceptions appear to drive casualty tolerance. All four perceptual variables were significant in at least one model for the nuclear scenario and three of the four in the genocide scenario. Furthermore, rightness was significant in all models and support was significant in all but one. Substantively, their effects were also quite large (ranging anywhere from a 20 to a 50 percent decrease in the hazard rate for the nuclear scenario and up to 70 percent in the genocide scenario). As for ideology, the results are mixed. In the nuclear scenario, the militant dimension is in the correct direction but is not significant ($p = .18$ and $.25$). It is possible that larger Ns may uncover

a significant relationship. The cooperative dimension is also significant in one model for the nuclear scenario and leads to an increase in the hazard rate. As for the genocide scenarios, the cooperative dimension is significant in the increasing trend where the militant dimension barely misses conventional significance ($p < .05$) in the decreasing trend. Like the earlier tables (Tables 7.6 to 7.8), this mixed significance from ideology is largely due to including the perceptual variables in the models. If the perceptual variables are removed (models not shown), ideology is highly significant across intervention type and casualty context. For example, in the nuclear scenario, the militant dimension is highly significant and leads to over a 40 percent decrease in the hazard rate for every unit increase. In the genocide scenarios, both dimensions are significant and a unit increase leads to anywhere between a 20 and 40 percent decrease in the hazard rate. Pairing this with the theoretical connection between ideology and perception, along with the results from Tables 7.2 to 7.4 showing a strong significant and substantive influence from ideology on perceptions, there is strong suggestive evidence that ideology certainly plays a role in casualty tolerance, but that the majority of its influence is by indirectly working through perceptions.

Expanding the Link between Ideology,
Perceptions, and Casualty Tolerance

While ideology's impact on casualty tolerance is inconsistent in the previous tables, I have argued (both theoretically and empirically), that much of ideology's impact is through the perceptual variables. One final way to explore this connection is through the use of path analysis. Path analysis techniques allow for an analysis of not just direct relationships (such as OLS) but also indirect relationships (relationships that occur

through mediating variables). This works well here because I can attempt to assess if ideology is working through perceptions to influence casualty tolerance. Using STATA 12's SEM package, I perform a path analysis that links ideology to preferences and intervention continuation. The dependent variable in this analysis is the 11 point scale used in the panel analysis (Tables 7.10 and 7.11).[51] Based on the theoretical discussion and earlier empirical results, I tested a number of model specifications. A base model that solely included ideology, perception, and casualty tolerance had a less than desirable fit. After considering the other empirical results, I added a few of the control variables and modified the path between some of the perceptual variables to obtain adequate model fits.[52] Given the paths, additional endogenous variables include support for the intervention, rightness of the intervention, importance, and success potential. In general, the paths started with ideology and party identification influencing perceptions.[53] Then ideology, party identification, perceptions, and a few select control variables all led into

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[51] Given the structure of the dependent variable, using path analysis is not entirely appropriate because it assumes a non-censored, continuous and linear dependent variable (like OLS). However, I present these models to display the overall picture that ideology indirectly influences casualty tolerance through these perceptual variables rather than be entirely accurate on the coefficients. Also, if the Cox hazard models (Tables 7.10 and 7.11) are rerun with OLS, the overall picture from the hazard models does not change substantively. In other words, running OLS does not distort the results. Given that these OLS models are quite close to the hazard models, I assume the path analysis models will be relatively accurate.

[52] According to Klein (2005), model fit is acceptable if the SRMR < .10, CFI > .90, RMSEA < .10 (but lower is better), and Chi-squared/df to be at least below 5 but more likely 2 or 3. While not all of the models met these standards, the models generally had adequate model fit according to a number of the fit statistics (see tables for fit statistics).

[53] The path analysis also indicated support for importance, rightness, and success potential to influence support for the intervention.

continuation of the intervention (primary dependent variable).[54] Tables 7.12 through

7.15 provide the model results.

While the models present some interesting results, I will confine my discussion to

the main purpose of showcasing these tables; demonstrating the influence of ideology.

All four tables show that ideology has a significant effect on intervention continuation.

Ideology appears to have both a significant direct and indirect effect on continuation but

the substantive effects show the bulk of the influence from ideology being done indirectly

through the perceptual variables (compare the direct effect to the total effect). These

results are largely in line with my explanation for why ideology's significant influence

has been mixed; mainly, because ideology is working through the perceptual variables to

influence casualty tolerance.

Discussion

The last few chapters have demonstrated that a foreign policy ideology matters

greatly in preferences during foreign intervention and how individuals assess leaders

during these interventions. This chapter also demonstrated the importance of ideology,

but on how it influences another major factor in preference formation, casualty tolerance.

In general, this chapter has shown that ideology has a strong influence on casualty

tolerance, but that this influence is mostly through shaping preferences and support for

intervention, which in turn influence casualty tolerance. So in summary, what we have is

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[54] I began the models by including variables and paths that were based off my theory and Tables 7.2 and 7.3 (where perceptions of conflict are the dependent variable) along with Tables 7.10 and 7.11 (hazard models I am comparing to). I then made some adjustments to the models to attempt to improve model fit.

an individual viewing the start of a foreign policy event through the lens of his or her foreign policy ideology. This influences how an individual perceives the intervention and initial support for the intervention (as shown in Table 7.2 and 7.3). When new information about the intervention is provided to the individual (in this case casualties), he or she views this new information in the context of his or her worldview and perceptions of the intervention. New information (or casualties for this chapter) has a lesser impact on individuals whose ideology and perceptions lead them to support the intervention in the first place. This differing impact is demonstrated by preferences for the continuation of a conflict. Individuals who are more supportive of the intervention (based on ideology and perceptions) stay in the intervention longer, regardless of what the casualty trend is. In effect, these individuals are biasing against this new information and are more casualty tolerant.

A possible way of looking at this ideology to preferences to casualty tolerance connection may be to think of this as a foreign policy version of the "funnel model" from the American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, Stokes, 1960). We can think of ideology as this long term effect that influences factors further down the funnel. These further down the funnel, and more short term, factors are perceptions of the intervention. What this chapter seems to indicate is that on its own, a long term factor, such as ideology plays a substantial role. However, when ideology is included with these more short term attitudes, the effect from ideology gets drowned out by these other factors. At the same time, this does not invalidate the influence of ideology because it still has an effect on these shorter term attitudes. As shown multiple tables, ideology is a strong predictor behind these different perceptions.

All in all, there is significant evidence to point to the notion that casualty tolerance is not a uniform effect and is mediated by a wide range of considerations, including ideology. While casualties are an important external cue on individual attitudes (as shown by a wide range of studies), the perception of casualties and its impact is heavily determined by the ideology and perceptions of the individual.

Before concluding it is important to acknowledge some weaknesses in this study surrounding the experiment. One major caution here lies with the lack of realism surrounding the only bit of information individuals receive is casualty figures. Certainly this is very limiting and not realistic at all. In a real situation, we should expect a wide range of additional factors to play a role, such as elite cues throughout, progress on the battlefield, changing objectives, etc. While limiting, it was essential to only have casualty numbers because including other data would have required additional manipulations and groups, which would have required a more subjects (which I did not have access to). Secondly, by only providing casualty information, this does improve internal validity in that we can be sure that the only changing condition in each round is the number of casualties.

Figure 7.1: Casualty Tolerance Experimental

Table 7.1: Factor Analysis of 25 Foreign Policy Items

	Factor 1 Militant	Factor 2 Cooperative
1. Protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression		
2. Strengthening the United Nations		
3. Combating international terrorism	0.484	
4. Maintaining superior military power worldwide	0.725	
5. Protecting the jobs of American workers		
6. Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations		
7. Securing adequate supplies of energy		
8. Controlling and reducing illegal immigration	0.402	
9. Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed nations		0.755
10. Improving the global environment		0.483
11. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons		
12. Promoting and defending human rights in other countries		0.671
13. Promoting economic growth		
14. Combating world hunger		0.835
15. Fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy		0.515
16. The best way to ensure peace is through American military strength.	0.855	
17. The use of military force only makes problems worse.	-0.666	
18. Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it is better for us to strike first.	0.586	
19. The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world.		
20. The U.S. government should just try to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved with other nations.		
21. It is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes.		
22. Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country's greatness.	0.691	

Table 7.1 Continued

23. The United States could learn a lot by following the example of other countries	-0.445
24. The United States should provide less economic aid to other countries	
25. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong	

Note: Iterated Principle Factor analysis performed. Only items loading greater than .4 are displayed. Question 1 to 15 reads: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the U.S. might have. For each one, please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the U.S., a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = one of the most important and 1 = not important. Question 16 to 25 reads: Please tell us how much you agree with the following statements. Responses range from 1 to 5 with 5 = strongly agree and 1= strongly disagree.

Table 7.2: Role of Ideology in Intervention Perception - Nuclear Scenario

	Support (1)		Success (2)	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	1.451**	(0.151)	0.814**	(0.144)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.238*	(0.106)	-0.214	(0.121)
Same Party as Pres.	0.452*	(0.204)	0.139	(0.199)
No Party Connection	-0.152	(0.369)	-0.100	(0.375)
Party ID	-0.041	(0.080)	-0.065	(0.081)
Domestic Ideology	0.129	(0.105)	0.031	(0.098)
Education	-0.060	(0.076)	-0.161*	(0.076)
Income	0.018	(0.050)	0.017	(0.047)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.319	(0.193)	0.078	(0.200)
Served In Military	-0.206	(0.374)	-0.195	(0.396)
Nonwhite	0.520	(0.346)	0.179	(0.318)
Age	0.008	(0.008)	-0.004	(0.008)
Female	-0.117	(0.224)	-0.389	(0.230)
Evangelical Protestant	0.301	(0.396)	0.262	(0.382)
Catholic	-0.211	(0.236)	0.360	(0.249)
Secular	-0.467	(0.315)	-0.584*	(0.293)
Religious Attendance	-0.215*	(0.088)	-0.130	(0.086)
Religious Beliefs	-0.028	(0.174)	-0.280	(0.172)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.154	(0.098)	0.016	(0.110)
Constant				
Cut 1	-3.742**	(0.765)	-6.314**	(0.908)
Cut 2	-1.534*	(0.753)	-3.783**	(0.843)
Cut 3	0.791	(0.758)	-0.882	(0.818)
Cut 4	2.406**	(0.774)		
Pseudo/ R-Squared		0.17	0.09	
Percent Correctly Pred.		0.44	0.59	
Prop. Reduction in Error		0.08	0.09	
Root MSE				
N		442	442	

Table 7.2 Continued

	Right/Wrong (3)		Importance (4)	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	1.230**	(0.168)	0.521**	(0.080)
Cooperative Dimension	0.195	(0.131)	-0.005	(0.074)
Same Party as Pres.	0.508*	(0.239)	0.277*	(0.128)
No Party Connection	0.218	(0.396)	-0.165	(0.245)
Party ID	-0.097	(0.091)	-0.119*	(0.047)
Domestic Ideology	0.072	(0.117)	0.161**	(0.061)
Education	-0.072	(0.088)	0.035	(0.052)
Income	-0.034	(0.057)	0.006	(0.031)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.018	(0.235)	0.084	(0.127)
Served In Military	0.170	(0.496)	-0.292	(0.248)
Nonwhite	0.115	(0.394)	-0.005	(0.211)
Age	0.007	(0.009)	0.010*	(0.005)
Female	-0.115	(0.261)	-0.280	(0.145)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.105	(0.471)	-0.184	(0.267)
Catholic	0.077	(0.308)	-0.323*	(0.150)
Secular	-0.507	(0.335)	-0.383	(0.203)
Religious Attendance	-0.151	(0.102)	-0.073	(0.057)
Religious Beliefs	0.142	(0.191)	-0.081	(0.111)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.355**	(0.128)	-0.014	(0.073)
Constant	1.726	(0.895)	4.719**	(0.513)
Cut 1				
Cut 2				
Cut 3				
Cut 4				
Pseudo/ R-Squared	0.2		0.21	
Percent Correctly Pred.	0.72			
Prop. Reduction in Error	0.44			
Root MSE			1.27	
N	439		442	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: Models 1 and 2 measured with ordered logit, Model 3 measured with logistic regression, Model 4 measured with OLS.

Table 7.3: Role of Ideology in Intervention Perception - Genocide Scenario

	Support (1)		Success (2)	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.815**	(0.144)	0.667**	(0.159)
Cooperative Dimension	0.550**	(0.118)	0.400**	(0.126)
Same Party as Pres.	0.194	(0.190)	0.338	(0.213)
No Party Connection	0.168	(0.475)	-0.222	(0.396)
Party ID	-0.102	(0.072)	-0.066	(0.075)
Domestic Ideology	0.033	(0.111)	0.055	(0.120)
Education	0.042	(0.087)	-0.116	(0.102)
Income	-0.086	(0.054)	-0.064	(0.052)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.081	(0.196)	0.242	(0.210)
Served In Military	-0.028	(0.371)	-0.226	(0.473)
Nonwhite	-0.073	(0.346)	-0.121	(0.347)
Age	-0.010	(0.008)	-0.005	(0.008)
Female	0.257	(0.205)	-0.170	(0.249)
Evangelical Protestant	0.040	(0.386)	0.306	(0.389)
Catholic	-0.199	(0.274)	0.066	(0.287)
Secular	-0.404	(0.277)	-0.724*	(0.295)
Religious Attendance	-0.055	(0.090)	-0.118	(0.092)
Religious Beliefs	-0.057	(0.171)	0.021	(0.177)
Pol. Knowledge	0.066	(0.110)	0.063	(0.112)
Constant				
Cut 1	-3.799**	(0.891)	-4.631**	(0.946)
Cut 2	-1.833*	(0.859)	-2.479**	(0.937)
Cut 3	0.392	(0.841)	0.460	(0.932)
Cut 4	1.769*	(0.827)		
Pseudo/ R-Squared	0.08		0.09	
Percent Correctly Pred.	0.48		0.57	
Prop. Reduction in Error	0.05		0.02	
Root MSE				
N	413		413	

Table 7.3 Continued

	Right/Wrong (3)		Importance (4)	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	1.082**	(0.183)	0.285**	(0.099)
Cooperative Dimension	0.608**	(0.145)	0.465**	(0.087)
Same Party as Pres.	0.726**	(0.257)	0.119	(0.134)
No Party Connection	0.580	(0.533)	0.058	(0.285)
Party ID	-0.193*	(0.094)	-0.096	(0.049)
Domestic Ideology	-0.041	(0.131)	-0.049	(0.077)
Education	0.181	(0.116)	0.079	(0.063)
Income	-0.047	(0.063)	-0.056	(0.035)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.215	(0.254)	-0.168	(0.134)
Served In Military	0.322	(0.456)	-0.488	(0.267)
Nonwhite	-0.442	(0.449)	0.203	(0.248)
Age	-0.016	(0.010)	0.007	(0.006)
Female	0.202	(0.274)	0.180	(0.156)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.359	(0.511)	-0.013	(0.234)
Catholic	-0.391	(0.325)	-0.180	(0.189)
Secular	0.267	(0.356)	-0.155	(0.184)
Religious Attendance	0.038	(0.110)	-0.066	(0.058)
Religious Beliefs	0.165	(0.207)	0.175	(0.119)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.119	(0.128)	0.058	(0.075)
Constant	0.797	(1.030)	4.300**	(0.626)
Cut 1				
Cut 2				
Cut 3				
Cut 4				
Pseudo/ R-Squared	0.17		0.19	
Percent Correctly Pred.	0.74			
Prop. Reduction in Error	0.22			
Root MSE			1.3	
N	412		413	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: Models 1 and 2 measured with ordered logit, Model 3 measured with logistic regression, Model 4 measured with OLS.

Table 7.4: Substantive Effects from Tables 7.2 and 7.3

Nuclear Scenario	Support (1)			Success (2)		
	Probability	95% CI		Probability	95% CI	
Militant Dimension						
-1 SD	0.01	0	0.02	0.11	0.05	0.16
Mean	0.05	0.02	0.07	0.2	0.13	0.27
+ 1 SD	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.34	0.23	0.46
Cooperative Dimension						
-1 SD	0.06	0.03	0.09			
Mean	0.05	0.02	0.07			
+ 1 SD	0.04	0.02	0.06			
Genocide Scenario	Support (1)			Success (2)		
	Probability	95% CI		Probability	95% CI	
Militant Dimension						
-1 SD	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.14
Mean	0.1	0.05	0.14	0.16	0.08	0.23
+ 1 SD	0.18	0.11	0.26	0.26	0.15	0.36
Cooperative Dimension						
-1 SD	0.06	0.03	0.09	0.11	0.05	0.18
Mean	0.1	0.05	0.14	0.16	0.08	0.23
+ 1 SD	0.15	0.08	0.22	0.21	0.12	0.3

Table 7.4 Continued

Nuclear Scenario	Right/Wrong (3)		
	Probability	95% CI	
Militant Dimension			
-1 SD	0.22	0.12	0.33
Mean	0.47	0.34	0.59
+ 1 SD	0.73	0.61	0.84
Cooperative Dimension			
-1 SD			
Mean			
+ 1 SD			

Genocide Scenario	Right/Wrong (3)		
	Probability	95% CI	
Militant Dimension			
-1 SD	0.44	0.27	0.61
Mean	0.68	0.55	0.81
+ 1 SD	0.85	0.77	0.94
Cooperative Dimension			
-1 SD	0.55	0.39	0.72
Mean	0.68	0.55	0.81
+ 1 SD	0.79	0.68	0.9

Note: For model 1, substantive effect is probability of individual being very supportive (5 on 5 point scale). For model 2, substantive effect is probability of objective being "very likely to succeed" (4 on 4 point scale). For model 3, substantive effect is probability of President being right in sending troops (1 on dichotomous scale).

Table 7.5: Relation of Ideology to Intervention
Continuation

A: Nuclear/High Militant
Total N = 195

Continue Intervention	Initial Casualties	
	Low	High
No	16	11
	16.7%	11.1%
Yes	80	88
	83.3%	88.9%
Total N	96	99
	100%	100%

B: Nuclear/Indifferent Militant
Total N = 185

Continue Intervention	Initial Casualties	
	Low	High
No	27	33
	29.0%	35.9%
Yes	66	59
	71.0%	64.1%
Total N	93	92
	100%	100%

C: Nuclear/Low Militant
Total N = 190

Continue Intervention	Initial Casualties	
	Low	High
No	45	70
	52.3%	67.3%
Yes	41	34
	47.7%	32.7%
Total N	86	104
	100%	100%

Table 7.5 Continued

D: Genocide/High Cooperative Total N = 177		
	Initial Casualties	
Continue Intervention	Low	High
No	15	23
	18.8%	23.7%
Yes	65	74
	81.3%	76.3%
Total N	80	97
	100%	100%

E: Genocide/Indifferent Cooperative Total N = 189		
	Initial Casualties	
Continue Intervention	Low	High
No	21	35
	22.6%	36.5%
Yes	72	61
	77.4%	63.5%
Total N	93	96
	100%	100%

F: Genocide/Low Cooperative Total N = 165		
	Initial Casualties	
Continue Intervention	Low	High
No	31	34
	38.3%	40.5%
Yes	50	50
	61.7%	59.5%
Total N	81	84
	100%	100%

Table 7.6: Initial Casualty Tolerance - Nuclear Scenario

	Model 1 High Casualties		Model 2 Low Casualties	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.667	(0.406)	0.155	(0.386)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.137	(0.273)	-0.134	(0.284)
Supports Intervention	1.136**	(0.418)	0.307	(0.346)
Success Potential	0.462	(0.265)	0.150	(0.380)
Right/Wrong	2.077**	(0.628)	3.887**	(1.017)
Importance of Mission	0.244	(0.195)	0.653**	(0.180)
Same Party as Pres.	0.303	(0.511)	0.628	(0.529)
No Party Connection	0.794	(0.698)	1.550	(1.039)
Party ID	0.201	(0.187)	-0.020	(0.228)
Domestic Ideology	0.144	(0.244)	-0.005	(0.307)
Education	0.137	(0.217)	-0.298	(0.268)
Income	0.211	(0.135)	-0.012	(0.117)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.912	(0.497)	-0.427	(0.498)
Served In Military	-0.436	(0.904)	-1.400	(0.890)
Nonwhite	0.667	(1.097)	-0.513	(0.698)
Age	0.023	(0.020)	0.017	(0.019)
Female	-1.093*	(0.531)	-1.050	(0.627)
Evangelical Protestant	-0.767	(0.880)	-0.143	(0.704)
Catholic	-0.909	(0.821)	0.004	(0.652)
Secular	0.306	(0.868)	-0.814	(0.672)
Religious Attendance	0.241	(0.255)	-0.414*	(0.189)
Religious Beliefs	-0.977*	(0.411)	0.161	(0.352)
Pol. Knowledge	-0.327	(0.255)	0.191	(0.253)
Constant	-6.655*	(2.661)	-1.720	(2.585)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.54		0.5	
Percent Correctly Pred.	89%		87%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	69%		55%	
N	220		218	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: Models measured with Logistic Regression with robust standard errors

Table 7.7: Initial Casualty Tolerance - Genocide Scenario

	Model 1 High Casualties		Model 2 Low Casualties	
	β	(SE)	β	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.157	(0.341)	0.637	(0.594)
Cooperative Dimension	0.255	(0.419)	0.202	(0.407)
Supports Intervention	0.544	(0.408)	1.008	(0.542)
Success Potential	0.214	(0.424)	0.198	(0.482)
Right/Wrong	3.610**	(0.804)	3.302**	(0.580)
Importance of Mission	0.438	(0.232)	0.087	(0.273)
Same Party as Pres.	0.282	(0.562)	-0.066	(0.604)
No Party Connection	-1.937*	(0.785)	-0.178	(1.061)
Party ID	0.065	(0.213)	0.135	(0.232)
Domestic Ideology	0.249	(0.279)	0.100	(0.240)
Education	-0.145	(0.204)	0.071	(0.242)
Income	-0.542**	(0.136)	-0.023	(0.152)
Known Mil. Cas.	-1.622**	(0.540)	-0.263	(0.576)
Served In Military	0.439	(0.919)	-0.962	(0.841)
Nonwhite	-0.530	(0.824)	-1.267	(0.751)
Age	0.073**	(0.022)	0.030	(0.030)
Female	-1.308*	(0.595)	-1.138	(0.588)
Evangelical Protestant	-1.564	(1.014)	1.715	(1.179)
Catholic	0.743	(0.605)	0.432	(0.904)
Secular	0.158	(0.772)	0.611	(0.957)
Religious Attendance	0.113	(0.228)	-0.114	(0.210)
Religious Beliefs	-0.111	(0.433)	0.432	(0.640)
Pol. Knowledge	0.652*	(0.272)	0.190	(0.343)
Constant	-5.864*	(2.932)	-6.205*	(3.057)
Pseudo R-Squared	0.54		0.55	
Percent Correctly Pred.	88%		91%	
Prop. Reduction in Error	64%		63%	
N	216		196	

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed

Note: Models measured with Logistic Regression with robust standard errors

Table 7.8 - Substantive Effects from Tables 7.6 and 7.7

	Nuclear - High Casualties			Nuclear - Low Casualties		
	Prob.	95% CI		Prob.	95% CI	
Militant Dimension						
-1 SD	0.8	0.46	1			
Mean	0.88	0.71	1			
+ 1 SD	0.93	0.84	1			
Supports Intervention						
1 (Not at all)	0.47	0	1			
3 (Moderately)	0.9	0.74	1			
5 (Very)	0.99	0.96	1			
Right/Wrong						
Wrong	0.48	0.13	0.84	0.48	0.24	0.73
Right	0.88	0.71	1	0.98	0.93	1
Importance of Mission						
1 (Not at all)				0.79	0.37	1
4				0.96	0.89	1
7 (Extremely)				0.99	0.98	1

Table 7.8 Continued

	Genocide - High Casualties			Genocide - Low Casualties		
	Prob.	95% CI		Prob.	95% CI	
Militant Dimension						
-1 SD						
Mean						
+ 1 SD						
Supports Intervention						
1 (Not at all)				0.69	0.23	1
3 (Moderately)				0.94	0.85	1
5 (Very)				0.99	0.97	1
Right/Wrong						
Wrong	0.19	0	0.4	0.39	0.06	0.73
Right	0.89	0.79	1	0.95	0.86	1
Importance of Mission						
1 (Not at all)	0.64	0.16	1			
4	0.87	0.73	1			
7 (Extremely)	0.96	0.91	1			

Table 7.9: Relation of Ideology to Intervention
Involvement Duration

A: Nuclear/High Militant Total N = 195		
	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	11	16
	11.1%	16.7%
Rounds 2-4	11	18
	11.1%	18.8%
Rounds 5-7	2	10
	2.0%	10.4%
Rounds 8-10	1	5
	1.0%	5.2%
Never Ended (Censor)	74	47
	74.7%	49.0%
Total N	99	96
	100%	100%

B: Nuclear/Indifferent Militant Total N = 186		
	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	33	27
	35.9%	28.7%
Rounds 2-4	13	23
	14.1%	24.5%
Rounds 5-7	6	11
	6.5%	11.7%
Rounds 8-10	2	4
	2.2%	4.3%
Never Ended (Censor)	38	29
	41.3%	30.9%
Total N	92	94
	100%	100%

Table 7.9 Continued

| C: Nuclear/Low Militant | | |
| Total N = 190 | | |

	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	70	45
	67.3%	52.3%
Rounds 2-4	12	19
	11.5%	22.1%
Rounds 5-7	1	6
	1.0%	7.0%
Rounds 8-10	0	3
	0.0%	3.5%
Never Ended (Censor)	21	13
	20.2%	15.1%
Total N	104	86
	100%	100%

| D: Genocide/High Cooperative | | |
| Total N = 176 | | |

	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	23	15
	23.7%	19.0%
Rounds 2-4	21	18
	21.6%	22.8%
Rounds 5-7	1	11
	1.0%	13.9%
Rounds 8-10	2	9
	2.1%	11.4%
Never Ended (Censor)	50	26
	51.5%	32.9%
Total N	97	79
	100%	100%

Table 7.9 Continued

E: Genocide/Indifferent Cooperative		
Total N = 190		
	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	35	21
	36.5%	22.3%
Rounds 2-4	8	29
	8.3%	30.9%
Rounds 5-7	8	21
	8.3%	22.3%
Rounds 8-10	3	8
	3.1%	8.5%
Never Ended (Censor)	42	15
	43.8%	16.0%
Total N	96	94
	100%	100%

F: Genocide/Low Cooperative		
Total N = 162		
	Casualty Trend	
Duration	Decreasing	Increasing
Round 1	34	31
	41.0%	39.2%
Rounds 2-4	13	14
	15.7%	17.7%
Rounds 5-7	1	15
	1.2%	19.0%
Rounds 8-10	0	6
	0.0%	7.6%
Never Ended (Censor)	35	13
	42.2%	16.5%
Total N	83	79
	100%	100%

Table 7.10: Panel Experiment - Nuclear Scenario

	Model 1 Increasing Casualties		Model 2 Decreasing Casualties	
	HR	(SE)	HR	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.866	(0.109)	0.838	(0.111)
Cooperative Dimension	1.270**	(0.108)	1.101	(0.079)
Supports Intervention	0.770*	(0.095)	0.717*	(0.118)
Success Potential	0.760*	(0.105)	0.991	(0.109)
Right/Wrong	0.499**	(0.091)	0.455**	(0.113)
Importance of Mission	0.738**	(0.052)	0.962	(0.057)
Same Party as Pres.	1.240	(0.192)	1.164	(0.210)
No Party Connection	0.602	(0.160)	1.069	(0.312)
Party ID	1.108	(0.067)	0.971	(0.077)
Domestic Ideology	0.948	(0.073)	0.871	(0.085)
Education	0.995	(0.063)	0.928	(0.056)
Income	0.973	(0.033)	0.915*	(0.036)
Known Mil. Cas.	1.216	(0.180)	0.621**	(0.114)
Served In Military	1.578	(0.521)	1.209	(0.509)
Nonwhite	1.254	(0.270)	0.582*	(0.151)
Age	0.985*	(0.006)	1.001	(0.007)
Female	2.083**	(0.428)	1.416*	(0.243)
Evangelical Protestant	1.212	(0.309)	1.102	(0.440)
Catholic	1.542*	(0.290)	1.244	(0.363)
Secular	0.960	(0.213)	1.119	(0.254)
Religious Attendance	1.044	(0.063)	1.002	(0.076)
Religious Beliefs	0.808	(0.092)	1.364*	(0.205)
Pol. Knowledge	0.805*	(0.068)	0.982	(0.085)
Decreasing Casualty Trend				
Log Pseudolikelihood	-652.38		-547.87	
N	219		220	

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, two-tailed

Note: Cox Hazard models with robust standard errors, hazard rate reported.

Table 7.11: Panel Experiment - Genocide Scenario

	Model 1 Increasing Casualties		Model 2 Decreasing Casualties	
	HR	(SE)	HR	(SE)
Militant Dimension	0.926	(0.114)	0.791	(0.095)
Cooperative Dimension	0.789*	(0.075)	1.020	(0.117)
Supports Intervention	0.765*	(0.091)	0.822	(0.108)
Success Potential	0.960	(0.130)	0.957	(0.134)
Right/Wrong	0.298**	(0.058)	0.341**	(0.076)
Importance of Mission	0.942	(0.066)	0.839**	(0.057)
Same Party as Pres.	1.316	(0.202)	1.021	(0.185)
No Party Connection	1.092	(0.404)	1.270	(0.353)
Party ID	0.965	(0.055)	0.952	(0.053)
Domestic Ideology	0.856	(0.068)	0.914	(0.073)
Education	0.971	(0.071)	0.953	(0.062)
Income	0.913*	(0.041)	1.124**	(0.046)
Known Mil. Cas.	0.921	(0.147)	1.591**	(0.266)
Served In Military	0.718	(0.221)	0.955	(0.361)
Nonwhite	1.505	(0.343)	0.985	(0.307)
Age	1.001	(0.007)	0.985*	(0.006)
Female	1.225	(0.221)	1.939**	(0.372)
Evangelical Protestant	1.069	(0.361)	1.015	(0.298)
Catholic	1.249	(0.267)	0.914	(0.174)
Secular	0.659	(0.166)	0.910	(0.228)
Religious Attendance	1.057	(0.069)	1.055	(0.078)
Religious Beliefs	0.899	(0.141)	1.074	(0.139)
Pol. Knowledge	0.881	(0.077)	0.851	(0.074)
Decreasing Casualty Trend				
Log Pseudolikelihood	-668.41		-548.43	
N	195		215	

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: Cox Hazard models with robust standard errors, hazard rate reported.

Table 7.12: Structural Equation Models - Casualty Tolerance of Nuclear Scenario - Decreasing Casualties

	Direct Effect		Total Effect	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
DV: Continue Intervention				
Support	0.925**	(0.344)	0.925**	(0.344)
Right/Wrong	2.796**	(0.698)	3.611**	(0.704)
Militant Dimension	0.93**	(0.344)	2.253**	(0.295)
Income	0.213	(0.110)	0.213	(0.110)
Known Mil. Casualties	0.110	(0.954)	0.110	(0.954)
Nonwhite	0.152	(0.682)	0.152	(0.682)
Female	-1.166*	(0.500)	-1.166*	(0.500)
Religious Beliefs	-0.197	(0.355)	-0.197	(0.355)
Success	-	-	0.266*	(0.115)
Importance	-	-	0.144*	(0.061)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.209	(0.114)
DV: Support				
Right/Wrong	0.88**	(0.105)	0.88**	(0.105)
Militant Dimension	0.304**	(0.055)	0.558**	(0.057)
Success	0.288**	(0.064)	0.288**	(0.064)
Importance	0.156**	(0.032)	0.156**	(0.032)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.057	(0.044)	0.095	(0.050)
DV: Right/Wrong				
Militant Dimension	0.289**	(0.029)	0.289**	(0.029)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.043	(0.028)	0.043	(0.028)

** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, two-tailed

N = 235, RMSEA = ..085, CFI = .947, SRMR = .039 , Chi2/df = 2.71

Table 7.13: Structural Equation Models - Casualty Tolerance of Nuclear Scenario - Increasing Casualties

	Direct Effect		Total Effect	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
DV: Continue Intervention				
Support	0.427	(0.277)	0.427	(0.277)
Success	0.586	(0.303)	0.692*	(0.305)
Right/Wrong	2.916**	(0.498)	3.248**	(0.500)
Importance	0.607**	(0.168)	0.696**	(0.168)
Militant Dimension	0.463	(0.261)	1.836**	(0.264)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.535*	(0.218)	-0.535*	(0.218)
Age	-0.037**	(0.013)	-0.037**	(0.013)
Female	-1.615**	(0.422)	-1.615**	(0.422)
Catholic	-0.978**	(0.476)	-0.978*	(0.476)
No Religious Preference	-0.044	(0.434)	-0.044	(0.434)
Political Knowledge	0.468*	(0.203)	0.468*	(0.203)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.278*	(0.124)
DV: Support				
Success	0.249**	(0.069)	0.249**	(0.069)
Right/Wrong	0.779**	(0.103)	0.779**	(0.103)
Importance	0.209**	(0.036)	0.209**	(0.036)
Militant Dimension	0.29**	(0.056)	0.635**	(0.062)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-0.006	(0.046)	0.070	(0.055)
DV: Success				
Militant Dimension	0.253**	(0.051)	0.253**	(0.051)
DV: Right/Wrong				
Militant Dimension	0.208**	(0.035)	0.208**	(0.035)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.041	(0.031)	0.041	(0.031)
DV: Importance				
Militant Dimension	0.574**	(0.095)	0.574**	(0.095)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.213*	(0.086)	0.213	(0.086)

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: N = 244, RMSEA = .111, CFI = .851, SRMR = .074 , Chi2/df = 4.02

Table 7.14: Structural Equation Models - Casualty Tolerance of Genocide Scenario - Decreasing Casualties

	Direct Effect		Total Effect	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
DV: Continue Intervention				
Support	0.667*	(0.304)	0.667*	(0.304)
Right/Wrong	3.783**	(0.633)	4.409**	(0.638)
Importance	0.476*	(0.211)	0.617**	(0.213)
Militant Dimension	0.548*	(0.258)	1.272**	(0.279)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.275	(0.281)	0.83**	(0.296)
Income	-0.333**	(0.110)	-0.333**	(0.110)
Known Mil. Casualties	-0.463	(0.825)	-0.463	(0.825)
Age	-0.058**	(0.018)	-0.058**	(0.018)
Female	-2.69**	(0.502)	-2.69**	(0.502)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.341*	(0.135)
DV: Support				
Right/Wrong	0.938**	(0.119)	0.938**	(0.119)
Importance	0.212**	(0.040)	0.212**	(0.040)
Militant Dimension	0.163**	(0.053)	0.298**	(0.060)
Cooperative Dimension	0.080	(0.059)	0.354**	(0.064)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.072*	(0.029)
DV: Right/Wrong				
Militant Dimension	0.132**	(0.029)	0.132**	(0.029)
Cooperative Dimension	0.153**	(0.031)	0.153**	(0.031)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.077**	(0.029)	0.077**	(0.029)
DV: Importance				
Militant Dimension	0.053	(0.087)	0.053	(0.087)
Cooperative Dimension	0.612**	(0.092)	0.612**	(0.092)

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, two-tailed

Note: N = 241, RMSEA = .12, CFI = .866, SRMR = .061 , Chi2/df = 4.50

Table 7.15: Structural Equation Models - Casualty Tolerance of Genocide Scenario - Increasing Casualties

	Direct Effect		Total Effect	
	Coef	SE	Coef	SE
DV: Continue Intervention				
Support	0.638*	(0.300)	0.638*	(0.300)
Right/Wrong	2.896**	(0.546)	3.458**	(0.550)
Importance	0.341	(0.177)	0.52**	(0.179)
Militant Dimension	0.464	(0.251)	1.24**	(0.267)
Cooperative Dimension	0.284	(0.234)	0.864**	(0.256)
Income	0.187*	(0.095)	0.187*	(0.095)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.251*	(0.114)
DV: Support				
Right/Wrong	0.88**	(0.107)	0.88**	(0.107)
Importance	0.28**	(0.035)	0.28**	(0.035)
Militant Dimension	0.212**	(0.054)	0.408**	(0.066)
Cooperative Dimension	-0.001	(0.052)	0.214**	(0.064)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	-	-	0.064*	(0.029)
DV: Right/Wrong				
Militant Dimension	0.152**	(0.034)	0.152**	(0.034)
Cooperative Dimension	0.099**	(0.032)	0.099**	(0.032)
Respondent/Pres Affiliation	0.072*	(0.031)	0.072*	(0.031)
DV: Importance				
Militant Dimension	0.224*	(0.105)	0.224*	(0.105)
Cooperative Dimension	0.461**	(0.101)	0.461**	(0.101)

** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$, two-tailed

Note: N = 223, RMSEA = .116, CFI = .941, SRMR = .059 , Chi2/df = 3.98

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE CAUSES AND

CONSEQUENCES OF A FOREIGN POLICY IDEOLOGY

Summary and Insights

The public is indeed a powerful force in shaping policy on foreign issues (Aldrich et al. 1989, 2006, Russett 1990, Sobel 2001). Because of this importance, decades of research has explored the causes of public opinion on foreign policy issues. The primary objective of this dissertation has been to explore the role of one of these influences on public opinion: a foreign policy ideology. This exploration has consisted of two parts. First, chapter 3 provided an initial analysis of the causes of an individual's foreign policy ideology. Secondly, the bulk of this dissertation's exploration consisted of analyzing the consequences of an individual's foreign policy ideology on shaping intervention preferences, perceptions of events, leader evaluations, casualty tolerance, and the ability of ideology to bias the interpretation of external information. Through these numerous chapters, a number of important insights have been uncovered. Below I summarize these major insights.

First, and most importantly, the overarching theme from this dissertation is that a foreign policy ideology matters greatly. Earlier research has shown that ideology can influence preferences for foreign events (e.g Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1999, Gelpi et al. 2009), and results from this research certainly confirm these earlier findings. In addition, this research has expanded beyond just looking at how ideology influences preferences by considering the role of ideology in influencing perceptions of events, leader assessments, casualty tolerance and the interpretation of new information

regarding a foreign event. Essentially, ideology does more than just influence if an individual supports or opposes a conflict, it shapes how he or she sees the entire event. This was shown most clearly in chapter 7 in that ideology strongly influenced how individuals perceived an event (success potential, justness, importance, support). Furthermore, ideology's influence goes beyond simply the event to shaping how individuals assess the actions of leaders during such events (chapter 6). An individual's ideology shapes his or her preferences and beliefs in the best way to handle a foreign event. If leaders do not act in a fashion favorable to how one's ideology would dictate, assessments of the leader suffer substantially. Finally, ideology has the potential to shape how new information regarding an event is interpreted by individuals. I say potential because empirical results were somewhat conflicting. While ideology did not appear to influence the impact of partisanship on leader evaluations, ideology did shape casualty tolerance (although mainly indirectly through perceptions).

Tied closely to the above discussion, a second insight is that the type of event dictates how ideology influence preferences. Given the multidimensional nature of ideology, it was hypothesized that different dimensions of ideology should matter depending on the nature of the event. In security oriented missions, what drives an individual's reaction to an event comes largely from the militant dimension. In humanitarian oriented missions, it was hypothesized that preferences and perceptions would be largely driven by the cooperative dimension but empirical results generally showed that both the militant and cooperative dimension played a role. I suspect this dual influence in humanitarian issues is largely due to the involvement consisting of the use of force. As I will elaborate a bit later in this chapter, further analysis should

consider humanitarian events that attempt other means at achieving humanitarian goals (such as sanctions) to see if this dual influence is still present. Nevertheless, while ideology plays an important role in shaping preferences and perceptions, what parts of ideology do the influencing depends on the nature of the event.

A third insight is regarding the causes of ideology in the first place. As I have mentioned, earlier research is quite limited in this area. The most notable exploration of the causes of a foreign policy ideology comes from Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) but they only consider two causes. In addition, a handful of studies (e.g. Barker et al. 2008, Schoen 2007, Guth 2010) consider a limited set of causes. In contrast, Page and Bouton (2006) theorize an elaborate model but do not test it. The purpose of chapter three was to combine this scattered research and attempt to create a unified model of ideology formation and also empirically test the model. Certainly we can consider this an initial exploration given some data limitations, but in general, the empirical tests showed that ideology is influenced by both sociological (external events) and psychological (personality traits and core values) forces. Beyond this, the empirical analyses identified specific forces within personality traits, core values, and external events that do seem to influence the formation of ideology.

A final insight is a challenge to the IR assumption that the public reacts uniformly in foreign events. For example, a major assumption of audience costs is that the public will uniformly punish a leader if the leader backs down in an escalated conflict or breaks an international agreement. What this dissertation (specifically, chapter 6) demonstrated was that ideological differences play a major role in if an individual punishes a leader and how severely.

Implications

The results presented in this research yield a number of implications for scholars of political science. First, and most importantly, ideology matters! This has been stated numerous times throughout this dissertation and purposely done to signify how important this is. Ideology is hardly, if ever, considered when we talk about public opinion and foreign policy, yet this dissertation, along with a handful of prior studies, has consistently demonstrated its usefulness in explaining preferences, perceptions, and a host of other factors related to foreign events. In some cases, this dissertation even showed ideology as being a stronger influence on preferences and perceptions than partisan identification or context.

The role of ideology has importance beyond simply influencing preferences. If an individual's worldview is as powerful as I have demonstrated, then we need to consider what else it may also influence. Aldrich and colleagues (1989) showed how attitudes and preferences on foreign events can influence elections. Given the tight connection between ideology and preferences, then we need to ask how ideology can shape electoral choice. Certainly this may not be a powerful influence in all elections, but if a foreign event is highly salient during an election, it would not be surprising if an individual's ideology could have an influence. Beyond vote choice, this also has implications in regards to rally effects or diversionary attempts. Like audience costs, rally effects and diversionary theory consider a uniform reaction among the public. I have demonstrated that this assumption is false for audience costs and it would make sense that the same would be true for rally effects and diversionary theory. Results from this dissertation

suggest we should spend more time researching who is more likely to rally or more likely to divert instead of assuming everyone will.

If we are going to start putting more emphasis on the role of ideology on foreign policy attitudes and preferences, then we need to have measures for ideology readily available on the public opinion surveys that we regularly use. One reason researchers put less emphasis, if any, on ideology is because rarely can we find measures for it. Beyond the Chicago Council for Global Affairs surveys, there are few surveys that contain a set of questions that can be used to form the dimensions of a foreign policy ideology. The American National Election Study started putting some questions on in 2004 and occasionally some questions are found on PEW surveys, but generally we are missing the tools to really study ideology. This would not be terribly difficult to achieve. For example, only four items were used to create the militant and cooperative dimensions in the two Hawkeye Poll surveys. Certainly a few more items would be preferred but even a few items are better than nothing.

Another implication is additional support to the notion of turning to a more domain specific conceptualization of ideology. While the standard left/right or liberal/conservative ideology is a simple and easy measure, it works poorly when considering foreign policy. Throughout this entire analysis, domestic ideology (from a liberal/conservative) perspective was significant a handful of times. Liberal and conservative doesn't have much of a meaning when it comes down to foreign events, as others have argued the same for economic or social issues (e.g. Feldman 1983, 1988, Layman and Carsey 2002, Jost, Federico and Napier 2009). Again, a problem here falls

upon having the right questions on surveys to be able to consider domain specific ideologies, but given the overwhelming evidence, something needs to be done.

Future Extensions

This research is not without a wealth of fruitful extensions. First of all, future research should continue exploring the connection between ideology and the event context. This dissertation only considered conflict events but international relations is ripe with other events beyond conflict and intervention. For example, we should consider if ideology influences preferences for sanctions in different contexts. This would be especially useful for humanitarian events because with conflict events, both the militant and cooperative dimensions were generally significant. If we find that only the cooperative dimension is significant for sanction events, then this gives us a better picture of when these ideologies actually do influence preferences (so for this example, the militant dimension only influences preferences for humanitarian issues if intervention or conflict is involved).

Second, a more thorough and complete analysis should be performed on the causes of ideology. While some of the more popular factors were considered (e.g. personality traits and core values), a wide range of other psychological measures could and should be considered (e.g. right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation). Also, my analysis only considered two external influences and neither related to the cooperativism dimension. Countless environmental influences could be considered. Finally, the last few years has shown an explosion in the interest of biological factors. This would be another fruitful consideration for ideology.

Third, future research should explore if the impact of ideology differs depending on the level of political knowledge of the individual. Knowledge has been shown to be a key aspect when considering preferences and attitude formation (Zaller 1992, Berinsky 2007, Converse 1964, Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Krosnick and Brannon 1993). Converse (1964) discussed how individuals with higher levels of knowledge should be more constrained (or consistent) in their ideology. If an individual is more constrained, then they should be more likely to link his or her ideology to other situations. At the same time, more knowledge should lead individuals to have more information available to maintain their consistency bias (Zaller 1992, Lodge and Hamill 1986, Taber and Lodge 2006). [55] Determining if knowledge leads to a stronger effect from ideology would be a useful extension by providing some conditionals on the impact of ideology, while also providing more evidence in the debate over the role of political knowledge.

Finally, the bulk of research on public opinion and foreign policy has focused on the American public. This dissertation has also focused solely on Americans. However, these theories should be explored with respect to other nations to see if they are unique to the US. This would not be difficult given that the CCGA surveys publics across the globe.

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[55] However, a counter-argument is that higher sophisticates would possess more information in general and may be more willing to acknowledge and update contradictory information (e.g. Krosnick and Brannon, 1993, Gilens 2001).

APPENDIX A

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 3

Table A1: Summary Statistics for Chapter 3

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Militant Dimension	1142	0	0.921	-2.143	2.487
Cooperative Dimension	1142	0	0.916	-2.483	1.998
Party ID	1087	2.960	1.881	1	7
Ideology	1134	3.080	1.588	1	7
Education	1150	5.875	1.184	1	7
Income	1062	5.253	2.439	1	9
Known Mil. Casualties	1147	0.447	0.497	0	1
Prior Mil. Service	1147	0.0436	0.204	0	1
Nonwhite	1124	0.140	0.347	0	1
Age	1130	33.60	13.57	18	100
Female	1139	0.582	0.493	0	1
Evangelical Protestant	1121	0.0419	0.201	0	1
Mainline Protestant	1121	0.244	0.429	0	1
Catholic	1088	0.187	0.390	0	1
Other Christian	1088	0.0689	0.253	0	1
Other Non-Christian	1088	0.0772	0.267	0	1
Religious Attendance	1135	2.662	1.514	1	6
Religious Orthodoxy	1023	1.966	0.701	1	3
Pol. Knowledge	1150	3.350	1.013	1	5
Security Value	1148	-0.102	1.010	-3.095	2.571
Conformity Value	1145	-0.587	1.147	-3.333	2.333
Tradition Value	1146	-0.868	1.135	-3.714	3.095
Benevolence Value	1146	1.052	0.751	-2.714	2.714
Universalism Value	1148	0.979	0.826	-2.476	3.048
Self-Direction Value	1146	0.681	0.846	-1.905	2.952
Stimulation Value	1148	0.0330	1.033	-3.095	2.619
Hedonism Value	1145	-0.333	0.959	-3.095	2.667
Achievement Value	1147	-0.134	1.048	-3.143	2.381
Power Value	1147	-1.211	0.882	-3.476	3.750
Extraversion Trait	1151	4.191	1.602	1	7
Agreeableness Trait	1151	4.972	1.194	1.500	7
Conscientiousness Trait	1151	5.631	1.153	1	7

Table A1 Continued

Emotional Stability Trait	1151	4.931	1.354	1	7
Openness Trait	1151	5.490	1.040	1	7

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 5

Table B1: Summary Statistics from CCGA data in Chapter 5

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
DV - Ensure Oil Supply	1162	0.481	0.500	0	1
DV - Iran Nukes	1171	0.651	0.477	0	1
DV - Humanitarian Crisis	1169	0.699	0.459	0	1
DV - Peacekeeping	1155	0.699	0.459	0	1
Militant Dimension	1151	-6.08e-11	0.815	-3.639	1.172
Cooperative Dimension	1151	-5.69e-10	0.889	-2.400	1.799
Party ID	1227	3.959	2.062	1	7
Ideology	1196	3.404	1.190	1	6
Female	1227	0.500	0.500	0	1
Protestant	1209	0.325	0.469	0	1
Catholic	1209	0.264	0.441	0	1
Secular	1209	0.186	0.389	0	1
Education	1227	4.197	1.724	1	9
Age	1227	47.12	15.98	18	95
Income	1227	10.22	4.206	1	19
Nonwhite	1227	0.264	0.441	0	1
Pol. Knowledge	1227	0.817	0.788	0	2

Table B2: Summary Statistics from Fall 2010 Hawkeye Poll data in Chapter 5

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
DV - Troop Timetable	1329	1.926	0.875	1	3
Militant Dimension	1305	3.17e-09	0.767	-2.484	1.116
Cooperative Dimension	1305	-1.42e-09	0.673	-2.067	1.006
Party ID	1359	4.149	2.179	1	7
Ideology	1350	4.543	1.914	1	7
Estimated Casualties (Log)	1142	7.895	1.545	0	11.51
Rec. Casualties Same	1247	0.330	0.471	0	1
Rec. Casualties Decrease	1247	0.132	0.338	0	1
Will Win in Afghanistan	1380	0.262	0.440	0	1
Income	1152	5.462	2.213	1	9
Education	1389	5.046	1.554	1	7
Nonwhite	1377	0.112	0.315	0	1
Religious Attendance	1366	3.785	1.677	1	6
Evangelical	1336	0.196	0.397	0	1
Catholic	1336	0.233	0.423	0	1
Secular	1336	0.147	0.354	0	1
Female	1387	0.526	0.500	0	1
Age	1366	58.05	16.13	18	98

Table B3: Summary Statistics from Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll data in Chapter 5

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
DV - Libya Support	682	0.463	0.499	0	1
Militant Dimension	770	-2.69e-09	0.770	-1.896	1.578
Cooperative Dimension	770	-9.87e-10	0.765	-2.270	1.151
Party ID	790	3.999	2.132	1	7
Ideology	785	4.451	1.839	1	7
Income	671	5.587	2.220	1	9
Education	807	4.828	1.553	1	7
Nonwhite	800	0.0725	0.259	0	1
Religious Attendance	797	3.784	1.615	1	6
Evangelical	773	0.208	0.406	0	1
Catholic	773	0.260	0.439	0	1
Secular	773	0.144	0.351	0	1
Female	805	0.516	0.500	0	1
Age	804	58.90	16.71	18	96
Political Knowledge	804	2.591	1.000	0	4

APPENDIX C

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 6

Experiment Text from Chapter 6

Below is the survey experiment text with the manipulated text in brackets.

All respondents received the following introduction:

The following questions are about U.S. relations with other countries around the world. You will read about a situation our country has faced many times in the past and will probably face again. Different leaders have handled the situation in different ways. We will describe one approach U.S. leaders have taken, and ask whether you approve or disapprove.

[Break]

A country is [attempting to enrich uranium to produce a nuclear weapon OR brutally murdering thousands of individuals in an ethnic genocide]. The international community has condemned the acts and has initiated sanctions against the nation. However, it is estimated that [a nuclear weapon OR the massacre of the entire ethnic group] will be complete in 3 months. The country has a relatively weak military and it would not take a major effort by the United States to end the [nuclear program OR genocide].

Question 1 [EXP1]

Should the United States take military action to end the [nuclear program OR genocide]?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse

Each respondent was randomly assigned to receive X1, or X2.

X1: The U.S. president, [a Republican OR Democrat OR NONE STATED], said the United States would stay out of the situation. [Republican OR Democratic (party is always the opposite of President) OR NONE STATED] leaders in Congress criticized the President for his decision.

X2: The U.S. president, [a Republican OR Democrat OR NONE STATED], said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would intervene and end the [nuclear program OR genocide]. [Republican OR Democratic (party is always the opposite of President) OR NONE STATED] leaders in Congress criticized the President for his decision.

Question 2 [EXP2 – EXP2c]

[EXP2]

Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the decision by the President?

1. Approve
2. Disapprove
3. Neither Approve nor Disapprove
4. Don't Know
5. Refuse

[If approve (EXP2=1)]:

[EXP2a]

Do you approve very strongly, or only somewhat?
1. Approve Strongly
2. Somewhat Approve
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse

[If disapprove (EXP2=2)]:

[EXP2b}

Do you disapprove very strongly, or only somewhat?
1. Disapprove Strongly
2. Somewhat Disapprove
3. Don't Know
4. Refuse

[If neither or DK/Refuse (EXP2= 3, 8, 9]:

[EXP2c]

Do you lean toward approving the decision of the U.S. president, lean toward

disapproving, or don't you lean either way?
1. Lean Towards Approving
2. Lean Towards Disapproving
3. Not Leaning Either Way
4. Don't Know
5. Refuse

Each respondent was randomly assigned to receive X1, or X2.

X1: The country continued to [create the nuclear weapon OR commit genocide]. In the

end, the U.S. president did not send troops, and the country [produced a nuclear weapon

OR eliminated the ethnic group].

X2: The country continued to [create the nuclear weapon OR commit genocide]. In the end, the U.S. president did not send troops, and the country [produced a nuclear weapon OR eliminated the ethnic group].

All respondents got the next two bullet points:

To summarize,
  a.   The international community has condemned the acts and has initiated sanctions against the nation.
  b.   It is estimated that [a nuclear weapon OR the massacre of the entire ethnic group] will be complete in 3 months
  c.   The country has a relatively weak military and it would not take a major effort by the United States to end the [nuclear program OR genocide].

Respondents received additional bullet points, depending on whether they had been assigned to X1 or X2.

 [If X1, include these additional bullet points]
  a.   The U.S. president, [a Republican OR Democrat OR NONE STATED], said the United States would stay out of the situation.
  b.   [Republican OR Democratic (party is always the opposite of President) OR NONE STATED] leaders in Congress criticized the President for his decision.
  c.   The country continued to [create the nuclear weapon OR commit genocide].
  d.   The U.S. president did not send troops.

[If X2, include these additional bullet points]
  a.   The U.S. president, [a Republican OR Democrat OR NONE STATED], said that if the attack continued, the U.S. military would intervene and end the [nuclear program OR genocide].
  b.   [Republican OR Democratic (party is always the opposite of President) OR NONE STATED] leaders in Congress criticized the President for his decision.
  c.   The country continued to [create the nuclear weapon OR commit genocide].
  d.   The U.S. president did not send troops.

All respondents received the final bullet point and the approval question:

[Final bullet point for all conditions]
   a. The country [produced a nuclear weapon OR eliminated the ethnic group]

Question 3 [EXP3 – EXP3c]

[EXP3]

Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the U.S.

president handled the situation?
  1. Approve
  2. Disapprove
  3. Neither Approve nor Disapprove
  4. Don't Know
  5. Refuse

[If approve (EXP3=1)]:

[EXP3a]

Do you approve very strongly, or only somewhat?
  1. Approve Strongly
  2. Somewhat Approve
  3. Don't Know
  4. Refuse

[If disapprove (EXP3=2)]:

[EXP3b]

Do you disapprove very strongly, or only somewhat?
  1. Disapprove Strongly
  2. Somewhat Disapprove
  3. Don't Know
  4. Refuse

[If neither or DK/Refuse (EXP3= 3, 8, 9]:

[EXP3c]

Do you lean toward approving the of the way the U.S. president handled the

situation, lean toward disapproving, or don't you lean either way?

1. Lean Towards Approving
2. Lean Towards Disapproving
3. Not Leaning Either Way
4. Don't Know
5. Refuse

Table C1: Summary Statistics from Chapter 6

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev	Min.	Max
DV and IV -Conflict Support	1144	0.69	0.462	0	1
DV - Initial Leader Assessment	1146	4.61	1.739	1	7
DV - Final Leader Assessment	1149	3.17	1.719	1	7
Militant Dimension	1142	0.00	0.92	-2.14	2.487
Cooperative Dimension	1142	0.00	0.92	-2.48	1.998
No Party Manip. or Ind.	1114	0.40	0.489	0	1
Different Party of President	1114	0.31	0.463	0	1
Party Identification	1087	2.96	1.881	1	7
Domestic Ideology	1134	3.08	1.588	1	7
Education	1150	5.88	1.184	1	7
income	1062	5.25	2.439	1	9
Known Mil. Casualties	1147	0.45	0.497	0	1
Served In Military	1147	0.04	0.204	0	1
Non-white	1124	0.14	0.347	0	1
Age	1130	33.60	13.57	18	100
Female	1139	0.58	0.493	0	1
Evangelical Protestant	1088	0.04	0.203	0	1
Catholic	1088	0.19	0.39	0	1
Secular	1088	0.42	0.493	0	1
Religious Attendance	1135	2.66	1.514	1	6
Religious Beliefs	1023	1.97	0.701	1	3
Pol. Knowledge	1150	3.35	1.013	1	5

APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR CHAPTER 7

<u>Initial Scenario Text from Chapter 7</u>

Genocide Scenario

[Bold and Bracketed portions indicate partisan manipulation]

Six months ago, the government of a South American country collapsed under the pressure of the public to replace its corrupt leadership. While the United States and international community celebrated this as a demonstration of public strength, this celebration quickly ended when the new faction that came to power began an ethnic genocide. As of last week, the faction in power had killed 50,000 citizens and over 300,000 citizens had already become refugees in neighboring countries. International condemnation and sanctions have had no success in stopping the genocide, and it is estimated that within three months, another 500,000 will either be murdered or displaced. Given the situation, the President of the United States, **a [Republican or Democrat]**, made an address to the American people announcing the approval of the use of airstrikes and 30,000 troops in an effort to protect the helpless citizens. [**Democratic/Republican]** leaders in Congress have openly criticized the President's decision to use the US military in this situation, claiming that this is a conflict the US does not need to be involved in. The **[Republican/Democratic]** President shot back, stating that this is situation is vital to the interests of the United States.   While the US has substantial military superiority over the nation, the nation has significant military assets and the jungle terrain will slow ground advances.

Nuclear Scenario

[Bold and Bracketed portions indicate partisan manipulation]

Six months ago, the government of a South American country collapsed under the pressure of the public to replace its corrupt leadership. While the United States and international community celebrated this as a demonstration of public strength, this celebration quickly ended when the new faction that came to power withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Agreement. Within months, the nation began enriching uranium in an effort to build nuclear weapons and began threatening the United States and its allies if any efforts were made to stop the enrichment. International condemnation and sanctions have had no success at stopping the movement towards nuclear weapons and it is estimated that within three months, the nation could have up to three nuclear weapons and have the missile technology to strike US allies in South and Central American, along with the southern tip of the United States. Given the situation, the President of the United States, **a [Republican or Democrat**, made an address to the American people announcing the approval of the use of airstrikes and 30,000 troops in an effort to permanently end the nuclear threat from the nation. [**Democratic or Republican]** leaders in Congress have openly criticized the President's decision to use the US military in this situation, claiming that this is a conflict the US does not need to be involved in. The **[Republican or Democrat** President shot back, stating that this is situation is vital to the interests of the United States. While the US has substantial military superiority over the nation, the nation has significant military assets and the jungle terrain will slow ground advances.

Table D1: Casualty Trend from Chapter 7 Experiment

	Increasing Context			Decreasing Context	
Month	Monthly Casualties	Total Casualties		Monthly Casualties	Total Casualties
1	7	7		191	191
2	22	29		162	353
3	39	68		138	491
4	55	123		117	608
5	80	203		99	707
6	99	302		80	787
7	117	419		55	842
8	138	557		39	881
9	162	719		22	903
10	191	910		7	910

Table D2: Summary Statistics from Chapter 7

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
DV - Continue Beyond R1	1110	0.671	0.470	0	1
DV - Intervention Duration	1109	5.757	4.412	1	11
Militant Dimension	1105	0	0.922	-2.114	2.502
Cooperative Dimension	1105	0	0.916	-2.368	2.166
Supports Intervention	1114	2.946	1.042	1	5
Success Potential	1111	2.914	0.753	1	4
Right/Wrong	1104	0.567	0.496	0	1
Importance of Mission	1111	4.701	1.428	1	7
Same Party as Pres.	1041	0.443	0.497	0	1
No Party Connection	1041	0.104	0.305	0	1
Party ID	1032	3.060	1.897	1	7
Domestic Ideology	1099	3.226	1.578	1	7
Education	1108	5.773	1.239	3	7
Income	1037	5.616	2.202	1	9
Known Mil. Cas.	1113	0.515	0.500	0	1
Served In Military	1111	0.0810	0.273	0	1
Nonwhite	1091	0.115	0.319	0	1
Age	1095	36.14	14.46	18	72
Female	1100	0.611	0.488	0	1
Evangelical Protestant	1090	0.0853	0.279	0	1
Catholic	1052	0.193	0.395	0	1
Secular	1052	0.359	0.480	0	1
Religious Attendance	1101	2.766	1.525	1	6
Religious Beliefs	1026	1.981	0.700	1	3
Pol. Knowledge	1113	3.361	1.016	1	5

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